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ABSTRACT 
 
Dá!a Pejchar Mortensen: The History of Gyalthang Under Chinese Rule:  
Memory, Identity, and Contested Control in a Tibetan Region of Northwest Yunnan 
(Under the direction of Michael Tsin) 
 
This dissertation analyzes how the Chinese Communist Party attempted to politically, 
economically, and culturally integrate Gyalthang (Zhongdian/Shangri-la), a predominately 
ethnically Tibetan county in Yunnan Province, into the People’s Republic of China. Drawing 
from county and prefectural gazetteers, unpublished Party histories of the area, and interviews 
conducted with Gyalthang residents, this study argues that Tibetans participated in Communist 
Party campaigns in Gyalthang in the 1950s and 1960s for a variety of ideological, social, and 
personal reasons. The ways that Tibetans responded to revolutionary activists’ calls for political 
action shed light on the difficult decisions they made under particularly complex and coercive 
conditions. Political calculations, revolutionary ideology, youthful enthusiasm, fear, and mob 
mentality all played roles in motivating Tibetan participants in Mao-era campaigns. The diversity 
of these Tibetan experiences and the extent of local involvement in state-sponsored attacks on 
religious leaders and institutions in Gyalthang during the Cultural Revolution have been largely 
left out of the historiographical record. This dissertation claims that, over the past two decades, 
the Chinese Communist Party’s attempts to control historical memory, the government’s 
promotion of ethnic tourism in Gyalthang, and elderly Tibetans’ reluctance to discuss their 
involvement in past atrocities have contributed to the effacement of these diverse Cultural 
Revolution narratives.
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INTRODUCTION 
 
From 1966 until 1976, Gyalthang, a predominately ethnically Tibetan area of northwest 
Yunnan Province, was caught up in the politics of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.1 
While recognizing the extent to which coercion was a reality under Chinese Communist rule, this 
dissertation contends that Gyalthang Tibetans were both victims and perpetrators of the 
widespread violence and destruction that took place during the Cultural Revolution. Tibetan, 
Naxi, and Han residents of Gyalthang burned Buddhist texts, destroyed religious relics, 
demolished monasteries and temples, and verbally and physically attacked local leaders during 
the Cultural Revolution. The destruction of Tibetan cultural objects, historical archives, and 
religious institutions was systematic and widespread.  
Given that by the mid-1960s, Gyalthang residents had already been living for a decade 
under the strains of a radically altered political, ideological and social system, in what ways did 
Tibetan cadres and farmers react to the sometimes empowering, sometimes terrifying 
implications of the Cultural Revolution? What were the political, social, and economic reasons 
why Tibetans in Gyalthang actively participated in a revolution that, at least at the local level, 
directly targeted Tibetan religion and culture? To what extent were Tibetans’ identities during 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Gyalthang (rGyal thang) is located in the easternmost foothills of the Himalaya Moutains in the northwest corner 
of present-day Yunnan Province in southern Kham. From 1725 until 2001, this area was referred to as Zhongdian 中
甸 in Chinese, but in 2001 Zhongdian County was renamed Shangri-la County (Xianggelila xian 香格里拉县). 
Gyalthang is a remarkably ethnically and linguistically diverse area, home to sizable populations of Tibetan, Naxi, 
Han, Bai, Yi, Hui, and eleven other ethnic groups that have been officially recognized by the government of the 
People’s Republic of China, as well as many other ethnically distinct populations that remain unrecognized by the 
state.  
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the Cultural Revolution shaped more by their diverse political and ideological orientations than 
by their subject positions as members of a marginalized ethnic minority group? Why, in the post-
Cultural Revolution era, have local histories of violence in Gyalthang been effaced from the 
public record while lingering on in public memory? To what extent has the recent promotion of 
tourism in Gyalthang played a role in silencing discomforting historical narratives? In addressing 
these questions, this study attempts to move beyond a simple narrative of Tibetan victimization, 
which has often occluded Tibetan Studies scholars’ understandings of the recent past. 
Located at the foothills of the Himalayan Mountains at around 3,300 meters above sea 
level, the area commonly referred to as Gyalthang by local Tibetan residents roughly 
corresponds to the contemporary political boundaries of Shangri-la County (Xianggelila xian 香
格里拉县) within the Diqing Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (Diqing zangzu zizhizhou 迪庆藏
族自治州) in Yunnan Province. The Salween (nujiang 怒江), Mekong (lancangjiang 澜沧江), 
and Yangtze (changjiang 长江; locally Ch.: jinshajiang 金沙江) rivers all descend within 
seventy-five kilometers of one another through Gyalthang’s Hengduan Mountains and conifer 
forests, en route to the lower climes of eastern China and Southeast Asia. The topographic 
variation in this area is remarkable. Elevations can change 4,000 meters within a span of ten 
kilometers. Subtropical ecosystems exist along canyon bottoms, whereas a few hours’ hike uphill 
brings one to temperate, boreal, and arctic-alpine life zones. Along the banks of these rivers and 
in the nearby mountain valleys grow more than ten thousand different plant species, making this 
region one of the most biodiverse in the world. 
Gyalthang historians disagree on the exact date when the name Gyalthang was originally 
used to officially designate this area of Northwest Yunnan Province. Gyalthang (alternatively 
spelled rGyal thang) is composed of the individual Tibetan words rGyal, meaning “royal,” and 
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thang, meaning “plain.” According to one story, which is widely shared by a number of Tibetan 
scholars living in Gyalthang, the name “royal plain” commemorates the seventh-century battles 
that were fought between the armies of the Tibetan king Songtsan Gampo, the kingdom of Dali, 
and the rulers of ’Jang (Sathang), a predominately ethnically Naxi area now known as Lijiang 丽
江. There are written records dating back as early as the fifteenth century that indicate that the 
Chinese name, Zhongdian 中甸, meaning “middle pasture” or “central field,” was used by 
Chinese government officials in written documents.2  
Historically, Gyalthang has been bordered to the southwest by the primarily Lisu, 
Tibetan, Naxi, and Han people living within what is now the Weixi Lisu Autonomous County 
(Weixi Lisuzu zizhi xian 维西傈僳族自治县), and bordered to the northwest by Dechen County 
(Deqin xian 德钦县) within the Diqing Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (Diqing Zangzu zizhi 
zhou 迪庆藏族自治州). The country of Myanmar and the Tibetan Autonomous Region lie not 
far to the west and northwest, respectively. Just beyond the Daxueshan 大雪山 mountain range 
(locally: jiarongya) and the valley system of Termarong (Dongwang 东旺) township, lies the 
Tibetan area of Ganzi County in Sichuan Province, which marks the northern boundary of 
Gyalthang. Muli Tibetan Autonomous County (Muli Zangzu zizhi xian 木里藏族自治县) in 
Sichuan Province marks the eastern border of Gyalthang, and the primarily ethnically-Naxi 
Lijiang Prefectural-level City lies to the south.3 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 Åshild Kolås, Tourism and Tibetan Culture in Transition: A Place Called Shangrila (New York: Routledge, 2008), 
4-5. 
 
3 Historically, Gyalthang did not include areas west of the Nyishar (Nixi 尼西) valley. Thus, Benzilan 奔子栏 and 
Dechen (Deqin 德钦) fell outside of Gyalthang, as did any areas west and southwest of Tacheng. Balagezong 巴拉
格宗, just to the west of Kaytshag (Geza 格咱) township was not part of Gyalthang, although the village of Nagara 
!
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Diqing Tibetan Autonomus Prefecture covers an area of 9,189 square miles, making it 
roughly equal to the size of New Hampshire, and it is one of sixteen prefectures located in 
Yunnan Province. Diqing faces Sichuan Province to the northeast, the Tibetan Autonomous 
Region to the northwest, the Lijiang Prefecture-level City to the southeast, and the Nujiang Lisu 
Autonomous Prefecture to the southwest. When it was established in 1957, Diqing was 
designated a “Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture.” Although Tibetans still are the largest ethnic 
group in Diqing, currently they make up only around thirty percent of a total registered 
prefectural population of 353,500 people.4 The remaining population is mostly Han, Lisu, Naxi, 
Bai, and Yi. Additional ethnic groups, such as the Hui, Pumi, Miao, Nu, and Dulong, each make 
up less than one percent of the total registered prefectural population.5  
Gyalthang covers an area of 4,484 square miles and is a remarkably ethnically- and 
linguistically-diverse area, home to seventeen different officially recognized ethnic groups. In 
1964, Tibetans comprised forty-one percent of the 66,532 people living in Gyalthang, or the 
region that the Chinese government defined as Zhongdian County. The remaining population of 
Zhongdian County was twenty-five percent Han, seventeen percent Naxi, and seventeen percent 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
(Tib: nags rked rag) was. Gyalthang likely extended to the southwest to Sanba 三坝 township and Baishuitai 白水
台 spring, and perhaps to Haba 哈巴, and to the south as far as the land across the river from Shigu town 石鼓镇, as 
is evidenced by the territorial demarcation inscribed on the town’s famous stone drum from which the town gets its 
moniker. For more on Gyalthang’s early history, see Peter Schwieger, “On the Jurisdiction in South-East-Tibet after 
the Rise of the Gandan Phodrang Government,” in Jeannine Bischoff, & Saul Mullard, eds., Social Regulation: Case 
Studies from Tibetan History (Leiden: Brill, forthcoming). 
 
4 According to the Chinese government census of 2010, Tibetans made up 32.36%, Lisu 26.72%, Han 18.34%, Naxi 
11.6%, and Yi 4.16% of the population of Diqing Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture. See China Statistical Bureau 
(2013), accessed March 31, 2016: http://www.tjcn.org. Cited in Emily Yeh and Chris Coggins, eds., Mapping 
Shangri-la: Contested Landscapes in the Sino-Tibetan Borderlands (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2014), 
8. 
 
5 Kolås, Tourism and Tibetan Culture in Transition, 2. 
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other ethnic minority groups such as Lisu, Yi, Bai, Miao, Hui, Pumi, and Zhuang.6 In the 1960s, 
the Han Chinese population was concentrated largely in the county and prefecture capital, 
Zhongxin Town (Zhongxin zhen 中心镇), whereas the surrounding rural areas were almost 
exclusively inhabited by Tibetans.7 
Four decades later, in 2001, Zhongdian County had a registered Tibetan population of 
thirty-eight percent. Han Chinese made up the next largest ethnic group in the county, 
comprising twenty-eight percent, while ethnic groups other than the Tibetans and Han – mostly 
Naxi, Lisu, Nosuo Yi, Bai, Miao, Hui, Pumi, and Zhuang – made up the remaining thirty-four 
percent of the population.8 Just like it was in the 1960s, the ethnic Han population today is 
predominately concentrated in the towns, and particularly in the current capital of Diqing 
Prefecture, Zhongxin Town, which has since been renamed Jiantang Town (Jiantang zhen 建塘
镇).9 While the residents of Jiantang Town are predominately recent Han Chinese immigrants, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 [ZXZ]: Zhongdian xianzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui 中甸县志编纂委员会 [Zhongdian County Gazetteer Compilation 
Committee], ed., Zhongdian xian zhi 中甸县志 [Zhongdian County Gazetteer] (Kunming: Yunnan minzu chubanshe, 
1997), 132. 
 
7 According to the census conducted by the Zhongdian County government in 1964, the population of Zhongxin 
Town was composed of 48% Han, 27% Tibetan, 16% Naxi, and 9% Bai, Lisu, Hui, and other minorities. On the 
other hand, the population of Dazhongdian 大中甸, a rural township located just north of Zhongxin Town, was 73% 
Tibetan, and only 17.7% Han and 5.8% Naxi in 1964. See [XXJZZZ]: Zhonggong Jiantang zhen weiyuanhui, 
Jiantang zhen renmin zhengfu 中共建塘镇委员会、建塘镇人民政府 [The Central Committee of Jiantang Town 
and The Jiantang People’s Government], ed., Xianggelila xian jiantang zhen zhen zhi (neishen, songshen, zhengqiu 
yijian gao) 香格里拉县建塘镇镇志（内审、送审、征求意见稿) [The Gazetteer of Jiantang Town in Xianggelila 
County (Unpublished internally-circulated draft)], July 17, 2009, 113. 
 
8 Diqing Nianjian Bianjibu 迪庆年鉴编辑部 [Diqing Yearbook Editorian Department], ed., Diqing Nianjian 2002 
迪庆年鉴 2002 [Diqing Yearbook 2002] (Kunming: Yunnan daxue chubanshe, 2002), 44. 
 
9 Jiantang Zhen 建塘镇 is now the official name of the capital of Shangri-la County, and official Chinese 
publications and maps use this name when referring to this town. Jiantang is the Chinese transliteration of the 
original Tibetan name for the town, Gyalthang. However, the majority of local people still refer to the town by its 
old name of Zhongdian 中甸, or its new name of Xianggelila 香格里拉 when speaking Chinese. The older section 
of Xianggelila is officially called Dukezong Gucheng 独克宗古城 in Chinese publications, while local people 
!
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the villagers living in the surrounding countryside, on the other hand, are almost all Tibetan.10 
Over the past two decades, Jiantang has exploded into a bourgeoning small city, stretching across 
the entirety of the valley between the central village of Dukezong and the historically important 
Geluk monastery Ganden Sumtsenling.11 Tibetan residents of Gyalthang are ostensibly 
predominately Gelukpa Buddhist, although the ravaging of institutional religion over the past 
half-century has left the entire region with a precarious sense of its own Buddhist vitality, and 
there has been a correlative reification of local (arguably non-orthodox Buddhist or pre-
Buddhist) religious practices. 
 Gyalthang is a region that many people—Chinese citizens living in other parts of China, 
Tibetan scholars living both in and outside of Tibet, and even local Gyalthang residents—have 
viewed as marginal in many respects. Gyalthang is often considered to be marginal to China 
because it is sparsely populated and most of its inhabitants are ethnic Tibetans. Indeed, due to its 
rather remote location in the far northwest of Yunnan Province and its historical lack of easily 
navigable roads linking it to the rest of the country, many of the political campaigns that were 
implemented quickly in other parts of China took a few weeks, months, or even years to be 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
continue to refer to it as Zhongdian Old Town (Zhongdian gucheng 中甸古城) in Chinese. The New Town of 
Xianggelila is officially called Jiantang New Town (Jiantang xincheng 建塘新城), however, most locals still refer 
to it as Zhongdian New Town (Zhongdian xincheng 中甸新城) when speaking Chinese. For the sake of clarity, I 
will refer to the Shangri-la County region as “Gyalthang,” to the capital of Xianggelila County as “Shangri-la,” to 
the old section of the town as the “Gyalthang Old Town,” and to the new section of the town as the “Gyalthang New 
Town.” 
 
10 For example, in 1997, ninety-nine percent of the population of the rural township of Da Zhongdian 大中甸乡 was 
Tibetan. Although this figure has most likely decreased in the twenty-first century, the overwhelming majority of 
Han Chinese that have moved into Shangri-la County over the past decade have settled in and around Jiantang Town 
rather than in the rural villages surrounding the town. See ZXZ, 57. 
 
11 Ganden Sumtsenling (Gadan Songzanlinsi 噶丹"松赞林寺) is a Gelugpa monastery that was founded in 
Gyalthang in 1679. The Qing dynasty’s Yongzheng Emperor renamed this monastery Guihuasi 归化寺 in 1724, but 
it continued to be referred to as Songzanlinsi 松赞林寺 in many Chinese documents written in the Qing, Republican, 
and Communist periods. DZZZZ, 20; YSDZZZXDZ, 78. 
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implemented in Gyalthang. The region is also sometimes viewed as marginal to Tibet because 
most Tibetans living in Gyalthang, known as Gyalthangpa, understand themselves to be 
Khampas, residents of the southernmost reaches of the historically eastern Tibetan province of 
Kham, which was historically outside of the area previously administered by the Dalai Lama’s 
government in Lhasa. And, finally, it is often viewed as marginal to Kham because Tibetan 
inhabitants of Gyalthang speak several local Tibetic languages, which are only distantly related 
to other Kham dialects of Tibetan.12 Gyalthang is regularly omitted from maps of Tibet. But 
despite its triple marginality, Gyalthang in recent decades has come firmly within the orbit of the 
ethnic tourism that has become a favorite pastime of the Chinese urban middle class.  
In the late 1990s, the Chinese Communist Party initiated a national campaign to “Open 
up the Western Regions” (xibu da kaifa 西部大开发), and the central government singled out 
tourism as an important development strategy for southwest China. Spotting a promising new 
source of revenue for a government that was heavily dependent on state subsidies, the Yunnan 
Provincial Government reacted quickly and made substantial investments in the necessary 
infrastructure to promote tourism in Gyalthang over the next few years. Gyalthang was identified 
as a particularly promising area for tourism development, due to its scenic beauty, diverse ethnic 
minority population, and its relatively low prospects for successfully following a more 
conventional industrial development path. 
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12 Hiroyuki Suzuki, “Overview of the Dialects Spoken in rGyal thang from the Historical Perspective.” Conference 
paper presented at the International Association for Tibetan Studies Conference in Ulaan Baatar, Mongolia, on July 
26, 2013; Ellen Bartee, “A Grammar of Dongwang Tibetan” (Ph.D. dissertation: University of California Santa 
Barbara, 2007), 93; Krisadawan Hongladarom, “rGyalthang Tibetan of Yunnan: A Preliminary Report,” Linguistics 
of the Tibeto-Burman Area 19 (2) 1996: 69-92. 
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On December 17, 2001, after holding a meeting in which some forty-eight academics 
concluded that the mythical town of Shangrila featured in James Hilton’s 1933 novel, Lost 
Horizon,13 was indeed located in Gyalthang, the Chinese central government decreed that this 
county would henceforth be renamed Xianggelila 香格里拉, or Shangri-la in English.14 
Although Hilton never set foot in China, he implied that the inspiration for “Shangri-la,” a 
mythical land of peace and harmony, came from the Austrian-American botonist Joseph Rock's 
many National Geographic articles about southwest China, which were published in the 1920s.15 
After the Yunnan provincial government marshaled Chinese academics to support their claim 
that Gyalthang was indeed Shangri-la, the decision to change the county name was officially 
approved by China’s top leaders in 2002. Local elites jumped to take advantage of the tourism 
boom, not only for its enormous monetary benefits, but also in order to encourage local pride in 
the area’s culture and history.16 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 James Hilton, Lost Horizon (London: Macmillan, 1933). 
 
14 Ben Hillman, “Paradise under Construction: Minorities, Myths and Modernity in Northwest Yunnan,” Asian 
Ethnicity 4 (2) 2003: 175-188. 
 
15 Joseph Rock, “Banishing the Devil of Disease Among the Nashi: Weird Ceremonies Performed by an Aboriginal 
Tribe in the Heart of Yunnan Province,” National Geographic (1924) 46: 473-499; Joseph Rock, “Land of the 
Yellow Lama: National Geographic Society Explorer Visits the Strange Kingdom of Muli, Beyond the Likiang 
Snow Range of Yunnan, China,” National Geographic (1924) 47: 447-491; Joseph Rock, “Experiences of a Lone 
Geographer: An American Agricultural Explorer Makes His Way through Brigand-Infested Central China En Route 
to the Amne Machin Range, Tibet,” National Geographic (1925) 48: 331-347; Joseph Rock, “Through the Great 
River Trenches of Asia: National Geographic Society Explorer Follows the Yangtze, Mekong, and Salwin Through 
Mighty Gorges,” National Geographic (1926) 50: 133-186. 
 
16 As Tenzin Jinba notes, a similar phenomenon has occurred in Danba County, located in Garze Tibetan 
Autonomous Prefecture (Ganzi Zangzu Zizhizhou 甘孜藏族自治州) in Sichuan Province. Tenzin Jinba, In the Land 
of the Eastern Queendom: The Politics of Gender and Ethnicity on the Sino-Tibetan Border (Seattle: University of 
Washington Press, 2014), x. 
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The myth of Shangri-la was endorsed by the Chinese national government and 
aggressively marketed by local government officials, tourist agencies, and cultural brokers.17 A 
new image of a harmonious Tibet was embraced by the Shangri-la County government, as well 
as by officials at the provincial and national levels. Over the past decade, Chinese vacationers 
have poured into the area, hoping to experience Hilton’s magical paradise first-hand. Since 2002, 
many local Tibetans have continued to call their county by its Tibetan name (Gyalthang), or, 
when speaking Chinese, by its former Chinese name (Zhongdian). However, Chinese tourists 
and government officials alike now refer to the county exclusively by its new name. Many 
Tibetans working in the tourism industry have also started referring to the county as Shangri-la, 
either to capitalize off of the romantic image that this name evokes, or simply because they have 
grown accustomed to the name change.  
 
Cultural Revolution Historiography 
In recent years, there has been something of a “Cultural Revolution fever” in the West as 
an increasing number of historians, political scientists, and literary critics have turned their 
attention to this topic.18 However, most of the scholarship that has been written about this period 
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17 For more on how this fictitious name, invented for the sake of tourists, reflects the state’s approach to developing 
ethnic minority regions, see Kolås, Tourism and Tibetan Culture in Transition; Hillman, “Paradise under 
Construction;” Sonja Laukkanen, “Being Tibetan in Shangri-la,” Dáln! V!chod [Far East] 4: 1 (2014): 61-73.  
 
18 Song Yongyi, the editor of the digital Chinese Cultural Revolution Database and one of the co-editors of the most 
comprehensive multi-language bibliography on the Cultural Revolution, claims that more than 7,000 works about 
the Cultural Revolution were published outside of China in various languages in the twentieth century alone. He 
notes a particular paradox in the historiography of the Cultural Revolution, maintaining that it is possible to track the 
phenomenon of the “inexhaustible Cultural Revolution” as it exists outside of mainland China even as one deals 
with the phenomenon of the “forbidden Cultural Revolution” inside China’s borders. This issue has also been 
referred to as “the Cultural Revolution occurred in China but the Cultural Revolution has been studied abroad” 
(wenge zai zhongguo, wengexue zai guowai 文革在中国，文革学在国外). While scholarly works on the Cultural 
Revolution have proliferated outside of China, the Cultural Revolution as an overtly historical research subject 
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of history is relatively limited in terms of its geographic scope, focusing on the political 
upheavals that took place either within the inner circles of the Communist Party or in large cities 
predominately populated by Han Chinese.19 
 Three distinct waves of research on the Cultural Revolution have emerged in the West 
over the past four decades. The earliest English-language scholarship on the Cultural Revolution 
sought to make sense of this mass movement as it was taking place, relying almost entirely on 
documents available outside of China. One of the first scholars of the Cultural Revolution was 
Stuart Schram, who analyzed nineteenth-century Chinese debates over the proper relationship 
between “Chinese essence” and “Western learning” in his quest for the origins of Mao’s 
motivation in launching this revolution.20 Roderick MacFarquhar, a British scholar known for his 
analysis of the power dynamics that took place within the Communist Party in the 1950s and 
1960s, also traced the factors that gave rise to the Cultural Revolution in a trilogy, The Origins of 
the Cultural Revolution, which was published over the span of three decades. MacFarquhar’s 
first volume (1974) focused on the 1957 Anti-Rightist Campaign, his second volume (1983) 
covered the Great Leap Forward, and his final volume (1997) detailed the events that took place 
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remains politically taboo within mainland China. Song Yongyi, “Editor’s Preface,” in Chinese Cultural Revolution 
Database, ed. Song Yongyi (2006), accessed December 1, 2010: http://ccrd.usc.cuhk.edu.hk; Yongyi Song, Dajin 
Sun, and Eugene Wu, eds. The Chinese Cultural Revolution: A Bibliography, 1966-1996 (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1998).  
 
19 Studies that analyze how the Cultural Revolution played out within the circle of elite Communist Party leaders, or 
within major urban centers in the central and eastern areas of the country, include Roderick MacFarquhar and John 
King Fairbank, eds. Revolutions within the Chinese Revolution, 1966-1982 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1991); Michael Schoenhals, China’s Cultural Revolution,1966-1969: Not a Dinner Party (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 
1996); and Elizabeth Perry and Xun Li, Proletarian Power: Shanghai in the Cultural Revolution (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1997). 
 
20 Stuart Schram, ed. Authority, Participation and Cultural Change in China (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1973). 
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during the final dramatic years before the Cultural Revolution.21 Yet, glimpses of the world 
beyond the Communist Party leadership are rare in these monographs. Schram’s and 
MacFarquhar’s work includes very little information about how the political campaigns that 
preceded the Cultural Revolution affected ordinary Chinese citizens.  
 In the mid-1970s, as the Cultural Revolution was nearing its end, a new generation of 
graduate students interviewed Chinese refugees in Hong Kong about their experiences in China 
over the past decade. This body of work, which is sometimes termed the “second wave” of 
Cultural Revolution scholarship, generally adopted a grass roots approach.22 These scholars were 
less concerned with Mao’s motivations and more focused on the conflicts that took place 
between those who sought to preserve the status quo and those who attempted to use the 
movement to rebel against perceived social and economic inequalities in China. 
 While the second wave of scholarship relied heavily on refugee interviewing and 
emphasized societal divisions, a third wave of scholarship focused once again on elite politics, 
with participants at the grass roots serving primarily as agents reacting to initiatives introduced 
by Communist Party leaders. This elite-centered approach reflected the new availability of 
memoirs written by Party leaders and scholars’ recently acquired ability to conduct interviews 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 
21 Roderick MacFarquhar, The Origins of the Cultural Revolution, 3 volumes total (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1974-1997). 
 
22 This “second wave” of scholarship tended to reveal the underlying divisions in Chinese society, which until then 
had been obscured by the tight control of information dispensed by the Chinese Communist Party’s propaganda 
apparatus. See Hong Yung Lee, The Politics of the Chinese Cultural Revolution: A Case Study (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1978); Susan Shirk, Competitive Comrades: Career Incentives and Student Strategies 
in China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982); Jonathan Unger, Education Under Mao: Class and 
Competition in Canton Schools, 1960-1980 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982); Stanley Rosen, Red 
Guard Factionalism and the Cultural Revolution in Guangzhou (Boulder: Westview Press, 1982); Anita Chan, 
Children of Mao: Personality Development and Political Activism in the Red Guard Generation (Seattle: University 
of Washington Press, 1985). 
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with the personal secretaries of Cultural Revolution leaders.23 This third wave of scholarship, 
much like MacFarquhar’s and Schram’s earlier work, included relatively little analysis of grass 
roots dynamics or state-society relations during the Cultural Revolution. 
In the immediate aftermath of the Cultural Revolution, scholarship published in the West 
suggested that the Cultural Revolution was mostly an urban phenomenon, targeting Chinese 
intellectuals and Party cadres in cities and leaving the countryside largely unscathed. Yet, 
evidence of extensive political activity in rural areas accumulated quickly after Mao’s death, and 
within a few short years it became clear that the Cultural Revolution was much more widespread 
than was originally understood. Some of the most startling revelations disclosed in the county 
gazetteers (xianzhi 县志) that were published in the post-Mao era involved violent incidents that 
took place in rural townships located far from major cities.24 It is now clear that the initial lack of 
scholarship on the Cultural Revolution in the countryside was far more reflective of urban 
scholars’ isolation from remote rural events than it was of rural isolation from national politics. 
 Although a wave of recently-published scholarship has begun to rectify some of the 
urban biases in Cultural Revolution historiography,25 one of the most significant remaining holes 
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23 Roderick MacFarquhar’s and Michael Schoenhals’ recently completed massive study of the Cultural Revolution is 
a prime example of this “third wave” of scholarship; see Roderick MacFarquhar and Michael Schoenhals, Mao’s 
Last Revolution (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006). 
 
24 Su Yang, Collective Killings in Rural China During the Cultural Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2011). 
 
25 Jeremy Brown and Matthew Johnson, eds., Maoism at the Grassroots: Everyday Life in China’s Era of High 
Socialism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2015); Anita Chan, Stanley Rosen, and Jonathan Unger, eds., 
Chen Village under Mao and Deng (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992); Edward Friedman, Paul 
Pickowicz, and Mark Selden, eds. Revolution, Resistance, and Reform in Village China (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2005); Jiangsui He, “The Death of a Landlord: Moral Predicament in Rural China, 1968-1969,” in 
Joseph Esherick, Paul Pickowicz, and Andrew Walder, eds. China’s Cultural Revolution as History (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2006): 124-152; Paul Pickowicz, “Rural Protest Letters: Local Perspectives on the State’s 
Revolutionary War on Tillers, 1960-1990,” in Ching Kwan Lee and Guobin Yang, eds. Re-envisioning the Chinese 
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in the historical scholarship is our understanding of the degree to which the fervor and the ideals 
of the Cultural Revolution infected China’s ethnically diverse southwest frontier.26 With few 
exceptions, the English-language scholarship that has been published in the post-Mao era 
assumes that the violence, cultural destruction, and social upheaval that occurred during the 
Cultural Revolution was carried out by ethnically-Han Chinese youth groups.27 These 
revolutionary youth groups, known as the Red Guards (hong weibing 红卫兵), allegedly traveled 
from Beijing, Wuhan, Chengdu, and other predominately Han Chinese urban centers to spread 
the ideological fervor of the Cultural Revolution into ethnically diverse areas of southwest 
China. Although Chinese Red Guards were very influential in certain Tibetan areas during the 
Cultural Revolution, in the case of Gyalthang, the Red Guards were composed entirely of local 
middle school students. To this day, very little has been written about the extent to which 
members of specific ethnic minority groups participated in the destruction of their own cultural 
and religious institutions and targeted their own neighbors during this period.28 
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Revolution: The Politics and Poetics of Collective Memories in Reform China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2007): 21-49. 
 
26 The limited scholarship that has been published on the Cultural Revolution in China’s ethnically diverse 
borderland areas includes June Dreyer, “China’s Minority Nationalities in the Cultural Revolution,” The China 
Quarterly 96 (1968): 96-109; Victor Falkenheim, “The Cultural Revolution in Kwangsi, Yunnan and Fukien,” Asian 
Survey 9 (1969): 580-597; Michael Schoenhals, “Cultural Revolution on the Border: Yunnan’s ‘Political Frontier 
Defence’ (1969-1971),” The Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies 19 (2004): 27-54; Charlene Makley, The 
Violence of Liberation: Gender and Tibetan Buddhist Revival in Post-Mao China (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2007); Mueggler, The Age of Wild Ghosts; Xian Wang, “Islamic Religiosity, Revolution, and State 
Violence in Southwest China: The 1975 Shadian Massacre” (MA thesis: University of British Columbia, 2013). 
 
27 For example, Peter Hopkirk titles the only chapter in his book dedicated to Tibet under Chinese rule, “Red Guards 
in Lhasa.” See Peter Hopkirk, Trespassers on the Roof of the World: The Race for Lhasa (London: John Murray, 
1982), 248. 
 
28 A few studies that analyze ethnic minority participation in the Cultural Revolution, rather than solely focusing on 
the activities carried out by a purportedly ethnically Han Red Guard, include Erik Mueggler, The Age of Wild 
Ghosts: Memory, Violence, and Place in Southwest China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001); Melvyn 
Goldstein, Ben Jiao, and Tanzen Lhundrup, On the Cultural Revolution in Tibet: The Nyemo Incident of 1969 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009); Benno Weiner, “When the Sky Fell to Earth: The Great Proletariat 
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Official Chinese Narratives of the Cultural Revolution 
 In the few studies published within mainland China that cover the history of northwest 
Yunnan Province after 1949, Chinese and Tibetan historians have downplayed the extent of 
Tibetan involvement in the Cultural Revolution by not mentioning any identifying information 
about the Red Guards, Party work team members, and local militia members perpetrating the 
violence.29 Unlike in some accounts of Han regions, the events of the Cultural Revolution are 
most often skipped in official chronologies (dashi ji 大事记) for Tibetan regions. Indeed, many 
government-sanctioned histories, surveys (gaikuang 概况), and collected “literary and historical 
materials” (wenshi ziliao 文史资料) published in Gyalthang omit mentioning the Cultural 
Revolution entirely.30 
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Cultural Revolution in the Tibet Autonomous Region, 1966-1971” (M.A. thesis: Columbia University, 2002); David 
Sneath, “The Impact of the Cultural Revolution in China on the Mongolians of Inner Mongolia,” Modern Asian 
Studies 28: 2 (1994): 409-430; Sandrine Catris, “The Cultural Revolution from the Edge: Violence and  
Revolutionary Spirit in Xinjiang, 1966-1976” (Ph.D. dissertation: Indiana University, 2015). 
 
29 Scholarship that covers northwest Yunnan Province in the post-1949 era includes Guo Jiaji 郭家骥, ed., Yunnan 
minzu guanxi diaocha yanjiu 云南民族关系调查研究 [Survey of Relations between the Yunnan Nationalities] 
(Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 2010); Ma Yao 马曜, ed., Yunnan jianshi 云南简史 [A Short History 
of Yunnan] (Kunming: Yunnan renmin chubanshe, 2010); Wang Xi’en 王希恩, “Xin Zhongguo 50 nian Zhongguo 
minzu guocheng jianlun 新中国50年中国民族过程简论 [A Brief Theory of 50 Years of China’s Nationalities],” in 
Wang Xi’en 王希恩, ed., Minzu guocheng yu Zhongguo minzu bianqian yanjiu 民族过程与中国民族变迁研究 
[The Process of Nationalities and Research on the Transformations in China’s Nationalities] (Beijing: Minzu 
chubanshe, 2011): 190-204; “Yunnan zangzu diqu de ‘wenhua da geming’ yundong 云南藏族地区的‘文化大革命’
运动 [‘The Great Cultural Revolution’ in Tibetan Areas of Yunnan],” in Dangdai Yunnan zangzu jianshi 当代云南
藏族简史 [A Short Contemporary History of Tibetans in Yunnan] (Kunming: Yunnan renmin chubanshe, 2009): 88-
107; Sulang Jiachu 苏朗甲楚, Sulang Jiachu zangxue wenji 苏朗甲楚藏学文集 [Collection of Sulang Jiachu’s 
Tibetan Studies Scholarship] (Kunming: Yunnan minzu chubanshe, 2007); Pei Pei 培培, “Yipian danxin yingchun 
lai: ji quanguo zangzu nüminbing yingxiong Jiangchu Zhuma 一片丹心迎春来: 记全国藏族女民兵英雄江初竹玛 
[One Loyal Heart on New Year’s Eve: Remembering the Nation’s Tibetan Heroine Jiangchu Zhuma],” Xianggelila
香格里拉 [Shangri-la] 1 (2007): 26-31. 
 
30 Diqing zhou gaikuang bianxie zu 迪庆州概况编写组 [Editing Division of the Survey of Diqing Prefecture], ed. 
Diqing Zangzu Zizhizhou gaikuang 迪庆藏族自治州概况 [Survey of the Diqing Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture] 
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 When the Cultural Revolution is mentioned it is strictly limited to an agentless “ten years 
of chaos” (shinian dongluan 十年动乱) between 1966 and 1976, when so-called “leftist errors” 
were made.31 The Gyalthang gazetteers and historical accounts that do include information about 
the Cultural Revolution concede that destructive acts were carried out in the region, but they 
avoid mentioning who it was that carried out these acts. For instance, Le’an Wangdui 勒安旺堆, 
a former Tibetan Red Guard and recently-retired government official of Zhongdian County, 
described Zhongdian as a “major disaster area” (zhong zai qu 重灾区) during the Cultural 
Revolution, but omitted naming the agents who carried out the destruction.32 Similarly, the 
Zhongdian County Gazetteer and the Diqing Prefecture Gazetteer reveal a certain amount of 
local participation in the Cultural Revolution, but do not elaborate on the type or the extent of 
involvement by particular individuals or groups.33 The editors of the Zhongdian County 
Gazetteer only devote five pages of their nearly 1,000-page volume to Cultural Revolution 
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(Kunming: Yunnan minzu chubanshe, 1986); Diqing zhou gaikuang bianxie zu 迪庆州概况编写组 [Editing 
Division of the Survey of Diqing Prefecture], Diqing Zangzu Zizhizhou gaikuang 迪庆藏族自治州概况 [Survey of 
the Diqing Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture] (Beijing: Minzu chubanshe, 2007); Li Shengchun李盛春, ed. Zhongxin 
zhen hongwei xiaoxue liushi zhou nian xiaoqing jinance (1936-1996) 中心镇红卫小学六十周年校庆纪念册 
(1936-1996) [The Sixty Year Anniversary Yearbook of Zhongxin Town’s Red Guard Elementary School (1936-1996)] 
(Zhongdian, Yunnan: Communist Party Internal Documents Press, 1996). 
 
31 Zhongguo renmin zhengzhi xieshang huiyi, Yunnan sheng Zhongdian xian weiyuanhui wenshi ziliao weiyuanhui 
中国人民政治协商会议云南省中甸县委员会文史资料委员会 [Chinese People’s Political Consultative 
Committee, Yunnan Province Zhongdian County Committee, Literary and Historical Materials Committee], ed., 
Zhongdian wenshi ziliao xuanji 中甸文史资料选集 [An Anthology of Zhongdian Literary and Historical Materials] 
(1992); Duan Zhicheng 段志城, Zhongdian yi zhong zhi (1956-1995) 中甸一中志, (1956-1995) [Zhongdian 
Number One Middle School Gazetteer (1956-1995)] (Zhongdian: Yunnan sheng ren da ban gongting yinshua chang, 
1996). 
 
32 Le’an Wangdui 勒安旺堆, Dangdai Yunnan zangzu jianshi 当代云南藏族简史 [A Short Recent History of 
Tibetans in Yunnan] (Kunming: Yunnan renmin chubanshe, 2009), 95. 
 
33 [DZZZ]: Diqing zhouzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui迪庆州志编纂委员会 [Diqing Prefecture Gazetteer Compilation 
Committee], Diqing zangzu zizhizhouzhi迪庆藏族自治州志 [Diqing Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Gazetteer], 2 
vols.) (Kunming: Yunnan minzu chubanshe, 2003); ZXZ. 
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history, but they nevertheless make it clear that the destruction and violence that took place 
during this decade was carried out at the hands of the local population.34  
 Local scholars leave out identifying details about local perpetrators not because they lack 
sufficient evidence to include such information, but because for political reasons it is still 
difficult to publish a comprehensive local history of the Cultural Revolution in most areas of 
China. In the early 1990s the Chinese government issued strict national regulations regarding the 
publication of material dealing with the Cultural Revolution.35 Although publishing houses in 
slightly less politically sensitive regions of China managed to duck some of these regulations, 
publishers dealing with Tibetan history have tended to adhere to these rules. 
 In 1981, the Chinese Communist Party announced an official narrative of the Cultural 
Revolution in its “Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party since the 
Founding of the People’s Republic of China,” and anything that did not adhere to this “correct” 
(zhengque 正确) version of history was henceforth made explicitly off limits for discussion.36 
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34 ZXZ, 30-35. The Chinese central government mandated that the local editorial committees responsible for 
compiling county gazetteers must refrain from describing the Party’s “mistakes” after 1949 in great detail. See 
Vivian Wagner, “Erinnerungsverwaltung: die politische Instrumentalisierung von Staatsarchiven in der VR China 
[The Administration of Memories: Political Instrumentalization of the State Archives in the PRC]” (Ph.D. 
dissertation: University of Heidelberg, 2003), 471. 
 
35 For more on the Chinese government’s policy in the reform era regarding the publication of material on the 
Cultural Revolution, see CCP Central Propaganda Department and State Press and Publications Administration, 
“Guanyu chuban ‘wenhua dageming’ tushu wenti de ruogan guiding 关于出版“文化大革命”图书问题的若干规定 
[Regulations Governing the Publication of Books about the ‘Great Cultural Revolution’],” reprinted in Zhonghua 
renmin gongheguo xianxing xinwen chuban fagui huibian (1949-1990) 中华人民共和国现行新闻出版法规汇编
（1949-1990年) [Operative Press and Publishing Laws and Regulations of the People’s Republic of China (1949-
1990)] (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1991): 231-232. 
 
36 Zhongduo gongchandang di shiyi zhou zhongyang weiyuanhui di liu ci quanti huiyi 中国共产党第十一届中央委
员会第六次全体会议 [Sixth Plenum of the Eleventh Chinese Communist Party Central Committee], “Guanyu 
jianguo yilai dang de ruogan lishi wenti de jueyi 关于建国以来党的若干历史问题的决议 [Resolution on Certain 
Questions in the History of Our Party since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China],” Renmin ribao 人民
日报 [People’s Daily], July 1, 1981.   
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Setting the guidelines for future official interpretations of the Cultural Revolution, this document 
presented the Cultural Revolution as a hysteric blip in Chinese Communist history entirely 
caused by Leftist aberration. Officially, only the disgraced Communist general Lin Biao and the 
“Gang of Four” were held responsible for the worst excesses that ensued during the disastrous 
years of the Cultural Revolution. The “Gang of Four,” a political faction composed of Jiang 
Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan, and Wang Hongwen, controlled the power organs of the 
Chinese Communist Party through the latter stages of the Cultural Revolution. Although to this 
day, it remains unclear which major decisions were made by Mao Zedong and carried out by the 
Gang of Four, and which were the result of the Gang of Four’s own planning, the Gang, together 
with the disgraced Communist general Lin Biao, were labeled the two major “counter-
revolutionary forces” of the Cultural Revolution.37 The Gang of Four was arrested on October 6, 
1976, a mere month after Mao’s death, and subsequently charged with a series of treasonous 
crimes.38   
 The subtext of the “Resolution” was that since this muddy period of Chinese history had 
been officially analyzed, the Chinese public should now move on and sweep any remaining 
historical memories under the metaphorical rug. For many Chinese young people, this is 
precisely what has happened. Chen Xiaojing, a former governor of Shanghai (1964-1967) who 
wrote a carefully hedged account of his experiences as a Communist Party leader during the 
Cultural Revolution, explains that while many young people in China today know that their 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 
37 Roderick MacFarquhar and Michael Schoenhals, Mao’s Last Revolution (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2006), 454-458. 
 
38 Alexander Cook, The Cultural Revolution on Trial: Mao and the Gang of Four (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2016). 
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country was engulfed in a period of turmoil in the 1960s, very few have any real sense of the 
extreme nature of this revolution. Chen maintains that events that were once “earth shattering 
have now turned into words with vague and sketchy meanings.”39 In the post-Mao period, 
Chinese historians were told to avoid analyzing the Cultural Revolution in their scholarship and 
to write straightforward “histories” instead.40 Overnight traumatic events in China’s recent past 
were effectively silenced at the level of the archives as well as at the level of historical analysis.41 
 The abrupt ideological U-turn that took place in China in the aftermath of the Cultural 
Revolution and the subsequent rise of the ethno-tourism industry in Yunnan Province have also 
contributed to the whitewashing of local history. A complex legacy of local/state collaboration 
and Tibetans’ reluctance to confront their own thorny pasts have led to new (a)historical 
understandings of local involvement in the Cultural Revolution. State-led development plans for 
Shangri-la County, which have relied, and continue to rely, on local Tibetan participation in the 
commodification of Tibetan religion and culture, have been rapidly implemented over the past 
ten years. Shangri-la has been showcased by the Yunnan Provincial government as a model for 
how poor, rural Tibetan counties can successfully tap into a burgeoning ethnic tourism market by 
branding and marketing their “Tibetan-ness.” In the process, Shangri-la has become a poignant 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
39 Chen Pixian [pseudonym], Chen Pixian huiyilu: zai “yi yue feng bao” de zhongxin 陈丕显回忆录: 在“一月风暴”
的中心 [Chen Pixian’s Memoir: In the Midst of the January Storm] (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 2005). 
 
40 Zheng Haiyan, “Interview with Gao Gao, the Author of A History of the Decade of China’s Cultural Revolution,” 
Jiushiniandai Yuekan 九十年代月刊 [The Nineties Monthly] 4 (1987): 67.   
 
41 Susan Weigelin-Schwiedrzik contends that in the aftermath of the publication of the “Resolution on Certain 
Questions in the History of Our Party since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China,” the field of Chinese 
history writing has split into two different genres—“official historiography” and “unofficial historiography.” Party 
historians continue to write narratives that follow the official Party line and, as such, can be considered “official 
historiography.” However, a growing alternative genre of “unofficial historiography” now consists of documentary 
literature, memoirs, eyewitness accounts, historical documentaries, oral history compilations, and history books 
written by people from outside the field of academic historiography. See Susan Weigelin-Schwiedrzik, “In Search of 
a Master Narrative for 20th-Century Chinese History,” The China Quarterly 188 (1) 2006: 1074. 
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symbol for the way in which discomforting historical narratives are cast aside in the face of 
market forces. During the course of my oral history research, elderly Tibetans spoke to me about 
the disconnect that exists between their memories of the Cultural Revolution and the ways in 
which these memories have been silenced not only by local Han, Naxi, and Tibetan scholars, but 
also by younger Tibetans’ inability to come to terms with far more complex, and far less 
romantic, representations of local history. 
 I regard “history” not as an objective story abstracted from the context of its telling, but 
rather as something that is intricately connected to the politics of memory. Memories are made 
into stories through contemporary, context-specific selections that foreground particular 
understandings of the past and repress others. My work draws on Paul Ricoeur’s work on 
memory and history, which regards historical knowledge as a particular kind of “disciplined 
memory.”42 Ricoeur maintains that history attempts to discipline memory by setting up standards 
regarding what should be remembered, how it should be remembered, and who should be given 
the privilege of doing the remembering. History is, in Ricoeur’s view, as much about forgetting 
as it is about remembering. It is often written in order to hide or deflect attention away from what 
has taken place in the past. 
 Although all scholars who study memory confront a wide range of daunting challenges, 
researching memory in contemporary China is particularly difficult due to the fact that Maoist 
social engineering during the Cultural Revolution was largely successful at framing the 
subsequent terms of “remembering” that took place. A crucial component of the Chinese 
Communist Party’s ability to sustain power in the post-Mao period has been the ongoing 
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42 Paul Ricoeur, Memory, History, Forgetting, trans. Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2004).  
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capacity of state officials to tightly control historical memory at several levels.43 At the archival 
level, such control takes the form of restricting access to historical documents. At the level of 
mass media and public education, control is exercised through censorship, political propaganda, 
and the careful writing and rewriting of history textbooks.44 Maoist social engineering, which 
was carried out through carefully orchestrated “speak bitterness” (suku 诉苦) meetings, was 
largely successful at framing the subsequent terms of remembering that took place.45 Finally, the 
enormous shift in values that has taken place in the post-Cultural Revolution era has reshaped 
Tibetan memories of the Maoist era in subtle, but still quite significant, ways.46 
 Furthermore, given that nearly every Gyalthang resident had not only friends and 
relatives who were victims, but also neighbors and family members who were perpetrators of 
violence during the Cultural Revolution, it comes as little surprise that many residents do not 
wish to remember this history, even within the safe confines of their homes. It is also not in the 
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43 Defining “official history” as the “engineering of political amnesia,” political philosopher Jiwei Ci maintains that 
in China “history is the institution for the social regulation of memory.” He contends that by controlling the means 
of regulating collective memory, the Chinese government has been able to successfully maintain its control over 
China’s history. Jiwei Ci, “The Death of Utopia: The Socio-Political Psychology of Modern China” (Unpublished 
essay presented at Stanford University, 1990), 4. 
 
44 Research on the Chinese state’s efforts to control social memory has focused predominately on the relationship 
between China’s intellectuals and the Chinese state; see Merle Goldman, Timothy Cheek, and Carol Mamrin, eds. 
China’s Intellectuals and the State: In Search of a New Relationship (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983); 
Jonathan Unger, ed., Using the Past to Serve the Present: Historiography and Politics in Contemporary China 
(Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1993). It is clear that more work is needed on local reactions to various official 
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The Violence of Liberation; Gail Hershatter, The Gender of Memory: Rural Women and China's Collective Past 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011); and Sun, Social Suffering and Political Confession. 
 
45 Sun, Social Suffering and Political Confession. 
 
46 In his 1996 ethnography, The Temple of Memories, Jun Jing explores how the politics of remembrance in post-
Mao China involve tragic memories of the Cultural Revolution that cannot be completely acknowledged, not only 
due to the state’s control over public acts of commemoration, but also due to reform-era shifts in local social, 
cultural, and political dynamics. Jing’s work also touches upon the complex dynamics of social order, shame, and 
guilt in rural China, contending that memories of past suffering are often repressed at the local level, lest they open 
old wounds and threaten the existing order of social relations; Jing, Temple of Memories, 1996. 
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economic interests of local government officials or businesspeople who are benefitting from the 
tourism industry to dwell on the fact hundreds of local residents destroyed Tibetan religious and 
cultural objects, struggled against respected elders, and looted and burned the largest Tibetan 
monastery in the region. The reform-era silencing of historical memory, therefore, is the 
unfortunate product of local, state, and corporate collaboration in Gyalthang.  
  The ways in which Cultural Revolution history has been silenced in public forums in 
Gyalthang stands in contrast to the kind of grievances that have been openly aired by Han 
Chinese living in other parts of China. One way in which young Han Chinese intellectuals were 
able to publically give voice to the suffering that they had experienced during the Cultural 
Revolution was through “Scar Literature” (shanghen wenxue 伤痕文学).47 In this genre of 
literature, members of China’s sent-down youth generation tended to describe their years in the 
countryside as one of personal deprivation and total psychological and physical fatigue. This 
literary movement was endorsed by the group of Communist Party leaders that rose to power 
after the Cultural Revolution, since it helped vent widespread resentment of the traumatic 
experiences of the past while deflecting anger away from the current regime. It presented the 
Cultural Revolution as a hysteric blip in Chinese Communist history, caused entirely by a 
supposedly “ultra-leftist” aberration.  
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47 The Scar Literature movement inherited its name from Lu Xinhua’s short story, “Shanghen.” See Lu Xinhua 卢新
华, “Shanghen 伤痕 ［The Scar],” Wen hui bao 文汇报 8 (1978). Public interest in Scar Literature reached its 
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However, unlike Han Chinese individuals and groups who in the 1980s and 1990s 
participated in writing Scar Literature, as well as in organizing a wide range of public 
memorializing activities to deal with the trauma of the Cultural Revolution, it has always been 
particularly dangerous for Tibetans—whose participation in Chinese national history has always 
been somewhat in doubt—to publically remember the Maoist years. This is not to say that Han 
Chinese have not also experienced limitations and political ramifications in memorializing the 
Mao years.48 However, since the early 1980s Han citizens have been able to participate in 
conferences and publish fiction and autobiographical memoirs about the Cultural Revolution in 
ways that have long been denied to Tibetans. 
The Chinese state has tried to sideline attempts among Han Chinese citizens to start 
public discussions about agency, responsibility, and coercion during the Cultural Revolution, 
which has made it doubly challenging for Tibetans to initiate analogous discussions in their own 
communities.49 After all, allowing Tibetans to openly air their grievances about past political 
campaigns could very well lead to expressions of discontent with the current state of affairs in 
their communities.50 Religious repression and political coercion are still very real issues in 
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48 For more on the difficulties involved in publically commemorating the trauma of the Mao era, see Feng Jicai, 
Voices from the Whirlwind: An Oral History of the Chinese Cultural Revolution (New York: Pantheon, 1991); Vera 
Schwarcz, “Cultural Dilemmas and Political Roles of the Intelligentsia—Memory and Commemoration: The 
Chinese Search for a Livable Past,” in Jeffrey Wasserstrom and Elizabeth Perry, eds., Popular Protest and Political 
Culture in Modern China (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994); Rubie Watson, Memory, History, and Opposition under 
State Socialism (Stanta Fe: School of American Research Press, 1994).  
 
49 In 1986 the Chinese author Ba Jin proposed the building of a state-funded Cultural Revolution museum to educate 
young people about the atrocities that occurred during the Mao era. See Ba Jin, “A Museum of the Cultural 
Revolution,” June 15, 1986, accessed January 5, 2011: http://www.cnd.org/CR/english/articles/bajin.htm. However, 
to this day, only a few private museums commemorating the Cultural Revolution have been built, such as the 
Cultural Revolution Museum in Guangdong Province and the Jianchuan Museum Cluster in Sichuan Province. 
 
50 Tibetans have faced particular challenges in openly acknowledging the catastrophic consequences of the Maoist 
years. See, for instance, Makley, The Violence of Liberation; Charlene Makley, “The Politics of Memory: Gender, 
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Tibetan areas today. Therefore, for Tibetans living in Gyalthang, the unspeakable past continues 
to be fraught with both emotional and political danger. Chinese state narratives, which dismiss 
the Cultural Revolution as a period marked by agent-less, senseless violence and ideological 
extremism, have done little to help Tibetans make sense of their own, much more ambivalent 
memories of this traumatic decade.  
  
Memory and Oral History Methodology 
 Using oral history as a critical source requires a consideration of both stories and 
silences, of memories and forgetting. Oral sources tell us not just what people did, but also what 
they now think they did—or did not—do.51 Whereas scholarship on the Cultural Revolution has 
generally relied upon printed sources, politics in rural areas of southwest China, and particularly 
in Tibetan areas, is still by and large an undocumented phenomenon. It cannot be fully 
understood by relying only on inscription, in part because much of what was voiced in 
interaction between non-elite and non-state agents in rural areas was never written down. The 
predominance of Party and state voices in written sources contributes to this limited 
understanding. Outside of what took place in the inner circles of the Chinese Communist Party at 
the center of political power, scholars still know very little about the Cultural Revolution in 
general, and far less about history at the margins. One of the main possible sources of that 
history, the voices of the Tibetans who lived through and remember the Cultural Revolution, is 
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51 For more on the particularities and complexities involved in using “oral histories” as historical sources, see 
Alessandro Portelli, The Death of Luigi Trastulli and Other Stories: Form and Meaning in Oral History (Albany: 
State University of New York Press, 1991), 45-58, 256. 
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rapidly becoming inaccessible. How elderly Tibetans tell their life histories and narrate their 
accounts of the Cultural Revolution casts light on particular aspects of the past, opening doors to 
new approaches to historical inquiry. 
Due to the nature of my project, I feel obliged to regard memory not as a kind of 
unmediated, authentic portal to the past, but rather as something that is sculpted by life 
experiences, changing social norms, and shifts in political discourse. I concur with Edward 
Carr’s now classic assertion that both history and memory are engaged in an “unending dialogue 
between the past and the present.”52 Fine lines cannot be drawn between dominant, nationalist 
discourses on the one hand and individual or collective memories on the other, since memory is 
not just composed of what the public thinks about a particular event, but also how the public has 
been trained to think about that event given the memorializing of the event in national history.53  
Historians skeptical of human memory are bound to ask: “How reliable are oral 
narratives?” Oral narratives, as Gail Hershatter points out, “are as contaminated as any other 
retrievable fragment of the past. It requires cultivating an interest in and respect for that 
contamination.”54 Using oral history to counterpose local remembrance against state-sanctioned 
written accounts of the Cultural Revolution is far less productive than acknowledging that the 
process by which historians gain access to the past is just as richly problematic as the 
relationship between memory and the archives.55 As Valentina Punzi has written, “working with 
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53 Shahid Amin, Event, Metaphor, Memory: Chauri Chaura, 1922-1992 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1995). 
 
54 Hershatter, The Gender of Memory, 24. 
 
55 My work has been molded by a number of historians that have written about memory and the Cultural Revolution, 
including Hershatter, The Gender of Memory; Ralph Thaxton, Catastrophe and Contention in Rural China: Mao’s 
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oral sources entails an orientation toward the meanings, the speculations and the interpretations 
given by the narrators rather than toward pursuing a precise account or an objective description 
of events.”56 Rather than worry about the nagging inconsistencies that inevitably appear in my 
oral sources, I have chosen to ask: what can the anachronisms and silences in oral history 
narratives tell us about how our interviewees experienced history and now view the world? The 
subjective dimension of oral narratives is valuable in its own right. It seems that we have a great 
deal to gain by proactively “putting the problems of memory on display,” despite the 
methodological, practical, and ethical challenges involved in doing so.57 
 The data upon which this dissertation is based was gathered during eight years of archival 
and ethnographic research in Gyalthang, starting in the summers of 2006, 2007, 2009, 2010, 
2011, and 2012. I conducted the majority of the interviews for this project from February 2012-
July, 2013 and June-August, 2014. The detailed historical evidence that I utilize in this 
dissertation is drawn primarily from the extensive interviews that I conducted with elderly 
Tibetan residents of Gyalthang who lived through the Cultural Revolution and experienced it 
first-hand. The majority of my research was conducted in Jiantang Town (Jiantang zhen 建塘镇), 
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the urban administrative center of Gyalthang. In order to contextualize these oral sources and 
gain insight into how historical memory has been codified in written texts, I have juxtaposed 
these oral narratives with the often very different kinds of narratives recorded in local Chinese 
Communist Party publications. These publications, which contain fragmented data about the 
Cultural Revolution in Gyalthang, include the first county and prefectural gazetteers (difang zhi 
地方志, zongjiao zhi 宗教志, jinrong zhi 金融志, diming zhi 地名志, zhengxie zhi 政协志) and 
Party newsletters (dangshi tongxun 党史通讯) compiled in Zhongdian County and Diqing 
Prefecture during the Communist eras. They also include local officially-collected “literary and 
historical materials” (wenshi ziliao 文史资料), draft copies of unpublished Party histories of the 
area, and other local internally-circulated reports. In addition, diaries of Han Chinese who 
traveled to Gyalthang during the Cultural Revolution and recorded their observations in Chinese 
are utilized in this study. Other sources include Gyalthang histories penned by Tibetan scholars 
in exile and travel accounts written by foreign missionaries, researchers, and explorers, who 
traveled to northwest Yunnan Province in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
 While conducting archival and ethnographic research in Gyalthang, I frequently struggled 
with the following question: Can oral narratives, particularly in the context of lament, be 
successfully integrated, or studied alongside, a textual history dominated by works composed 
under the auspices of the Chinese Communist Party? Some of the hurdles that make conducting 
both ethnographic and archival research about the Mao period so challenging include: 1) gaining 
access to restricted post-1949 archival documents; 2) attempting to maintain analytic distance 
and avoid unwittingly taking up dominant state categories of space and scale when utilizing these 
sources; 3) gradually building trust in a community and diversifying one’s circle of interviewees; 
4) trying to conduct interviews in ways that minimize or eliminate any negative repercussions for 
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interviewees; 5) finding ways to put different kinds of sources in dialogue with each other in 
order to write multi-voiced histories of the margins.  
The difficulty of maintaining analytic distance from Chinese state categories of scale and 
jurisdiction is particularly tricky when we base our historical analysis, at least in part, on the 
research reports written by state officials who conducted their own analyses of the frontier zone. 
The challenge, then, is to make use of the very limited written sources that we have at our 
disposal and to engage in a careful meta-analysis of these official reports, while avoiding simply 
reproducing their terms.58 
 
Outline of the Dissertation 
 Chapter One, “The Role of Locality, Religion, and Ethnicity in Identity Formation in 
Gyalthang,” examines the complex power dynamics and identity politics at play prior to Chinese 
Communist involvement in this frontier region. It demonstrates the limited authority exercised 
by the government of the Dalai Lama, the Qing court, the Nationalist government, and the early 
Chinese Communist government in Gyalthang in the early- to mid-twentieth century. Although 
ethnicity served as a marker of identity in Gyalthang prior to Chinese Communist involvement in 
the area, entirely new ways of conceptualizing and articulating ethnicity-centered identities 
emerged as a result of the Communist Party’s Ethnic Classification Project of the early 1950s.  
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 Chapter Two, “From the Long March to the Socialist Education Movement: The 
Consolidation of Communist Party Rule in Gyalthang (1936-1965),” uses information gleaned 
from local county and prefectural gazetteers, interviews with Gyalthang residents, and accounts 
written by Tibetan historians in Gyalthang to analyze three decades of Tibetan encounters with 
the Communist Party, starting with the Long March in 1936 and ending on the eve of the 
Cultural Revolution. In particular, this chapter emphasizes how Tibetan involvement in the Long 
March, the Land Reform campaign and the subsequent anti-Land Reform rebellions, the Great 
Leap Forward campaign, the Collectivization policy, the Five Antis Campaign, and the Socialist 
Education Campaign affected the ways in which Tibetans in Gyalthang responded to the launch 
of the Cultural Revolution in 1966. In Gyalthang the political turmoil of the Cultural Revolution 
was immediately preceded by the rapid inversion of long-standing economic and social 
structures, and this chapter sheds light on some of the still unresolved questions about the first 
few decades of Communist involvement in Gyalthang. How appropriate or theoretically useful 
are the terms “collaboration” or “cooperation” in explaining why some religious and secular 
leaders joined forces with Chinese Communist government in the 1950s in response to mounting 
social and political pressures? What were the political, social, and economic factors that led 
Gyalthang residents to actively participate in a series of campaigns that increasingly targeted 
Tibetan culture, traditions, and religion? And finally, to what extent were Tibetans’ identities in 
Gyalthang in the 1950s and early 1960s shaped more by their socioeconomic status and 
ideological orientations than by their identities as members of a marginalized ethnic minority 
group in China?  
Chapter Three, “Revolutionary Enthusiasm or Political Coercion? Tibetan Participation 
in the Cultural Revolution in Gyalthang,” is a detailed examination of the nature and extent of 
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Tibetan participation in the Cultural Revolution in Gyalthang. It explores which monasteries and 
temples were destroyed, which schools were shut down, which Chinese Communist Party cadres, 
Buddhist abbots, and local leaders were denounced, and which villagers joined Red Guard units. 
Information gleaned from local county and prefectural gazetteers, Communist Party internal 
documents housed in private local collections, secondary sources, and interviews with residents 
in Gyalthang are utilized in this analysis.  
Finally, Chapter Four, “Ethnic Politics, Historical Amnesia, and the Reframing of 
Gyalthang History in the Twenty-First Century,” discusses the complex historical legacy of the 
Cultural Revolution in Gyalthang. It explores how Cultural Revolution narratives have been 
reframed in the post-Mao era, positioning Tibetans as unqualified victims rather than participants 
in this revolution. Close attention is paid to the politics of ethnicity and the ways in which the 
categorized have attempted to appropriate, internalize, evade, negotiate, or transform the 
categories that have been imposed upon them. Central to this analysis is the degree to which 
Tibetans have either challenged or internalized the Chinese state’s essentialist notions of 
ethnicity in the post-Cultural Revolution period and how this re-framing of “Tibetan-ness” has 
led to the formation of new—and the effacement of old—Cultural Revolution narratives. This 
chapter draws on ethnographic research conducted between 2006 and 2014, as well on films, 
posters, literature, and tour books, and focuses on the rapid social, economic, and demographic 
transformation that has taken place in Gyalthang over the past three decades. It examines how 
ethnic tourism in the post-Mao era has led to the commodification of Tibetan religion and 
culture, on the one hand, and widespread historical amnesia, on the other. 
Today, four decades after the conclusion of the Cultural Revolution, Tibetan involvement 
in the Cultural Revolution continues to raise a number of contentious questions about individual 
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agency, ideological fervor, coercion, and ethnic and religious repression by the Chinese 
Communist Party. Tibetans living in Gyalthang responded to the Cultural Revolution in a 
number of ways. Some resisted and often paid with their lives, but many others participated for a 
variety of political, social, ideological, and personal reasons. This wide range of responses, from 
suicide and exile to looting and murder, sheds light on the difficult decisions Tibetans made 
under particularly complex and coercive conditions. Refocusing attention on the agency of 
individual actors allows us to see the ways in which not just state coercion, but also 
revolutionary ideology, youthful enthusiasm, and mob mentality played a role in motivating 
Tibetan participants in the Cultural Revolution. The diversity of these experiences has hitherto 
been left out of the written record. Contemporary economic and political incentives, coupled 
with intensely personal and emotionally-driven motives, have led to a community-wide 
suppression of Cultural Revolution memories in Gyalthang. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
THE ROLE OF LOCALITY, RELIGION, AND ETHNICITY IN IDENTITY 
FORMATION IN GYALTHANG 
 
Gyalthang’s geographic location along the Sino-Tibetan border means that it was 
historically far from Chinese and Tibetan centers of political power.59 Local formations of 
religious and sociopolitical authority in Gyalthang were nonetheless influenced to a certain 
degree by the expansions and contractions of these two competing imperial polities. This chapter 
investigates the role of locality, religion, and ethnicity in identity formation in Gyalthang from 
the seventeenth century to the mid twentieth century. It also explores how the mid-twentieth-
century ethnic classification projects undertaken by the Nationalists and Communists created 
new ways of thinking about ethnic boundaries and ethnic identity. Prior to class politics taking 
center stage in Gyalthang under Communist Party rule, Gyalthang residents’ lives were greatly 
influenced by residents’ affiliations with particular monastic colleges at Ganden Sumtsenling 
Monastery, their relationships with wealthy landholding families, and their likelihood of 
becoming victimized by raiding bandits.  
In order to understand how understandings of identity have shifted in Gyalthang over 
time, it is important to first examine Gyalthang’s place within the wider Tibetan world. While 
today the term “Tibet” (Xizang 西藏) commonly calls up the image of the administrative Tibetan 
Autonomous Region (Xizang zizhizhou 西藏自治州) in the People’s Republic of China, many 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
59 Gyalthang is located more than 2,000 kilometers southwest of Beijing and nearly 900 kilometers west of Lhasa. 
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other political, cultural, and ethnic “Tibets” also exist. The contemporary Tibetan Autonomous 
Region includes the western and central parts of the Tibetan plateau, but it excludes other 
ethnically Tibetan areas that were placed under the administration of Gansu Province, Qinghai 
Province, Sichuan Province, and Yunnan Province by the Chinese Communist government in the 
1950s. From 1642 until 1951, the central part of the Tibetan plateau and most of its western areas 
were ruled by the Ganden Phodrang government based in Lhasa. The Ganden Phodrang 
government had its own army and administration and a long history of effective self-rule over 
the central Tibetan plateau. It is for this historical reason that Hugh Richardson termed this area 
“political Tibet,” maintaining that: 
In “political” Tibet the Tibetan government has ruled continuously from the earliest times 
down to 1951. The region beyond that to the north and east [Amdo and Kham]…is its 
“ethnographic” extension which people of Tibetan race once inhabited exclusively and 
where they are still in the majority. In that wider area, “political” Tibet exercised 
jurisdiction only in certain places and at irregular intervals; for the most part, local lay or 
monastic chiefs were in control of districts of various size. From the 18th century onwards 
the region was subject to sporadic Chinese infiltration.60 
 
Up until the mid-twentieth century, Tibetans who lived in the eastern half of the plateau 
generally used the Tibetan word for Tibet, Bod, to refer only to the central Tibetan area ruled by 
the Ganden Phodrang government, and some Tibetans still continue this practice today.61 
However, over the past few decades, Tibetan exiles and their supporters have come to formulate 
a different understanding of “Tibet” that is much closer to Richardson’s conceptualization of 
“ethnographic Tibet.” This alternative understanding of Tibet refers to all regions inside of China 
where historically the majority of the population has been Tibetan. During its long-running talks 
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with China, the exile Tibetan leadership has formally requested several times that all 
ethnographic areas of Tibet should be allowed to have a single Tibetan administration, but 
Beijing has repeatedly rejected this proposal.62 This broader and more controversial usage of the 
term “Tibet” is not without some historical basis, since from the seventh to ninth centuries and 
for a period in the mid-seventeenth century as well, much of the plateau had been unified under 
the rule of Lhasa. But this idea of a single Tibetan polity was remote from the lives of eastern 
Tibetans in the early twentieth century.63 
In recent years the idea of an even broader definition of a diasporic Tibet has begun to be 
expressed. Substantial Tibetan communities exist not only in five Chinese provinces and regions 
(Tibetan Autonomous Region, Qinghai Province, Gansu Province, Sichuan Province, and 
Yunnan Province), but also in parts of India, Nepal, and Bhutan. Tibetan diaspora communities 
also have a growing presence around the world, most notably in part of Europe, Canada, and the 
United States. A former government official in the Central Tibetan Administration therefore 
suggests that in the twenty-first century, “Tibet” might be productively imagined as a global, 
diasporic community that is no longer tied to any one bounded geographic area inside of China. 
This kind of radical reimagining, he argues, can free Tibetans from trying to work within a 
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politically-stifling nation-state framework, and encourage them to focus instead on how they 
might preserve and promote Tibetan language, culture, religion, and traditions among the 
constituents of a much broader, geographically dispersed Tibetan nation.64 While this chapter 
acknowledges the historical and ongoing tension that existed and continues to exist between 
these different conceptions of Tibet,65 it is primarily concerned with identity formation in one 
particular geographic area of eastern Tibet—Gyalthang. 
The eastern part of the Tibetan plateau, an area about three times the size of France, 
consisted until the 1950s of a plethora of localities and microsocieties differentiated by custom 
and language as much as by distinctive governments. They were sometimes seen as 
principalities, chiefdoms, or tribal areas and were ruled by semi-independent chiefs, local kings 
or princes, lamas, occasional Chinese armies, and sometimes Chinese Muslim warlords. These 
areas were known by local names, and there was no single Tibetan term to describe them as a 
collectivity. The Chinese language likewise has no term meaning “eastern Tibet” or “eastern 
Tibetan areas.” British officials in the early twentieth century referred to the eastern area as 
“Inner Tibet,” but the Tibetans referred to it mainly by local toponyms. Today, the northeastern 
part of the Tibetan plateau is referred to by Tibetans most frequently as Amdo, while the name 
Kham is used for the eastern and southeastern areas.66 
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In the seventh century the Tibetan Kingdom (Tubo 吐蕃) expanded and Tibetan control 
extended across the entire Qinghai-Tibet plateau and into Gyalthang.67 The Tibetan military post 
at the Iron Bridge Fort (Tie qiao zhen 铁桥镇), located fifty kilometers north of Shigu 石鼓 on 
the First Bend of the Yangtze River, guarded the Tibetan Kingdom’s southeastern flank.68 To 
resist further Tibetan expansion towards Chinese held territory, the Tang Dynasty strengthened 
their southwest border defenses in 664, but after a major campaign in 703 led by Tsenpo Dusong 
Mangje, Gyalthang remained firmly in Tibetan hands.69 The Tibetan population soon 
outnumbered the local Naxi 纳西, Lisu 傈僳, and Mosuo 摩梭 populations in Gyalthang. 
Although the Nanzhao 南诏 kingdom based in Lijiang threatened Tibetan control in the area in 
the eighth century, local Tibetan nobles retained control of most positions of authority in 
Gyalthang even after the Tibetan Empire declined in the mid-ninth century.70 
In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the Mongols established military command 
over Gyalthang, naming it Dandang 旦当—from which the current Tibetan name of Gyalthang 
derives—but it appears that there was not much Mongol settlement in the region.71 Prior to 1640, 
the dominant political power in southern Kham was the Naxi kingdom, which Tibetan historians 
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have commonly called the kingdom of ’Jang.72 The Mu family controlled this Naxi kingdom and 
their conquests extended from Lijiang north to Gyalthang, Muli, and Lithang.73 The Eighth 
Karmapa Mi bskyod rdo rje (1507-1554) was the first prominent Karma Kagyu religious leader 
who was invited to the Naxi kingdom and he traveled through Gyalthang on his way to Lijiang in 
1515. Mu Ding 木定 (1477-1526), the reigning Naxi king, promised the Eighth Karmapa that he 
would not wage war against Tibet for thirteen years and he would establish one hundred 
monasteries in the area. When the Eighth Karmapa traveled back through Gyalthang after his 
visit to Lijiang, he founded the region’s first Karma Kagyu monastery.74 However, due to 
skirmishes in the seventeenth century between the joint Mongolian and Gelugpa Tibetan forces 
against the Naxi kingdom, and the eventual defeat of the Mu family, control of Gyalthang passed 
from the hands of the Mu family to the nominal control of the Ganden Phodrang government in 
Lhasa. The strongest symbol of the dominance of the Ganden Phodrang forces in the region was 
the destruction of the region’s largest Karma Kagyu monastery in 1674. On the ruins of this 
razed monastery, construction began in 1679 on a much larger Gelugpa monastery, which the 
Fifth Dalai Lama named Ganden Sumtsenling Monastery.75   
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Kham was not consistently ruled by Lhasa after about 1700, although in brief periods 
until the 1930s the Tibetan army was able to regain control of one or other regions within Kham. 
The Lhasa government had attempted to extend influence over Kham from the seventeenth 
century, but never succeeded in any consistent manner, aside from converting many important 
monasteries to the Gelukpa tradition.76 In the late seventeenth century, the Lhasa government 
dispatched governors to Gyalthang and each of her neighbors—Dechen (Adunzi 阿墩子 or Deqin 
德勤) and Balung (Weixi 维西)—and in so doing, managed to assert nominal authority over 
these districts. The desirability of the area meant that border skirmishes between central Tibetans 
and Chinese government troops in Sichuan and Yunnan provinces were frequent within Kham.77  
In 1720, the Qing army passed through Gyalthang on its way to Tibet to oust the Dzungar 
Mongols from Lhasa. Recognizing the strategic importance of the Gyalthang area, the Qing set 
up a garrisoned post in Gyalthang in 1724 with three hundred soldiers who were returning from 
fighting the Dzungar Mongols in Lhasa.78 They called this garrisoned post the Zhongdian office 
(Zhongdian ting 中甸厅). After successive campaigns in the region by the Qing military, the 
Qing government succeeded in stationing garrisons not only in Gyalthang, but also in Dechen 
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and Balung, and it formally incorporated these three districts into Yunnan Province.79 As the 
Qing stabilized their presence in Gyalthang, not just soldiers and officials, but also Chinese 
artisans, farmers, miners, traders, and refugees drifted into the Gyalthang area. Gold and silver 
mines were opened in Gyalthang, with much of the labor carried out by runaway Qing soldiers 
and criminals.80 Although Han officials were sent by the Qing to serve as county governors 
(xianzhang 县长) in Gyalthang, they didn’t actually wield much power and tended to turn to the 
local Tibetan and Naxi tusi 土司 and tuguan 土管 to manage local affairs.81 Thus, even after it 
came under the nominal jurisdiction of Yunnan Province, Gyalthang remained a contested 
borderland space well into the mid-twentieth century.82 
By the mid-eighteenth century, most western regions of Kham were under the loose 
control of the Lhasa government, and most of the numerous localities, chiefdoms, and so on 
within Kham fell under the administration of the western Chinese provinces of Sichuan and 
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Yunnan.83 But Qing rule in these Tibetan areas remained largely nominal, and by the early 
twentieth-century Kham had become an agglomeration of around twenty-five different semi-
independent polities.84 
As one of the most ethnically-diverse and highly-contested borderland regions of Kham, 
Gyalthang and its complex twentieth-century history is illustrative of what Lawrence Epstein has 
termed the “discursive process of frontier creation.”85 Looking at early twentieth-century 
Gyalthang, what we find is loose communities that bonded together primarily for the purpose of 
dealing with external threats and maintaining social cohesion at the local level.86 Over the course 
of the twentieth century, successive Chinese powers attempted to respond to the age-old 
challenge of dealing with the borderland areas of southern Kham during a period of rapid and 
volatile change. A series of autonomy movements demanding “Khampa rule for Kham” arose in 
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the 1930s.87 Local leaders in Gyalthang displayed a great deal of finesse in mediating between 
different power holders at the local, regional, and national levels in the mid-twentieth century. 
The government of the Ganden Phodrang in Lhasa, the Qing court, the Nationalist 
government, and the early Chinese Communist government each exercised only limited authority 
in Gyalthang in the early- to mid-twentieth century. Instead, Ganden Sumtsenling Monastery was 
the seat of political, economic, and military dominance in Gyalthang. Even when the government 
of the Ganden Phodrang, based in Lhasa, did not exert direct control over Gyaltang, Ganden 
Sumtsenling Monastery remained the most influential institution in the region. Due to direct 
kinship ties between secular and monastic rulers in Gyalthang, the political influence of the 
monastery was often closely intertwined with the power of the wealthiest landholders. 
Historically, Tibetan families in Gyalthang supported Sumtsenling monastery by 
fulfilling corvée tax obligations, which included constructing new monastic buildings or 
renovating existing structures, porting water and firewood, farming the monastery’s land, and 
sending one or more of their sons to the monastery. Another vital source of yearly income for 
Sumtsenling was the leasing of agricultural estates and pastoral areas to local residents and the 
charging of rent for the use of such land. In addition, monks and reincarnate lamas would 
perform various types of rituals, ceremonies, and medicinal services, and teach written Tibetan 
and Buddhist doctrine to lay people in exchange for donations.88 Tibetans monks from Gyalthang 
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traveled to study at many of the most renowned monasteries in Lhasa well into the mid-twentieth 
century. To a certain extent, therefore, religion was a unifying force that played a role in 
ideologically integrating the millions of Tibetans that were living in Gyalthang and other 
politically divided polities within Kham, Amdo, and central Tibet. Aside from the influence of 
Ganden Sumtsenling Monastery and other competing monastic powers in Gyalthang, there was 
not really a single political authority that formed the basis of collective identity and governance 
in the area until the Chinese Communist government solidified control over Gyalthang in the 
mid-1950s.89  
Tibetan residents of Gyalthang speak several local Tibetic languages and most 
Gyalthangpa (Tibetans of Gyalthang) understand themselves to be Khampas, residents of the 
southernmost reaches of the eastern Tibetan cultural world. However, there are small pockets 
within this territory where Tibetan inhabitants identify neither as Gyalthangpa nor Khampa. 
Much can be learned about historical monastic influence and control by researching the doctrinal 
and political loyalties of the monks residing in different khangsten (monastic colleges) within 
Ganden Sumtsenling Monastery.90 This is because families from particular geographic regions in 
and around Gyalthang sent their sons to be monks at regionally-affiliated khangtsens within the 
monastery. Some of the geographical areas controlled by the eight khangtsens in Sumtsenling are 
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not located in the region that locals commonly refer to as “Gyalthang.”91 Therefore, Gyalthang 
identity neither can be solely defined by the constellations of monastic power, nor defined by 
shared linguistic or ethno-national affiliations. So, with no specific historical, political, or 
religious demarcation of the boundaries of Gyalthang, and with no unified linguistic or ethnic 
identity, what historically has defined the identity of the Gyalthang people? 
 
The CCP’s Ethnic Classification Project and the Creation of “Tibetan” identity 
One influential state policy that altered local understandings of identity in Gyalthang in 
the early twentieth-century was the Chinese ethnolinguistic classification project. Originally 
during the Republican era (1911-1949) and then more fully during the first decade of Communist 
rule, the Chinese state enlisted ethnographers in a campaign to impose cultural legibility on the 
people living in China’s peripheral regions. Nationalist Party leaders recognized that China was a 
multi-national/multi-ethnic (duo minzu 多民族) country, and Sun Yat-sen even endorsed the 
design of a new flag to symbolize this multi-nationalism. However, ethnic groups other than the 
five official nationalities of the Han, the Mongols, the Manchus, the Tibetans, and the Tartars 
(Turkic Muslims), were not included in Sun’s conceptualization of a multi-ethnic nation state. 
The Nationalists initially spoke of self-determination and self-government for China’s diverse 
minority peoples, but eventually assimilation was acknowledged as the ultimate goal.  
Some ethnologists in the Republican period, such as Cen Jiawu, attempted to formulate a 
moderate discourse on minzu 民族 (“ethnicity” or “nationality”) that could act as an interface 
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between the multi-minzu worldview of the field of Chinese ethnology and the assimilationist 
ideology of the Nationalists.92 In the 1930s, Cen Jiawu attempted to find a place for the xinan 
minzu 西南民族 (the minzu of the southwest) within the official Nationalist concept of the 
“Republic of Five Peoples” (wuzu gonghe 五族共和). In addition to being composed of the five 
main minzu outlined in the theory of the Five Peoples’ Republic, Cen argued that the Chinese 
nation also encompassed the Miao, Yao, Yi, and Luoluo. While Cen’s push for official 
recognition of ethnic diversity was motivated partially by his own desire for recognition of his 
discipline, his worldview, and his expertise as an ethnologist, he was also firmly committed to 
the principle of recognizing and acknowledging ethnic diversity when it could clearly be shown 
to exist, according to the ethnological practices of the day.  
However, the war with Japan, coupled with the Nationalists’ oppositional relationship 
with the Chinese Communist Party, prompted the Nationalists to redouble their commitment to a 
homogenous China in the late 1930s. Chiang Kai-shek insisted that the Zhonghua minzu 中华民
族 (alternatively interpreted to indicate a singular “Chinese nationality” or plural “Chinese 
nationalities”) must be thought of as singular and indivisible. He maintained that any attempt to 
divide up the country into minority and majority ethnic groups would harm national unity, which 
was essential to maintain in the face of the Japanese imperialist threat. Chiang insisted that every 
citizen of the Republic of China belonged under the single overarching label of Zhonghua minzu, 
regardless of his or her linguistic, religious, or cultural background. As a result, Chinese 
ethnologists, explorers, travelers, and intellectuals found themselves forced to comprehend the 
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diversity and the historical conflicts among the peoples they observed in the southwest and the 
northwest as “variations within” rather than categorical “differences among.” In the end, 
ethnologists were never able to integrate their worldview into the Nationalists’ official 
demographic ideology. 
In contrast to the Nationalists, even before the Communists ascended to power in 1949, 
CCP leaders were firm advocates of the idea of a multi-minzu China. The CCP’s 
acknowledgement and affirmation of ethnic differences amongst the people living in China’s 
peripheral borderlands was initially strategically designed to solicit the support of these non-Han 
populations during the Nationalist/Communist civil war. The Communists needed to rely on the 
support of ethnic groups in southwest China, in particular, while fleeing from the Nationalists 
during the Long March (1934-1936).  
The Chinese Communist Party’s ethnic classification project of the 1950s was central to 
its efforts to both implement political reform and strengthen national unity amongst an 
ethnically, religiously, and linguistically diverse citizenry. The Party came to power in 1949 
armed with two ideologies: nationalism and Marxism-Leninism.93 It was determined to use 
nationalism to unite its ethnic minority populations with its Han majority, and to forge a 
“unified, multinational state” (tongyi de duominzu guojia 统一的多民族国家).94 The CCP’s 
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policy on ethnicity was also influenced by Stalinist ideology, which held that Communist 
governments everywhere had the responsibility to identify and recognize each distinct nationality 
(Rus.: nastia) within their respective nation-states, so as to better plan political campaigns and 
developmental strategies to integrate these nationalities into Communist society. The goal of the 
Communist project, as outlined by Stalinism, was ostensibly not to make “peripheral peoples” 
more like those of the “center,” but rather to bring them to a universal standard of modernity that 
would, eventually, exist independent of where the center might be on the historical scale at any 
given moment.  
To convince diverse Chinese ethnic groups to “buy in” to the concept of the nation state, 
and to Maoist ideology itself, the Party had to provide guarantees that each people’s linguistic, 
religious, and cultural traits would be recognized. However, this desire to provide reassurances 
that ethnic differences would be respected was often at odds with the Party’s ideological goal of 
leading the nation toward socialism, which relied on downplaying cultural and ethnic differences 
in favor of emphasizing class. To accomplish these sometimes ideologically contradictory goals, 
the Communist Party sequestered the aid of social scientists in assigning each ethnic group to a 
specific stage of history, with the understanding that the Party would help liberate each of these 
groups from its particular “backward” stage of history and usher in a socialist future. As a result, 
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by the late-1950s, many of China’s leading ethnologists had become closely implicated in the 
twin projects of nation-building and socialist development.95    
In order to devise and sustain a revolutionary policy that would allow different minority 
groups to be led fruitfully toward socialism, Chinese ethnologists utilized the Stalinist model of 
Marxist ethnology to draw up a table of the evolution of societies and peoples that was to serve 
as the framework for their field studies. Each minority group was placed along this ladder of 
human evolution. Although the researchers studied the life and customs, spiritual culture, politics 
and society, and demographic data of each ethnic minority group, they were most interested in 
researching each group’s economic structures—such as the concentration of land ownership, 
exchange relations, production techniques and work experience, and the ownership of the means 
of production. The four Stalinist criteria for defining a nationality were “a common language, a 
common territory, a common economic life, and a common psychological make-up [which was 
manifested in common features of national culture].”96  
Apart from Stalin’s criteria for identifying nationalities, Chinese social thinkers were also 
heavily influenced by Friedrich Engels’ stage evolutionary theory, which in turn, was shaped by 
the writings of the nineteenth-century American anthropologist Lewis Henry Morgan.97 In the 
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first chapter of his famous 1878 treatise, Ancient Society, Morgan used the term “the ethnical 
period” to describe the development of human society from a general state of savagery, to 
barbarism, and finally to civilization.98 Upon taking power in 1949, the Chinese Communist 
Party embraced this Morganian project of classifying human history into five stages (the 
primitive, slave, feudal, capitalist, and socialist modes of production) and used this stage 
evolutionary theory to formulate national development policies.99 Members of different ethnic 
groups within China were understood to occupy different rungs of this ladder of human progress, 
with the Han positioned at the top.100 The Communists formulated a policy of development that 
urged the “brother nationalities” (xiongdi minzu 兄弟民族) to follow the example of the 
advanced Han and liberate themselves from their current positions as “living fossils” of much 
more primitive periods of human history.101 
In order to plan the type of political campaigns that would raise the civilizational levels 
of the various minzu in China, it first became necessary to determine where each minzu fit on a 
Marxist scale of history. The Chinese Communists maintained that specific ethnic groups, which 
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were judged to be in the late-feudal stage of the landlord economy (which is where most of the 
Han peasantry was judged to be), were to undergo the violent class struggles of Land Reform. 
On the other hand, those that that were still at the slave stage, or even showed vestiges of the 
primitive commune stage, were subjected to a much milder process, termed “Democratic Reform” 
(minzhu gaige 民主改革), which involved the cooptation of local leaders into the state project. 
Nine months after the formation of the People’s Republic of China, the CCP dispatched 
Nationalities Visitation Teams (minzu fangwentuan 民族访问团) to border regions throughout 
the country. At the time, it was understood that once the process of defining the various minzu 
was finished, the CCP would be able to go full steam ahead in “civilizing” these groups.   
Chinese ethnologists involved in the Chinese Communist Party’s ethnic classification 
project of the 1950s assigned an ethnic label to each Chinese citizen, utilizing Marx’s 
“materialist conception of history” to determine each ethnic group’s location on the Marxist-
Leninist ladder of economic and social development.102 In the end, they largely succeeded in 
making the public internalize these ethnic labels. One of the major differences between the 
ethnographic research conducted by ethnologists in the pre-Communist period and that which 
took place after 1949, was that the Communist Party’s modern nation-building project meant that 
ethnologists working in the Communist period had to secure the consent of the categorized. 
“Persuasion work” (shuofu gongzuo 说服工作), which involved ethnologists transforming the 
worldviews of their informants in the process of researching, labeling, and mobilizing them for 
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the socialist project, was based on techniques that the Communist Party devised during their 
mobilization of the urban working class in the 1930s and 1940s.103  
However, after the initial Nationalities Visitation Teams, which were dispatched in 1950, 
returned with a much more complicated report about the ethnic, religious, and linguistic diversity 
of the Chinese population than the Chinese Communist Party had originally anticipated, the 
Party decided to endorse a much more “scientific” project with the aim of establishing 
“objective” criteria for ethnic identification.104 The 1953 Election Law stipulated that at least one 
representative seat in the National People’s Congress must be awarded to each minority, 
regardless of population size. The issue that then arose was how to find out who these minorities 
were. The political need to establish clear criteria for ethnic minority identification led the 
Chinese Communist Party to carry out its first census in 1953-1954. 
 In designing the census, the Communist authorities decided to pose the question of 
ethnonational identity as an open-ended, fill-in-the-blank inquiry, which, in retrospect, might 
well be viewed as a radically liberal experiment with self-categorization. Yet, this attempt at 
uncovering Chinese citizens’ understanding of their own ethnic identity led to a political crisis, 
since the 2.5 million census takers returned back to Beijing with roughly 400 minzu categories, 
some with a registered population size of just one person.105 In order to avoid derailing the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
103 The emphasis that the Communist Party placed on transforming the worldviews of Chinese workers in the 1930s 
was similar to the importance they placed on creating and strengthening the “ethnic consciousness” of various minzu 
living in China’s borderland areas. For more on working class consciousness and worker mobilization in early 
twentieth-century Shanghai, see Elizabeth Perry, Shanghai on Strike: The Politics of Chinese Labor (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1993). 
 
104 Dru Gladney, Muslim Chinese: Ethnic Nationalism in the People’s Republic (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1991), 16-17. 
 
105 Fei Xiaotong, “Ethnic Identification in China,” in Fei Xiaotong, ed., Toward a People’s Anthropology (Beijing: 
New World Press, 1981), 60. 
 
 
!
50!
formation of the People’s Congress, the Chinese Communist Party immediately initiated the 
1954 Ethnic Classification Project (minzu shibie 民族识别). A small group of Beijing scholars, 
many of whom had trained in foreign universities, was enlisted to identify and categorize all of 
the ethnic minority groups that should be recognized by the national government.106 These 
ethnologists and linguists tended to rely on the ethnotaxonomic frameworks devised by the 
British colonial officer Henry Rudolph Davies (1865-1950). The Chinese Communist Party’s 
Ethnic Classification Project, therefore, was not really that different from many other European 
colonial projects designed to classify “native subjects.”107 
One of the most important factors in the assessment of the ethnic potential of a proposed 
minzu category was to estimate whether it would elicit support or resistance, particularly from 
the local elites who would play an integral role in all subsequent phases of Chinese Communist 
minority work. As a result, Chinese social scientists realized in the 1950s that for the first time 
ever, their clean-cut, objectivist models of identity would need to come into direct contact with 
the subjectivities of their informants if they were to understand the level of local support for their 
classification project. This was a profoundly complicated interaction that, in the end, necessitated 
an adjustment in their previously primordialist classificatory praxis.  
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Chinese ethnologists ended up relying heavily upon Communist methods of assessing 
and molding the political consciousness of various communities, in order to complete their goal 
of securing the consent of the categorized. Mullaney describes the interview processes involved 
in persuading different minorities in Yunnan that they actually belonged to the same minzu.108 
Just as the Chinese Communist Party had turned to ethnologists for their assistance—a process 
that opened the door to social scientific approaches to Communist ethnopolitics—in the 
fieldwork phase of the project, Chinese ethnologists came to heavily rely upon Communist 
methods of assessing and molding the political consciousness of communities at the local level. 
Since the researchers had helped the state see the Chinese people categorically, the state was now 
willing to help the researchers secure the consent of the categorized.109 
After ethnologists had determined where minority populations in various regions stood 
on the scale of human development, local Communist Party organizers had to tackle the problem 
of social transformation. Although between 1947 and 1952 land reform was carried out in almost 
every rural area of China, land reform was only implemented in minority regions where it was 
determined that the social system had already evolved to the last stage of “feudalism,” 
characterized by a landlord economy. In regions deemed to have “early feudalist societies,” such 
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as in Tibet, or in areas where social evolution was “retarded” at the stage of “slave society,” such 
as along the Yi corridor on the Sichuan/Yunnan Provincial border, land reform was not initially 
carried out. Indeed, in many of these regions, native authorities, who formally had been 
recognized by imperial governments as tusi 土司 or tuguan 土管, were allowed to remain in 
place and rule alongside the new Party-led administration. This delay in social reform lasted until 
1956 in most areas of southwest China. Rather than inducing local villagers to struggle against 
and overthrow their own leaders, Party officials introduced so-called “Democratic Reforms” to 
attempt to co-opt as many local leaders as possible into the new administration. These local 
leaders often cooperated with the Chinese Communist Party, since doing so guaranteed them a 
certain measure of prestige, calling into question the degree to which life for villagers in the 
early Communist period was all that different from life in imperial times. 
Defining numerous linguistically and culturally diverse groups of Tibetic peoples as 
Zangzu (Tibetan) in the CCP’s 1950s ethnic classification project was an important part of 
efforts to understand, delineate, and control particular groups of peoples along China’s ethnic 
borderland areas. But this process resulted in certain unforeseen consequences—certain 
translocal ethnic solidarities resulted from this new classification scheme that were not 
necessarily in line with CCP interests.110 The label Zangzu recognized the cultural, linguistic, and 
historical links among peoples scattered across a wide territory, even as they were divided 
among five separate provinces and various “autonomous” districts and counties. Yet, historically 
in regions like Gyalthang, understandings of place and identity were generally much more 
locally grounded and the broader notion of “Tibetanness” did not carry much meaning for local 
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residents. Thus, as Charlene Makley argues, CCP recognition of the Zangzu as a cohesive group 
of people lent “state administrative weight to a reified translocal identity that had arguably never 
existed among Tibetans.”111 The Chinese state’s heavy-handed approach to defining, creating, 
solidifying, and controlling ethnic boundaries within the PRC resulted in the emergence of new 
forms of ethic consciousness in the 1950s. Certain forms of ethnic identity, artificial as they may 
have been at the point of creation, took on lives of their own in the years following the ethnic 
classification project.112   
In the case of Gyalthang, the project of PRC state incorporation generated new 
understandings of ethnic identity and heightened local Tibetans’ interest in budding pan-Khampa 
movements.113 The CCP’s decision to enforce land reform in Kham in the late 1950s seems to 
have led to the opposite of its intended effect: facing dispossession, many Khampas reverted to a 
probably half-forgotten or perhaps half-invented memory of Tibetan political unity. In 1956, 
soon after Khampa rebels formed an army in order to counter the Chinese military’s attacks on 
their monasteries, the Khampa army moved westward to join forces with Tibetans in Lhasa and 
to defend the Dalai Lama. It was largely the flood of Khampa refugees into Lhasa as they fled 
from conflict with the Chinese forces in the eastern areas that led to the famous uprising of 
March 1959 in the Tibetan capital. The failure of that rebellion led the Dalai Lama and nearly 
eighty thousand of his followers to seek refuge in India, where they remain today.
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
FROM THE LONG MARCH TO THE SOCIALIST EDUCATION MOVEMENT:  
THE CONSOLIDATION OF COMMUNIST PARTY RULE IN GYALTHANG  
(1936-1965) 
 
In official Chinese histories, the period immediately following the Communist 
“liberation” of China in 1949 is sometimes termed the “Golden Age” or the “Honeymoon 
Period” of Chinese Communist rule, particularly when compared with the turmoil of the Cultural 
Revolution just over a decade later.114 In contrast, a few other scholars have claimed that the first 
decade of Maoism was one of the worst tyrannies in the history of the twentieth century.115 It is 
now clear that China’s diverse regions did not undergo political transformation in the same way 
or at the same rate. Chinese society during the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s was not monolithic, nor 
was the Chinese state singular. It is impossible to understand how Communist political 
campaigns and ideological work affected people’s lives in different regions of China, without 
closely taking a more local or “grassroots” approach to examining this period of history.116 
Villagers living in rural ethnic minority areas, like Gyalthang, experienced a very different kind 
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of political trajectory than Han Chinese residents living in urban areas in the 1940s and 1950s. 
By departing from what Gail Hershatter calls “campaign time” and looking more closely at how 
particular events affected Gyalthang residents in different ways and at different times than 
residents living in other parts of China, this chapter aims to examine politics through the eyes of 
the Tibetan students, monks, farmers, and village leaders who experienced it first-hand, rather 
than through elite policy-makers and propagandists.117  
This chapter uses information gleaned from local county and prefectural gazetteers, oral 
history interviews with Gyalthang residents, and accounts written by Tibetan historians in 
Gyalthang to shed light on some of the crucial questions that remain unanswered about the first 
three decades of Tibetan encounters with the Communist Party in Gyalthang, starting with the 
Long March in 1936 and ending on the eve of the Cultural Revolution. How did Tibetan 
religious and secular leaders in Gyalthang respond to the Red Army’s desperate request for help 
during the Long March? How appropriate or theoretically useful is the term “collaboration” in 
explaining why some religious and secular leaders joined forces with Chinese Communist 
government in the 1950s in response to mounting social and political pressures? What were the 
political, social, and economic factors that led Gyalthang residents to actively participate in a 
series of campaigns that increasingly targeted Tibetan culture, traditions, and religion? To what 
extent were Tibetans’ identities in Gyalthang in the 1950s shaped more by their socioeconomic 
status and ideological orientations than by their identities as members of a marginalized ethnic 
minority group in China? In Gyalthang the political turmoil of the Cultural Revolution was 
immediately preceded by the rapid inversion of long-standing economic and social structures. 
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Gyalthang Tibetans’ involvement in the Chinese Communist Party campaigns of the 1930s, 
1940s, and 1950s greatly influenced how local residents later responded to the launch of the 
Cultural Revolution in 1966. 
 
The Long March 
The Chinese Communist Party’s efforts to win over the elite power holders in Gyalthang 
began during the Long March (chang zheng 长征). As Communist armies in the south of China 
attempted to evade being captured by Guomindang troops, different divisions of the Chinese 
Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army (Zhongguo gongnong hong jun 中国工农红军) took part in a 
series of marches that later came to be known collectively as the Long March. A few divisions of 
the Red Army intended to move northward from Guizhou Province to Shanxi Province in the 
spring of 1935, but Guomindang troops blocked the way. The Red Army was forced to detour 
through northern Yunnan Province, enter areas inhabited by Tibetans, Naxi, Yi, and other ethnic 
minority populations, and cross over numerous snow mountains on the Yunnan-Sichuan 
border.118 Between April 25 and May 7, 1936, Commanders He Long 贺龙, Xiao Ke 肖克, Ren 
Bishi 任弼时, Wang Zhen 王震, and Guan Xiangying 关向应 led 18,000 troops in the Second 
and Sixth divisions of the Red Army through Gyalthang.119 
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The Second Division of the Red Army forged the Yangtze River on small wooden 
rowboats and began to transport their supplies northward into Gyalthang on April 25, 1936. Five 
days later, the Red Army set up their command center in Zanggong Hall (Zanggong tang 藏公
堂), an ancestral hall and the administrative center for Chinese residents in Gyalthang.120 On his 
first evening in town, Commander He Long raised the Communist Party’s red flag on the roof of 
Zanggong Hall and urged his troops to respect Tibetan religion and culture and to do their utmost 
to win over the wealthy and powerful elite in Gyalthang.121 He also required his weary soldiers 
to first secure the consent of the male head of the household before staying overnight in a 
Tibetan home. Since it was customary for young and middle-aged Gyalthang men to travel along 
trade routes to Dali 大理, Bathang 巴塘, and Dartsedo (Tachienlu 打箭炉 or Kangding 康定), 
during the spring and summer, most of the household heads in Gyalthang were away from home. 
As a Han Chinese commander with very little knowledge of local Tibetan customs, Commander 
He not only had to deal with an immediate and severe shortage of food and housing, he also 
faced significant linguistic and cultural barriers that prevented him from immediately resolving 
this pressing problem.122    
In order to win over the local Tibetan elite and garner their support, the Red Army troops 
staged musical performances and the troop leaders gave lengthy speeches, which were translated 
by local sympathetic Tibetans proficient in Chinese.123 They assured the Tibetan power holders 
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in Gyalthang that the Red Army would not threaten their way of life. The troop leaders erected a 
large banner in front of Ganden Sumtsenling Monastery forbidding their soldiers from entering 
the main assembly hall. Desperate for provisions to feed his hungry soldiers, He inquired into 
purchasing grain from Sumtsenling Monastery, since the monastery controlled most of grain 
reserves in the Gyalthang valley. Sumtsenling’s monastic leaders sent Sonam Phuntsok (Sunnuo 
Pinchu 孙诺品楚), the monastery’s representative, to meet with He in Zanggong Hall.124 
Commander He explained the CCP’s religious and ethnic minority policies to Sonam and wrote a 
letter to the eight leaders of Sumtsenling Monastery assuring them of his army’s goodwill and 
his desire to protect their monastery from any harm.125 On a large red silk banner Commander 
He wrote in bold black brushstrokes, “The Red Army is a friend of the Tibetan people” (Hongjun 
shi fanmin de hao pengyou 红军是番民的好朋友), and presented the banner to Sonam.126 In 
return, Sonam assured He that he would figure out a way to procure grain for the Red Army.127 
Commander He knew his army would be unable to push onwards without purchasing new 
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provisions in town, so he was in urgent need of any help that the monastic establishment could 
provide. 
A lengthy meeting between Commander He and the representatives of each of the eight 
monastic colleges of Sumtsenling Monastery took place on May 2.128 Commander He used this 
formal occasion to present the monastery with a pair of Qing dynasty porcelain vases and a red 
silk banner, upon which he had written the following good tidings: “May the Tibetans Prosper” 
(xingsheng fanzu 兴盛番族).129 In return, the monastic leaders agreed to open the monastery’s 
grain storage doors the following morning and provide the Red Army with salt, brown sugar, and 
60,000 jin of grain.130 The monastery also asked the Tibetan villagers living within the 
jurisdiction of the monastery to sell an additional 10,000 jin of barley to the Red Army. 
Zangbum Dorje (Songmou Angwang Luosang Danzeng Jiacuo 松谋"昂汪洛桑丹增嘉措) (1899-
1967), the seventeenth reincarnation of the Zangbum Lama of Sumtsenling Monastery, 
instructed the leaders of Sumtsenling Monastery’s eight monastic colleges to meet with the 
Chinese troops and present them with khatas.131 He also wrote a letter to the abbot of 
Dondrupling Gompa (Gadan Dongzhulinsi 噶丹"东竹林寺), a Gelugpa monastery in nearby 
Trirangkar (Benzilan 奔子栏), asking him to protect the Red army and ensure the safety of his 
troops as they passed through Trirangkar.132 After they were well re-provisioned, the Red Army 
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left Gyalthang on May 4, 1936, and set out for Chatreng (Xiangcheng 乡城), continuing on their 
northern push into central Sichuan.133 
Although the Red Army was treated with respect by the monastic leaders of Sumtsenling, 
one hundred and sixty officers and soldiers were either killed or died of malnutrition and 
hypothermia during the seventeen days (April 29-May 15, 1936) that the Red Army spent 
passing over the mountains or gathering supplies in Gyalthang.134 This death toll included seven 
Gyalthang residents who joined the Red Army as translators when the troops came through town, 
but then died due to the harsh conditions in the high mountains or during later skirmishes with 
Tibetan troops led by warlords in Termarong and Chatreng.135 Many soldiers in the advanced 
guard of the Red Army that came through Gyalthang also died after being attacked by the 
formidable Tibetan warlord, Wangchuk Tempa (Wang Xueding 汪学鼎). Born into a powerful 
family in Gyalthang, Wangchuk received monastic training in Lhasa, but later left the monastic 
life to become the political and military ruler of Yangthang (Xiao Zhongdian 小中甸). In the 
1930s he built a well-armed militia and successfully recruited local residents to join him in 
protecting Gyalthang from roaming Tibetan bandits and outside military incursions.136 
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While many Gyalthang residents joined Wangchuk’s militia and fought against the Red 
Army, others appear to have been at least partially won over by the Red Army soldiers’ actions, 
speeches, and musical performances in town. There are accounts of pregnant Tibetan slaves, who 
were so impressed by the Red Army commanders’ speeches about the need to do away with 
social inequality in Gyalthang, that they named their newborn children “Communist” (gongchan 
共产).137 
 
The Growth of the Underground Communist Party in Northwest Yunnan 
A growing underground Communist Party (di xia dang zuzhi 地下党组织) gained 
support among young Tibetan and Naxi residents in Gyalthang during the fourteen years 
between the Red Army’s departure from Gyalthang in 1936 and the People’s Liberation Army’s 
arrival in 1950.138 In the autumn of 1941, Yang Zhanying 杨湛英, the Yunnan Provincial 
representative of the Second Communist Party Congress, traveled to Gyalthang and nearby 
Deqin and Weixi to gather support for an underground Communist Party in ethnic minority areas 
of northwest Yunnan Province.139 In the 1930s and 1940s Tibetan intellectuals began to discuss 
the various ways through which Tibet might achieve political, economic, and social “modernity,” 
and in these rarefied circles some were attracted to the ideals of the Communist Party.140  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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A small group of Tibetan Communist activists proposed to use Deqin County as their 
base of operations from 1945-1946, since there were not any permanently stationed Guomindang 
troops in Deqin at that time. Moreover, the de facto governor of the area was Gompo Tsering 恭
布泽仁 (Hai Zhengtao 海正涛), a Tibetan Communist Party sympathizer who had been part of 
the short-lived Tibetan Government (Tib.: bod pa srid gzhung) set up by the Red Army in 
neighboring Ganzi in Sichuan Province, when they crossed through Kham during the Long 
March.141 During World War II, the Guomindang sent Gompo Tsering to Deqin with a supply of 
three hundred guns and a mandate to establish a local Tibetan guerilla force that would help 
protect against the Japanese, who were in control of nearby Burma. Gompo Tsering soon became 
the commander of the militia force and the governor of Deqin County. Han Chinese living in the 
area in the 1940s called him “Commander Hai” (Hai siling 海司令).142 
In September, 1946, Gompo Tsering from Deqin, Phüntso Wangye 平措汪阶 (Min 
Zhicheng 闵志成) from Bathang, Ngawang Kesang 昂旺格桑 (Liu Shaoyu 刘绍禹) from 
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Xikang, and He Qichang 何其昌 from Gyalthang secretly established the “Eastern Tibetan 
People’s Autonomous Alliance” (Tib.: bod shar rgyud mi dmangs rang skyong mna’ mthun; Ch.: 
dong zang renmin zizhi hui 东藏人民自治会) in Yunniang Village 酝酿村, located in 
Shengping Town 升平镇 in Deqin County.143 He Qichang 何其昌 was a Tibetan merchant who 
came from a powerful and wealthy family in Gyalthang. His father, He Rongguang 何荣光, 
served as the Police Chief of Zhongdian County and the qianzong 千总 of Kaytshag (Geza 格咱) 
during the Republican period until he was assassinated by the monk warlord Ajian 阿坚 from 
Termarong (Dongwang 东旺) in 1930.144  
The “Charter of the Eastern Tibetan People’s Autonomous Alliance” (Tib.: bod shar 
rgyud mi dmangs rang skyong mna’ mthun; Ch.: dong zang renmin zizhi tongmeng jianzhang 东
藏人民自治同盟简章) cited Sun Yatsen’s Three Principles of the People as its guiding 
philosophy and declared that Tibetans should turn to Chinese Communist-style guerrilla warfare 
tactics in order to overthrow local Guomindang-backed warlords.145 The leaders of this alliance 
intended to recruit Deqin Middle School students to join their organization and to finance their 
expanding organization by taking control of the Guomindang tax office in Deqin. Their goals 
were to establish a democratically elected, autonomous government in Eastern Tibet, abolish the 
corvée (Tib.: ulag) tax system, and improve the livelihoods of Eastern Tibetans by utilizing local 
resources, building roads, and improving farming techniques. Although they were prepared to 
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engage in armed rebellion against the Guomindang government in Xikang and Yunnan, their 
plan was foiled when the Guomindang preemptively discovered their intentions and killed 
Gompo Tsering.146 Phüntso Wangye subsequently fled and spent the next few months in 
hiding.147 
Apart from He Qichang, a few other young Tibetans who came from wealthy families in 
Gyalthang joined the underground Communist Party in Lijiang 丽江 in the late 1940s. One such 
student was Liu Hanxun 刘汉勋 (1918-1972), the second son of Liu En 刘恩 (1888-1967), a 
powerful tusi in Gyalthang. As a young man, Liu Hanxun traveled to Lijiang to take the entrance 
exam for high school. Upon failing the exam, he became a horse caravan leader and merchant 
(mabang 马帮) on the Tea Horse Road (cha ma gu dao 茶马古道) that ran from southern 
Yunnan, through Gyalthang, and west to Lhasa.148  
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from Yunnan and Sichuan into Tibet and for bringing warhorses from Tibetan areas into Yunnan and Sichuan. The 
road also served as a significant corridor for migration and a bridge for cultural and economic exchange between 
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Two of the most successful traders in the region were Li Liesan 李烈三, a wealthy 
merchant from Lijiang who controlled much of the horse caravan trade in Gyalthang in the 1940s, 
and the Heqing merchant Bao Pinliang 鲍品良. Li and Bao joined together in 1947 to form a 
very successful trade insurance association (baoshangdui 保商队), called the Snow Mountain 
Society (Xueshanshe 雪山社), which expanded its membership base to over 40,000 merchants 
across Kham and into southern Yunnan Province by the late 1940s.149 Liu Hanxun and He 
Qichang worked directly under the command of Li Liesan and engaged in a thriving horse trade 
caravan business in the 1940s.  
In October, 1948, He Qichang introduced Bao Pinliang to He Wanguo 和万国, a 
Professor in the Chinese Department at Kunming Normal University (Kunming shifan xueyuan 
昆明师范学院), who had been engaged in underground Communist organizing for a few years 
in Kunming.150 He Wangguo insisted that if the Snow Mountain Association was willing to 
follow the leadershipof the Communist Party, then he would help He Qichang and Bao Pinliang 
to purchase guns and ammunition and transport their supplies north to Baoshan.151 In the coming 
months, numerous Tibetan and Naxi traders in Lijiang and Gyalthang were persuaded to work 
with the Communist Party to fight against the local Guomindang warlord, Luo Ying 罗瑛. 
Pamphlets were printed and circulated along the Tea Horse Caravan Route in Lijiang and 
Gyalthang, declaring “Defeat Luo Ying, Protect our Home Town!” (Dadao Luo Ying, baowei 
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jiaxiang 打倒罗瑛，保卫家乡), and “If We Don’t Protect Lijiang, We Won’t Be Able to Do 
Business!” (Bao bu zhu Lijiang cheng, shengyi zuo bu cheng 保不住丽江城，生意做不成).152 
On May 20, 1949, Liu Hanxun and He Qichang secretly joined the Communist Party 
organization in Lijiang and the following month they returned home to lay the groundwork for 
the establishment of the CCP in Gyalthang. After being persuaded to do so by his son, Liu En 
pretended not to notice that underground Communist organizing was taking place in Gyalthang, 
and he protected the Communist organizers by naming a newly-created Communist organization 
the “Native Place Protection” association (baowei sangzi 保卫桑梓).153 This organization later 
merged with the Voluntary City Defense Militia (chengfang yiwu dadui 成方义务大队) that the 
young Tibetan trader, Zhao Baohe 赵宝鹤, organized in 1948 in order to defend Gyalthang 
against bandit attacks from neighboring Termarong and Chatreng.154 !
By late May, 1949, the Voluntary City Defense Militia had grown to include sixteen men 
who had access to more than 200 weapons and who took turns patrolling Gyalthang’s city walls. 
Young Tibetan Communist activists, including Qi Yaozu 七耀祖 and Qi Shichang 齐世昌, later 
joined this organization, and their political and ideological discussions with their relatives and 
neighbors helped create more favorable conditions for the arrival of the advance guard of the 
People’s Liberation Army in early 1950.155 One of the popular grassroots organizational 
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techniques used by local Tibetan members of the underground Communist Party in Gyalthang 
involved organizing night schools for town residents. Residents of Jinlongjie 金龙街, 
Cangfangjie 仓房街, and Beimenjie 北门街—the three main residential alleys in Gyalthang’s 
town center—were invited to attend night classes where teachers explained the ideals of the 
Chinese Communist Party and taught basic Chinese literacy using the classical text, Sanzi Jing 
三字经.156 Because the night school teachers concluded every evening’s class with rousing 
renditions of Chinese folk songs that had been translated into Tibetan, the classes became very 
popular and attendance grew rapidly.157  
In August 1949, after a discussion with the Chinese Communist Western Sichuan Work 
Committee, Phüntso Wangye and a few other Tibetan underground Communists established the 
“C.C.P. Kham-Tibet Frontier Work Committee,” which later became known informally as the 
“Bathang Underground Party,” since it was headquartered in Bathang. Thousands of Tibetan 
intellectuals and Party members in Kham, including many in Gyalthang, became deeply involved 
in politics and many joined the “Eastern Tibet Democratic Youth Alliance” (Dongzang minzhu 
qingnian tuan 东藏民主青年团)—often abbreviated as minqing 民青—an organization that 
became the basis for the Communist Party’s early administration in Kham.158 On August 28, 
1949, the first underground Communist Party branch was established inside the town limits of 
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Zhongdian.159 By the time the PLA arrived in Gyalthang in 1950, more than thirty young Tibetan, 
Naxi, Bai, and Han residents of Gyalthang had joined the Communist Party or the Youth 
League.160 
Due to the PLA’s military successes in eastern China in the fall of 1949, by early 1950, 
local Tibetan youth who had been won over by Communist Party ideology, including many 
members of the local Youth League, were no longer fearful of publically aligning themselves 
with the Communist Party. They began to focus their energy on publicizing the goals and tenets 
of this new Communist Party. Local Youth League members translated Chinese revolutionary 
song lyrics into Tibetan, organized concerts, staged political plays, and gave public speeches in 
villages in the Gyalthang valley in order to persuade Tibetan farmers that a bright future lay 
ahead under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party.161 Feng Ruzhang 冯如璋, the local 
Tibetan leader of the Chinese Communist Youth League and a well-regarded classical painter, 
was given the assignment of painting an enormous portrait of Chairman Mao. The PLA 
Commander, General Liao Yunzhou 廖运周师长, who had come to Gyalthang ahead of his 
troops, requested that this painting be prepared in time to greet the rest of the PLA troops upon 
their arrival in town and he assigned Liu Hanxun to work as Feng’s assistant. Feng used the large 
curtain hanging in front of the entrance to the Tibetan Meeting Hall Zangjing tang 藏经堂 as his 
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canvas and he diligently painted for three days straight. He wrote the following slogan in large 
Chinese characters under his painting of the Chairman:  “Mao Zedong [is] the Great Leader of 
People of All Ethnicities.”162  
When the forty-two leaders of the 125th division of the People’s Liberation Army arrived 
in Zhongxin Town on May 10, 1950, Gyalthang residents assembled on both sides of the road 
leading from the town’s South Gate to watch the procession. To celebrate the “liberation” of 
Gyalthang, the new Communist leadership erected a five star Communist flag above Big Turtle 
Mountain (da gui shan 大龟山).163 Eight days later, Chinese Communist Party leaders in 
Gyalthang declared the establishment of the new Zhongdian County government under 
Communist Party leadership.164   
Many Tibetans were rewarded for their loyalty to the CCP once the Communists took 
over control of Tibetan areas in Yunnan Province. In May, 1950, Liu En was appointed the Vice 
Chair of the Zhongdian County Committee of the State Administrative Council (Zhongdian xian 
zhengwu weiyuanhui fu zhuren 中甸县政务委员会副主任). A few months later, in September, 
1950, as a symbol of appreciation for his aid to the Communists, Liu En’s son, Liu Hanxun, was 
invited to travel to Beijing to participate in the National Independence Day celebration. Just a 
few months after that, Liu En was selected to become the Vice Governor of Zhongdian County 
(Zhongdian xian fu xianzhang 中甸县副县长), a post which he held for fourteen years until he 
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was made a target of struggle sessions during the Cultural Revolution.165 In assessing this period 
of Kham history, Gray Tuttle, a historian of Tibetan-Chinese relations, claims that 
the Tibetan Communist cadres displayed the most surprising ignorance in their idealistic 
and naïve acceptance of Chinese propaganda even in the face of [an] obvious Chinese 
superiority complex…. Just as the Tibetan elite believed the Chinese Communists’ 
promises to preserve Tibetan traditions, the Tibetan Communists believed the promises of 
nationality equality, until it was too late.166  
 
While a number of young Tibetans in Gyalthang were intrigued and inspired by the 
Communist activists they met, many others remained unconvinced by the ideological viewpoints 
espoused by the underground Communist Party members, and they fiercely resisted the People’s 
Liberation Army’s encroachment on their territory. During interviews that Jamyang Norbu, a 
Tibetan historian and former resistance fighter, conducted with Tibetan refugees in exile, 
Gyalthang Tibetans insisted that they had resisted the PLA when it first advanced into their 
territory in 1949. Norbu maintains that: 
their claims are to some extent confirmed by the accounts of Peter Goullart, a White 
Russian employee of the Kuomintang Government, who served in the late 1940s as an 
agricultural expert of sorts in the Nakhi [Naxi 纳西] town of Lijiang in Yunnan 
Province.167  
 
Goullart claimed that in 1949, after the fall of Kunming and the PLA’s push toward the west, 
Khampas from Gyalthang came to Lijiang at the request of the Naxi. Together with Naxi 
resisters, these Khampa fighters managed to inflict an initial defeat on an advance guard of the 
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PLA. Later, according to Goullart, the Communists infiltrated agents among the Naxi, which led 
to the Communist takeover of Lijiang.168 Goullart maintained that the Naxi generally viewed 
Gyalthang Tibetans as formidable fighters who strongly resisted the encroaching Communist 
army. 
 
Wangchuk Tempa 
Indeed, while a number of young Gyalthang residents were intrigued by the ideological 
and political rhetoric espoused by underground Communist Party members, many local leaders 
remained uninterested in joining the early CCP administration in Gyalthang. Some went into 
hiding, fled to evade capture, or engaged in sustained and well-planned attacks on Party work 
units and PLA base camps. Wangchuk Tempa, a Tibetan monk who was born into a powerful 
family in Gyalthang, was one such leader.169 After learning of the Communist Party’s military 
successes in Sichuan in 1948, Wangchuk announced that he would defend Gyalthang from 
Communist aggression. Concerned about the growing influence of the Communist Party in 
Yunnan, Wangchuk sent his nephew, Wang Qupi 汪曲批, to meet with underground Communist 
Party officials in Lijiang in July, 1949. Wang requested that the underground Communist Party 
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dispatch an official to travel to Gyalthang and negotiate with Wangchuk about the future of 
Communist Party rule in Gyalthang.170  
The Communist Party sent the Western Yunnan Work Group to meet with Wangchuk 
and discuss the current political situation in Kham and the Party’s policies involving ethnic 
minority groups. The meeting went well and the Party representatives were prepared to write a 
very glowing report about the progress the Party had made in Tibetan areas of Yunnan, when 
they were blindsided. On September 3, 1949, the Western Yunnan Work Group left Gyalthang 
and passed through Jingkou 菁口 when Wangchuk’s army launched a surprise attack, killing six 
members of the work group, including Li Liesan 李烈三 and He Chengzong 和承宗, and 
injuring four others.171  
On October 20, 1949, Wangchuk assembled the tusi from Gyalthang, Deqin, and Weixi, 
and the monastic leaders of Sumtsenling and the surrounding monasteries to discuss the region’s 
future. At the meeting, Zangbum Dorje and Zhao Baohe 赵宝鹤, the commander of Gyalthang’s 
City Defense Volunteer Militia (chengfang yiwu dadui 城防义务大队) and a relatively new 
member of the Communist Party, tried to convince Wangchuk that the PLA was too powerful 
and that he should try to negotiate rather than fight a losing battle.172 Wangchuk ignored this 
advice and organized a number of local militias to engage in a well-coordinated attack on the 
PLA on October 29, 1949. The attack was successful and Wangchuk’s coalition militia killed 
many PLA soldiers and work team members (gongzuo dui yuan 工作队员), burned houses in the 
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area, and stole valuable PLA property. The battles continued over the next two months until 
December 25, 1949.173  
The extent of local resistance to the People’s Liberation Army’s advances is still on 
display today in Gyalthang’s Memorial Park, where numerous PLA soldiers who were killed 
during the “liberation” of Gyalthang have been buried. Located at the entrance to the Old Town 
at the southern end of Long March Road, Memorial Park has recently been remodeled. It now 
boasts an impressive bronze statue of a PLA soldier, a colorful mural with inscriptions observing 
the event in both Tibetan and Chinese, and newly planted flowers and trees near the tombs of the 
fallen soldiers. Every year on Tomb Sweeping Day (Qing Ming Jie 清明节), teachers bring their 
pupils to the Memorial Park cemetery to sweep the tombs of the soldiers, insisting that the 
students show respect for the sacrifices that the PLA soldiers made.174 
According to Communist Party historiography, Gyalthang was officially “peacefully 
liberated” (heping jiefang 和平解放) on May 10, 1950, by the PLA, however, Wangchuk 
continued to fight against Communist rule in the area for the next two years. Wangchuk 
organized armed rebellions against PLA troops and Communist leaders in Bulugu 布鲁谷 and 
Jingkou 菁口 in late May, 1950, leading to the deaths of many PLA soldiers, work-team 
members, and self-defense forces (ziwei duiyuan 自卫队员).175 Out of gratitude, the 
Guomindang government gave him a medal of honor in the spring of 1950. In May, 1951, 
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Wangchuk supported the Sanba 三坝 rebellion by sending troops, weapons, and supplies, but the 
rebellion was suppressed by the PLA. His nephew, Wang Qupi, started another uprising in 
March, 1952, when he killed six businessmen from Zhongxin Town who were traveling through 
Xiao Zhongdian under the protection of the local PLA Commander, General Liao.176 This 
marked the beginning of what CCP historians later termed the “Second Rebellion,” which lasted 
until Wangchuk’s troops bore the brunt of a particularly lengthy and devastating exchange of fire 
in Bulugu 布鲁谷.177 Injured and frightened, Wangchuk fled with sixty of his surviving militia 
members to a mountain cave in Termarong.  
In order to persuade Wangchuk to come out of the mountains, surrender, and join the new 
CCP government, General Liao asked two people to travel to Termarong and explain the Party’s 
religious policy to Wangchuk. A Tibetan monk, who was Wangchuk’s former body guard in 
Bigu Village 碧古村 in Yangthang, along with Zhi Zhu from Nagara, joined the PLA 
commander on his trip to visit Wangchuk. General Liao was finally able to win over Wangchuk 
after sending even more Tibetan representatives to negotiate with him, including Liu En 刘恩 
and Qi Yaozu 七耀祖, two former tusi who had already begun working for the Communist 
government. These former tusi promised Wangchuk that if he surrendered to the Communists, he 
would not be harmed or prosecuted, but instead made a member of the United Governing 
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Committee of the Lijiang Special District (Lijiang zhuanqu lianhe zhengfu weiyuan 丽江专区联
合政府委员). 
In the end, Wangchuk capitulated and, accompanied by his four most loyal bodyguards, 
traveled to Zhongxin Town to meet General Liao. Upon Wangchuk’s arrival in town, Liao 
ordered local officials to take him to Lijiang. Wangchuk proceeded south, accompanied by his 
own bodyguards and flanked by PLA troops. As the caravan traveled through the Axi Pass 阿喜
渡口, one of Wangchuk’s bodyguards reached over and grabbed a PLA soldier riding near him. 
Without a word, he began to strangle the soldier, and a few minutes later the pair fell off of their 
horses and tumbled over the cliff and into the raging river below. The two men drowned in the 
icy river in a matter of minutes. Wangchuk remained quiet throughout this incident and refused 
to say a word for the remainder of the trip to Lijiang. Upon arriving in Lijiang, Wangchuk stayed 
by himself in the house of an underground central commander of the PLA. All of the other 
soldiers and Communist Party representatives who accompanied him stayed in a grain storage 
facility. 
Wangchuk was initially very wary of the Party’s policies and skeptical that the 
Communists had the Tibetans’ best interests in mind. However, after many days of listening to 
United Front workers lecture about the Party’s ethnic minority policies, Wangchuk agreed to go 
on a trip to Chengdu. Travel and sightseeing, or what the historian Uradyn Bulag has termed 
“political tourism,” played an important role in the Chinese Communist Party’s attempt to win 
over and transform ethnic minority leaders.178 In Chengdu, Wangchuk encountered Commander 
He Long for the first time since they last met on the battlefield in 1936 during the Second Red 
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Army’s Long March through Yunnan. Much to Wangchuk’s surprise, Commander He expressed 
little animosity toward Wangchuk for his past actions, including his violent attack on 
Commander He’s own caravan in 1936. Instead, Commander He assured Wangchuk that the 
Party would not prosecute him for his past crimes against the Red Army or the PLA. 
Commander He declared that he and Wangchuk were actually on the same side, since they both 
wanted what was best for the people of Gyalthang. After a lengthy conversation and many cups 
of tea, He made arrangements for Wangchuk to attend Party education classes in Chengdu for the 
duration of the week. 
The next week a different battalion commander accompanied Wangchuk to Beijing to 
attend additional Party classes. In Beijing he was welcomed by representatives of the United 
Front Department and the Nationalities Affairs Committee (minzu shiwu weiyuanhui 民族事务
委员会). Over the course of the next few years, Wangchuk joined United Front Department 
cadres and other ethnic minority leaders on official tours to schools, factories, and farms in 
Beijing, Hunnan, and Kunming. The purpose of these tours was to show the former elite class the 
progress that the country was making under a new socialist system.  
The rationale for these political tours originated in a proposal that Ren Naiqiang 任乃强, 
a Chinese ethnologist specializing in southwestern frontier issues, made to Liu Wenhui, a 
Sichuanese warlord, in 1934. Ren suggested that sightseeing (guanguang 观光) would be one of 
the most effective ways to promote the assimilation of Tibetans into a newly constituted Chinese 
nation. He maintained that ethnic minority leaders that had been to China proper and had had 
long-term dealings with the Chinese were politically submissive to China, whereas those who 
had little knowledge of China were arrogant to the extreme. Ren alleged that, living in isolation, 
the frontier people were “like frogs in a well,” convinced that the small circle of sky visible 
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above them was actually the entire heavens. When ethnic minority leaders were “told about the 
great size of China and the large population of the Han Chinese people by outsiders who had 
visited Nanjing and Shanghai,” Ren explained, “they roared with laughter, dismissing it as a 
lie.”179 Although the Guomindang did not implement Ren’s proposal since they were distracted 
by an entirely different set of policy concerns during the Sino-Japanese War, CCP leaders later 
found Ren’s rationale for proposing minority sightseeing compelling. By Ren’s reasoning, the 
frontier people’s resistance to integration was not so much a political request for maintaining a 
separate polity for themselves, but purely the result of their ignorance of China. Their alleged 
belligerence was attributed to geographical isolation, and the only way out of it was for the 
frontier people to see with their own eyes what China looked like.  
As a result, after the CCP came to power, CCP leaders made a concerted effort to invite 
so-called “representative figures of the upper echelon”—ethnic minority members of the 
traditionally elite strata who had not joined the Communist Party—to participate in political 
tourism. The most important quality for selection as an invitee was the person’s “radiating power” 
(fushe li 辐射力), which was measured by the number of people that this person could directly or 
indirectly influence.180 Although the delegates’ attitudes toward the Communist Party were 
investigated ahead of time, hostile attitudes did not necessarily exclude elites from being invited 
to participate in political tourism. In fact, the more powerful or hostile they were, the greater the 
chances of being invited to Beijing. Certain elites, like Wangchuk Tempa, were even permitted 
to bring their bodyguards. 
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The ideological goal of political tourism was to shape and script minority leaders’ 
impressions of China. Bulag writes that: 
Prior to each visit, minority leaders would be fed with particular lines of information, and 
after the visit, they would be organized to have a seminar discussion, not to explore 
issues from different angles, but to achieve a unified understanding or consensus of what 
they had seen. Should one of them have a different, or rather ‘wrong’ opinion, he or she 
would be ‘helped’ to understand why they were in the wrong. At the end of the tour, 
minutes would be drafted, which would then be sent to the provincial or prefectural party 
committee for approval. The minutes were usually filled with lines of how elite visitors 
were impressed by Chinese hospitality, how advanced Chinese regions were, and most 
importantly how powerful the Chinese were….. The minority visitors would each be 
given a copy of the minutes and then charged with going back to their villages to make 
oral reports on what they had seen.181 
 
Party documents suggest that Wangchuk’s tour of inland China may have helped convince him 
of the power of the Communist government or the futility of fighting against it. A few months 
after returning back to Gyalthang in 1953, Wangchuk expressed his willingness to work with the 
leadership of the Communist Party, and later that same year, he was appointed Vice Governor of 
Zhongdian County (Zhongdian xian fu xianzhang 中甸县副县长). 
 
Recruiting the Local Elite 
After the People’s Republic of China was established in 1949 and the PLA subsequently 
“liberated” northwest Yunnan, the CCP attempted to avoid direct confrontations with Tibetan 
and Naxi elites in the area. Keenly aware of the tenuous nature of their position in ethnic 
minority areas along China’s borders, the CCP dispatched Nationalities Visitation Teams (minzu 
fangwentuan 民族访问团) in 1950 to help fill in gaps in the Party’s knowledge about existing 
conditions in the border regions. It was understood that once the process of investigating the 
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various minzu was finished, the CCP would be able to proceed with “civilizing” these groups and 
integrating the minzu leaders into the Party-state apparatus.182 Between July 1950 and the end of 
1952, the central government sent four missions to ethnic minority regions in the Southwest, the 
Northwest, the Center-south, and the Northeast, in order to investigate each region’s social, 
economic, and political conditions and explain the Party’s programs and policies to its future 
beneficiaries. 
From August 29, 1950 until May, 1951 a central delegation of anthropologists, linguists, 
and party workers was dispatched to investigate the conditions of the ethnic minorities living in 
Yunnan. The first stage of their research covered the districts of Guishan, Lijiang, Baoshan, Dali, 
Wuding, and Chuxiong, and was carried out from August 29, 1950-January 31, 1951.183 
Gyalthang was included in this first stage, since Zhongdian district (Zhongdian qu 中甸区) was 
under the jurisdiction of Lijiang until 1954.  
Led by high-ranking ethnic minority cadres and pro-communist scholars, these missions 
relayed greetings from Mao and the Central People’s Government to the minorities, apologized 
to them for the past wrongs wrought on them by previous Han Chinese regimes, and propagated 
the CCP’s new minority nationality policy. The delegates held numerous meetings with local 
ethnic minority leaders and they distributed gift items that were locally difficult to come by, 
including salt and medicine, with the aim of securing local leaders’ confidence in the new state. 
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During their time in Gyalthang, the delegation staged concerts, dances, and theatrical 
performances for Tibetan villagers and paid courtesy visits to the Gyalthang elite to assure them 
that the Party was interested in working with local monastic and lay leaders.184 The delegation 
showed films about the birth of “New China” (Xin Zhonguo 新中国) and distributed portraits of 
Mao Zedong to assist Gyalthang residents in identifying with the leader of their new nation.185 
The delegation, therefore, served both a fact-finding and propagandistic function. The task of the 
delegation was defined as:  
interviewing minority nationalities on behalf of the Communist Party Government and 
Chairman Mao, transmitting the deep concern of Chairman Mao and of the Communist 
Party Government for the minority nationalities, publicizing the nationalities policy of the 
Common Program and, when possible, gaining an understanding of basic conditions and 
demands of the fraternal nationalities.186  
 
Since the Communists’ long-term goal was to incorporate Tibetans into this new multi-ethnic 
Chinese nation-state in a seamless manner, the delegation focused its efforts on first winning 
over the aristocratic and religious elites in Gyalthang. Under the banner of “New Democracy,” 
the Chinese government proclaimed a united front of cooperation with the patriotic members of 
the ethnic minority elite. Wang Lianfang 王连芳 led the division of the Southwest Delegation 
that visited Gyalthang for twelve days and he assured the tusi and monastic leaders that the CCP 
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was not interested in pushing through land reform in Gyalthang without the full consent of the 
Tibetan elite.187 
On November 7, 1950, the delegation visited Sumtsenling Monastery and met with the 
eight monastic leaders of the khangstens. The monks staged a music and dance performance in 
honor of the visiting delegation. A large meeting, attended by reincarnate lamas, more than four 
hundred monks, and two hundred lay people of different ethnicities, was held in the courtyard of 
Sumtsenling Monastery.188 Wang, General Liao, and Sun Zhihe 孙致和, the governor of 
Zhongdian County, spoke at the meeting. That evening, Zangbum Dorje, the abbot of 
Sumtsenling, presided over the funerary rites for a highly esteemed monk who had recently 
passed away in Gyalthang. Wang later revealed that he believed that the visiting delegation’s 
presence at this ceremony helped the CCP gain the trust of local Tibetans.189 On November 11, 
1950, General Liao and Delegation Leader Zang (Zang tuanzhang 臧团长) held a meeting for 
more than three hundred secular and religious leaders in the area, including tusi from Deqin and 
reincarnate lamas from Weixi. During the meeting, they attempted to settle a long-lasting dispute 
between Ji tusi 吉土司 and Zhao huotou 赵伙头 of Weixi, encouraged Chatreng and Gyalthang 
representatives to pledge that their people would refrain from attacking and robbing each another, 
and tried to ease the worries of the upper social strata in Gyalthang.190 Finally, the leaders of the 
visiting delegation joined local political and religious leaders in meeting with more than 3,000 
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Gyalthang residents. During this meeting, Gyalthang villagers were encouraged to express their 
opinions of the new Communist system of government.191 
The CCP leaders understood that winning the trust and loyalty of the Gyalthang elites 
would entail more than just holding meetings and giving propaganda speeches; it would require 
correct behavior on the part of the PLA and the slow and gradual development of a cooperative 
relationship between the CCP cadres and the Tibetans. However, many ethnic minority elites in 
Gyalthang remained terrified of CCP rule, having learned early on that landlords in neighboring 
Jiangbian 江边 had been subjected to violent struggle sessions, tortured, and killed. Tibetan 
elites feared that if land reform was implemented in Gyalthang, they would also be struggled 
against and perhaps killed. They knew very well that they were the targets of the so-called 
“Democratic Reforms”—the version of land reform deemed appropriate for ethnic minority 
areas—despite the fact that the CCP leadership had insisted land reform would be introduced 
only after consultation with local power holders. 
In order to assuage the local elites’ grave concerns, the CCP introduced social and 
political reforms very gradually in Gyalthang. While there were obvious risks in allowing the 
secular and religious elites to retain real power in the short term, the long-term benefits of 
winning over the Tibetan population were so significant that the CCP was willing to make 
extraordinary concessions. It was a shrewd strategy that traded short-term setbacks (permitting 
local religious leaders to retain power and the manorial estate system to continue) for the 
achievement of longer-term national interests (Tibetans’ gradual acceptance of political and 
economic reforms under Chinese rule).  
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One such member of the Gyalthang elite was Liu En, one of the three remaining tusi in 
Gyalthang in the 1940s. In 1906 Liu inherited the position of the bazong 把总 of Yangthang, 
which meant that he became a low-level officer of the Qing army. In 1912, when the Yunnan 
Republican army came through Gyalthang on its westward march, Liu was given the 
responsibility of provisioning the Republican army with grain. According to Zhongdian County 
records, Liu carried out his official duties honorably and he was awarded a medal of distinction 
by the Republican government. In 1913 he was appointed to be the tuqianzong 土千总 of 
Nyishar (Nixi 尼西). In 1932 he successfully organized a local Gyalthang militia to defend the 
town from Chatreng bandit attacks and in acknowledgement of his success, the Guomindang 
government subsequently appointed Liu to be the Governor of Zhongdian County. He 
supposedly agreed to cooperate with the CCP in the early 1950s because past experience had 
taught him that it was best not to defy the central Chinese government. He initially assumed that 
the Communist Party would treat the Gyalthang elite similarly to how they had been treated by 
the Republican government in the 1940s. Liu was appointed to be the Vice Chairman of the 
Chinese People’s Consultative Conference in 1950 and in 1951 the CCP gave Liu the position of 
Vice Governor of Zhongdian County. While the CCP was strategically strengthening its 
relationship with the local Tibetan elite, the PLA expanded its presence in Gyalthang, which 
greatly diminished the CCP’s risk of losing Gyalthang in a revolt.192  
In the spring and summer of 1950, the Southwest Bureau began to build roads into central 
Tibet from the areas that it already held in Eastern Kham. Contracts worth millions of silver 
dollars (Tib.: dayan; Ch.: dayang 大洋) were awarded to aristocrats and Khampa trading 
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families in order to procure grain and transport enormous quantities of supplies on yak caravans 
into central Tibet. Tibetans were recruited by the Southwest Bureau to provide yaks and horses 
and many members of the Tibetan elite made their fortunes transporting supplies for the Chinese 
troops between 1950 and 1952. Phünwang, who was responsible for organizing transport in one 
part of Kham, recalled it was not difficult to convince Tibetan herders to loan the Southwest 
Bureau their yaks. He maintained that, “everyone was happy to do this because the PLA was 
paying in silver dollars. Many Tibetans made a lot of money from this.”193 A song composed in 
Kham points to the alacrity with which Tibetan traders and aristocrats in Kham took to helping 
the Chinese:  
The Chinese Communists are our parents to whom we are grateful. 
Dayan coins are coming down like rain.194 
 
According to one elderly Khampa from Chamdo who is now living in exile, cooperation and 
coexistence with the Chinese Communists seemed very plausible during the early years of 
Communist rule, due to the Communists’ willingness to generously compensate the Khampas for 
their labor and the use of their pack animals.195  
Based on the recommendations relayed back to the Central Government in the Visitation 
Team’s report, a United Front policy, which drew on a traditional Chinese military strategy of 
“turning enemies into friends” (hua di wei you 化敌为友), was implemented in northwest 
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Yunnan.196 It held that local leaders should be given new titles and large salaries and permitted to 
maintain their authority until CCP authority in the area could be firmly established. The CCP’s 
United Front Work Department was responsible for building a broad consensus among non-Party 
members and ethnic minorities for Party-supported programs and goals and to co-opt local elites 
through a variety of different tactics. One such tactic was “political persuasion work” (zhengzhi 
shuofu gongzuo 政治说服工作), which entailed lengthy meetings between recalcitrant Tibetan 
leaders and other local elites who had already been won over by the Communists. Another tactic 
was political tourism, in which elites were taken on tours to areas of the country that had already 
undergone land reform and were firmly under Communist control. Treaties were signed and 
ceremonies were held to mark the success of winning over particular elites. Rather than deposing 
these elites from power, or simply killing them off, they were wooed and enticed to join the 
Party and to be part of the new Communist government’s efforts to govern Gyalthang.  
One might wonder why the PLA didn’t simply move in and conquer Gyalthang, given 
their overwhelming military superiority in the area. The CCP wished to differentiate its policies 
from that of the Guomindang’s more forceful rule in the area. In doing so, it hoped to minimize 
the possibility of resistance in ethnic minority areas where Party control was weak and its 
ignorance of local customs was potentially dangerous. The CCP’s policy of cooperation with the 
“patriotic upper strata” may also be seen as an effort to close an expertise gap. The traditional 
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minority elite were simply co-opted into the Communist Party regional governmental hierarchy 
after reassuring the Communists that they would cooperate. These local elites served as 
guarantors of the population and tried to smooth relations between the Party and the populace. 
The local village (local Tib.: shuka; standard Tib.: tsho khag) elites of Gyalthang, Termarong, 
and Kaytshag that were in power in the 1930s and 1940s either remained in power or passed 
their positions of power onto their sons in the 1950s and early 1960s, until many of them were 
killed during struggle sessions at the height of the Cultural Revolution.197 Through carefully 
coordinated “nationality work” and “political persuasion work,” so-called liberation allowed the 
CCP to achieve what conquest could not.198 
Although the Communists believed that the policy of compromise was the most efficient 
way to establish good relations with the local elites, they nevertheless remained suspicious of the 
political loyalties of these traditional elites.199 With rare exceptions, local elites generally did not 
become party members. Instead, they were given low-level government positions that 
corresponded with the Party’s assessment of their potential future value. The CCP’s intent was to 
maintain traditional symbols of power while gradually changing the content that they symbolized. 
The Party’s policy of compromise was never intended to be permanent; it was only meant to be 
implemented until the party’s position had been consolidated in Gyalthang. As the Party gained 
support, as local Gyalthang residents gained expertise as cadres, and as Chinese cadres became 
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familiar with the situation in Gyalthang, the Party envisioned having more room to maneuver 
against the will of the local elites. Members of the traditional elite would then be forced to go 
along with the party’s policies or risk being subjected to struggle sessions.200   
From 1950 to 1953, China carried out land reform in most areas of the country and 
redistributed land confiscated from landlords to landless peasants, but land reform did not occur 
in Tibetan areas until much later. In other areas of the country, landlords became the objects of 
CCP-orchestrated popular justice during the early years of land reform. They were denounced, 
dispossessed, and in many cases executed. Some accounts claim that as many as five million 
landlords were killed in China during this period.201 This number includes those landlords who 
were struggled against and either committed suicide or were executed in Jinjiang 金江 (also 
known as Jiangbian 江边), a swath of land along the banks of the Yangtze River. Although it 
falls within the jurisdiction of Zhongdian County, Jinjiang is inhabited predominately by 
ethnically Bai and Han villagers. Young Bai and Han students from Jinjiang started the 
underground Communist Party in Zhongdian County in the 1930s and the Communists had a 
strong base of support there. Therefore, they possibly felt that the political conditions were ripe 
in Jinjiang to successfully carry out land reform in the early 1950s. In contrast, land reform in 
Tibetan and Yi areas of Zhongdian County was delayed until 1957.  
In the early 1950s, special ethnic minority policies were put in place in particularly 
sensitive areas of China’s western regions to delay the implementation of land reform and 
allegedly protected the autonomous rights of the minority peoples the CCP claimed to represent. 
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Given their control over the local population and their location along borders that were difficult 
for Chinese troops to access and challenging for past Chinese administrations to control, Tibetan 
elites’ loyalty to the new regime was understandably consequential to the political stability of the 
frontier.202 As a result, these special ethnic minority policies, which were a vital part of the 
United Front policy to win over the former governing elites in China’s frontier areas, remained in 
place in Gyalthang until rebellions in the area were firmly suppressed. 
One of the initial ways that the CCP attempted to win over the local elites after the PLA 
arrived in Gyalthang in May 1950 was through appeasing the religious leaders at Sumtsenling 
Monastery. The newly elected governor of Zhongdian County, Sun Zhihe 孙致和, personally 
undertook the work of recruiting the top secular and religious leaders in Gyalthang to support the 
government’s work. Some of the stipulations Sun outlined were that the Communist government 
would respect Sumtsenling’s religious ceremonies, give the monastery necessary support, respect 
the people’s daily customs, and provide local residents with adequate food and clothing.203 The 
CCP also encouraged religious leaders to join the committees responsible for reorganizing the 
local administrative and political power structure. Although certain local leaders, like Wangchuk 
Tempa, were initially adamantly opposed to the CCP taking over control of Gyalthang, believing 
that the locals could handle things best if left to do so on their own, Zangbum Dorje, the abbot of 
Sumtsenling Monastery, was much more ambivalent. In order to reach clarity about the complex 
political decision facing him and his monastery, Zangbum Dorje left Sumtsenling and retreated 
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to a meditation hut in Gyaxing Village (Jiren cun 吉仁村) in Nyishar Township in the summer 
of 1950.204  
Zangbum was very suspicious about the sincerity of the Communist Party, yet after being 
considerably wooed by Party officials, he consented to being appointed the Vice Chairman of the 
United Government of the Lijiang Special District (Lijiang zhuanqu lianhe zhengfu fu zhuxi 丽江
专区联合政府副主席) in October, 1950. In February, 1951 he was appointed the Assistant 
Director of the Lijiang Special District (Lijiang zhuanqu fu zhuanyuan 丽江专区副专员), and in 
late 1951 he was appointed leader of the Southwest Ethnic Minorities Tour Group and embarked 
on his own year-long political tour around the country. On January 1, 1952, this tour group met 
Chairman Mao Zedong and celebrated the New Year in Beijing. When the Preparatory 
Committee for the founding of Diqing Autonomous District was established in 1954, Zangbum 
Dorje was encouraged to chair the committee. He was also given the task of naming this newly 
organized “Tibetan Autonomous District” (Zangzu zizhiqu 藏族自治区), and he chose the 
Tibetan name bde chen (Diqing 迪庆), meaning “great fortune.”205 
 
Land Reform 
Even after the PLA secured control over Tibetan areas Northwest Yunnan, the provincial 
government was under strict orders to delay the implementation of radical social reforms, such as 
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land redistribution and class struggle. This reticence was a carefully considered strategy of 
gradualism insisted on by Mao and the Party leadership. Tibetans in Gyalthang had been 
informed repeatedly that reforms in minority areas would not be rushed and would not be 
implemented by force, as had been done in the Han areas of China in the early 1950s. Rather, 
implementation would occur primarily through the elite at a time when conditions were deemed 
appropriate, which in theory meant when most of the elite agreed to the reforms. Most of the 
Gyalthang elite were not very troubled by having become part of the PRC in 1950, since most 
people remained fairly unaffected by the political changeover in Gyalthang. After the 
establishment of Communist control over Gyalthang in 1950, the Tibetan religious and secular 
elites in Gyalthang had settled into a new routine that allowed them to have a certain amount of 
influence in the new government while still remaining wedded to the old socioeconomic power 
structure. This cozy arrangement, however, changed abruptly in late 1955 and early 1956 when 
talk of implementing “Democratic Reforms” surfaced, forcing the Khampa secular and religious 
elites to reassess their prospects for maintaining their current level of comfort and security in the 
future.206  
From the earliest days of the CCP there had been a fierce debate within its ranks about 
how long to wait before enacting radical reforms in ethnic minority areas. Leftists argued that, 
since reactionaries and the elite are rarely won over anyway, there was no point in delaying 
radical reforms such as land redistribution and class struggle. Yunnan’s leaders found themselves 
under increasing pressure to evaluate when local conditions would be appropriate for launching 
land reforms in Gyalthang. Since the Central Committee had not laid out operationally detailed 
procedures for determining when conditions were ripe for reforms, local leaders had great 
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latitude to interpret Mao’s instructions as they wished.207 One technique that the Party cadres 
used to secure evidence that the masses were requesting reforms was to hold a number of public 
education sessions. During these education sessions, poor Tibetan farmers were introduced to the 
Communist concepts of “exploitation” and “class struggle,” and they were informed that they 
could, in fact, rise up and overturn this system of oppression.208  
In late 1955 Mao proclaimed that ethnic minority groups were now ready for reforms and 
he lambasted Party cadres who suggested otherwise, accusing them of demonstrating a form of 
ethnocentrism that he termed “Han Chauvinism” (Da Hanzu zhuyi 大汉族主义). Mao ended the 
gradualist approach and started a nationwide push for partial collectivization known as the “High 
Tide in Socialist Transformation.”209 The Chinese authorities insisted that their initial agreement 
not to impose reforms on Tibet applied only to Tibetans living within the Tibetan Autonomous 
Region. Thus, the Chinese claimed, they were not breaching any agreement when they started 
the process of imposing land distribution and “religious system reform” in certain parts of Kham 
in 1955.210 However, efforts to demonstrate that the Tibetan elite were willing to accept these 
reforms proved to be problematic. Mao’s basic strategy was to persuade the elite to accept 
reforms in exchange for maintaining their current standard of living and social status. This was 
referred to as “peaceful democratic reforms” (heping minzhu gaige 和平民主改革), to 
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distinguish it from the harsh methods used in other regions in China, where landlords and 
wealthy peasants were subjected to public struggle sessions and their land and possessions were 
confiscated.211 Goldstein explains some of the main differences between peaceful democratic 
reforms and the kinds of land reform carried out in other areas of China: 
The salient difference was that [peaceful democratic reforms] were to be done without the 
humiliation, physical beatings, demeaning tasks, and expropriatiosn of wealth and 
property that characterized reforms done in inland China—that is, without the elite 
suffering material impoverishment, social degradation, and political isolation. With 
peaceful reforms, the former elite who did not oppose reforms would have the status of 
full citizens, and the state would provide them a standard of living equal to what they had 
before. Moreover, in many cases, they would be giving leadership positions in 
government. The key leverage when pressuring the Tibetan elite to accept reforms, 
therefore, was that there would be no struggle sessions and that their standard of living 
would not decline after reforms were implemented.212    
 
The Chinese Communist Party announced its new policy of “adjusting land ownership, 
renegotiating rent and liberating the serfs” (tiaotian yizu, jiefang nuli 调田议租, 解放奴隶) in 
Diqing Tibetan Autonomous District in late 1955.213 This policy fell in line with the general 
Communist Party directive to move toward the total collectivization of land throughout all 
regions of the country. There was a general sense that reforms should begin to be implemented in 
December 1955, so that the Communist leaders would have enough time to carry out reforms and 
be able to report their concrete achievements at the next national meeting of the People’s 
Congress in Beijing in March-April 1957.214  
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The first stage of reform entailed categorizing the local population according to the 
Chinese Communist Party’s class categories. Local leaders and officials were ordered to collect 
the necessary information for categorizing all households in the area and then given the difficult 
task of assign each household one of the following class labels: chieftain (tusi 土司), slave owner 
(nuli zhu 奴隶主), serf owner (nongnu zhu 农奴主), land owner (dizhu 地主), wealthy farmer (fu 
nong 富农), middle-class farmer (zhong nong 中农), poor farmer (pin nong 贫农), serf (nongnu 
农奴), or slave (nuli 奴隶).215 In Gyalthang, as in other parts of eastern Tibet, Tibetan society 
was far less strictly divided than in Central Tibet. Unlike in Lhasa, there were not any aristocratic 
families in Gyalthang, and neither were there “unclean” (Tib.: drib) outcast families, such as 
blacksmiths and corpse cutters. However, there were wealthy landowners, some of whom held 
hereditary servants, known locally as shenyog (Tib.: bran gygog). These servants were slaves in 
the sense that they could be bought and sold. However, not all house servants were “slaves,” and 
the term nang’zin was used most often as a more general term for servant.216 A great deal of 
controversy remains regarding the extent of “slavery” in Kham, and particularly in Gyalthang, 
prior to the Chinese Communist Party’s involvement in the area. One ninety-three-year-old 
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Tibetan resident of Nyishar claims that she spent the first thirty years of her life as a slave 
working for a wealthy family in a village near Feilai Temple (Feiliasi 飞来寺) in Deqin County. 
She maintains that after the Communist “liberation” of northern Yunnan Province, she and seven 
of her siblings were given a document proclaiming them to be free.217 In contrast, a few Tibetan 
scholars argue that poor Tibetan farmers in Kham often exaggerated their accounts of slavery in 
the early 1950s order to receive land allocated to former slaves by the Chinese Communist Party 
government.  
In 1955 it was announced that land that belonged to chieftains, owners of slaves or serfs, 
landowners, and wealthy farmers would be confiscated and either kept as government-controlled 
communal lands or redistributed to poor peasants.218 This announcement led to armed conflicts 
between the PLA and wealthy Tibetan farmers, landowners, and monks. 
 
The Khampa Rebellions of 1956-1957 
In 1954 the first National People’s Congress took place in Beijing. Representatives from 
the Qinghai-Tibetan plateau were sent, including cadres from southern Kham. On his return trip 
to Tibet after attending the National People’s Congress in Beijing, the fourteenth Dalai Lama’s 
junior tutor, Trijiang Rinpoche (Chijiang huofo 赤江活佛), stopped home to visit his extended 
family in Chatreng (Xiangcheng 乡城) in Sichuan Province. Trijiang Rinpoche was the head 
lama of Chatreng Sampheling Monastery, one of the largest monasteries in Kham.  
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Chinese Communist cadres accompanied by PLA escorts had entered Tibetan villages in 
the Chatreng area in February 1954, in order to introduce land reforms. However, according to a 
monk from Chatreng Sampheling monastery, most people in the villages refused to cooperate 
with the cadres, and in a few cases, they attacked the cadres and PLA troops.219 Tibetan villagers 
later managed to block the Chinese cadres and PLA troops’ access to a brook for fifteen days, 
cutting off the Chinese camp’s sole source of water.220 After months of fighting in the 
surrounding areas, by February 1956, thousands of villagers had taken refuge in Chatreng 
Sampheling Monastery, living alongside the nearly 3,000 resident monks. The PLA sent 
airplanes overhead that dropped leaflets, urging the monks and people to surrender. However, 
after months of intense standoff, the PLA ordered a single airforce plane to bomb Chatreng 
Sampheling Monastery. The monastery was ruined and the Tibetans who survived the attack 
either surrendered to the PLA or fled overland to Lhasa.221   
Meanwhile, in 1955, the abbot of Ba Chödeling Monastery (Zhuwasi 竹瓦寺) in 
neighboring Bathang sent a letter to Zangbum Dorje at Sumtsenling Monastery in Gyalthang, 
asking him to send troops to support this revolt aimed at protecting Tibetan religion in Kham. 
The abbot of Ba Chödeling Monastery also sent messengers to monastic officials in Lithang and 
Chatreng requesting all Khampas to unite against the Chinese. The letter carried by the Bathang 
messengers stated: 
Lingkha shi of Ba is already engaged in fighting against the Chinese. No matter what the 
Chinese Communists say, their aim is to occupy Tibet in the name of Ngabo’s Seventeen-
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Point Agreement. Therefore every Tibetan must unite and fight until even if there are no 
men left, women will have to take up weapons. If we let China do whatever it wants, 
Tibetan Buddhism and the Tibetan race will become extinct. Our property will be 
confiscated. Evil people will be the leaders and good people will be the servants. It is 
clear that things will happen which have never before happened in this world. Therefore, 
we must not be deluded by the Chinese deceit, and we must rise up in unison. We must 
completely forget personal and collected resentments that exist between our different 
areas, and confront together the enemy of our region.222  
 
The letter asked that Tibetan rebels coming through Gyalthang be given necessary 
supplies. According to Sulang Jiachu, a Tibetan historian of Gyalthang, the letter also stated that 
Bathang rebels threatened to burn the homes of villagers in Gyalthang who refused to aid the 
rebels.223 When this letter arrived in Gyalthang, Zangbum Dorje was meeting with Tibetan 
abbots and Chinese government representatives in the Tibetan Autonomous Region. Before 
Zangbum Dorje left Gyalthang to take part in this meeting, he supposedly told his assistant at 
Sumtsenling Monastery: “We are located along the Han-Tibetan border and we are different 
from other Tibetan districts. We must be prudent and refrain from participating in the southern 
Kham rebellion.”224 As a result, lamas in high positions of authority at Sumtsenling Monastery 
did not initially participate in the southern Kham rebellion. 
Nine days after fighting broke out in Bathang, it began in neighboring Lithang (Litang 理
塘). During the Tibetan New Year of 1956, the Chinese military used airstrikes and ground 
troops to lay siege to Lithang monastery, killing many of the monks and laypeople who had 
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barricaded themselves inside.225 Yunru Pon Sonam Wangyal, the young and charismatic nomad 
chief of the Lithang resistance, sent messengers throughout Kham calling for coordinated attacks 
on Chinese positions on the eighteenth day of the first Tibetan month of 1956. Monasteries and 
village leaders in Nyarong, Kanze, Bathang, Drango, and Linkashiba responded to this call to 
action.  
A particular mythic aura surrounds the battle that took place at the Lithang Monastery 
during the revolt of 1956. According to former-resistance-fighter-turned-historian Jamyang 
Norbu, the death of Yunru Pon Sonam Wangyal was legendary. Yunru Pon and other chiefs 
defended the Lithang Monastery for days against numerous Chinese infantry assaults and 
endured extended aerial bombing by Chinese aircraft sent from the airforce base in Chengdu. 
When his ammunition ran out, Yunru Pon pretended to surrender and, raising a white flag above 
his head, he approached the PLA troop commander. However, instead of allowing himself to be 
arrested, Yunru Pon waited until he was less than five feet from the PLA commander and then 
shot the commander at point blank range with a pistol concealed beneath his robe. The entire 
division of PLA soldiers then reportedly gunned him down. One eyewitness, Loto Phuntsok, 
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later testified to the International Commission of Jurists in 1959, that more than 500 Chinese 
soldiers fired on Yunru Pon in response to his assassination of their commander.226  
On the tenth day of the second Tibetan month of 1956, after the rebellion had spread to 
Lithang and a message had been sent to the surrounding monasteries requesting them to unite in 
the fight against the Chinese, around 2,500 Bathang Tibetan men between the ages of eighteen 
and sixty joined the monks in rebelling. The fighting began at night and continued until the 
Chinese troops were driven into the building that had formerly housed Tibetan government 
representatives. The Bathang Tibetans surrounded the building, cutting off the PLA troops’ water 
supply. From inside the building, the PLA soldiers radioed for help, and two days later two 
planes appeared overhead. They bombed Bathang for twelve days straight, dropping a total of 
seventy-three bombs and destroying Bo Chödeling Monastery and private homes. By late 1956, 
around 10,000 refugees had streamed into Lhasa from Kham.227  
Although there were long-standing animosities between Tibetan residents of Bathang, 
Lithang, and Gyalthang—as there were in many neighboring areas of Kham—at the end of the 
year leaders from each of these three Khampa regions signed a twenty-two-point agreement in 
which they agreed to unite to fight against the Chinese. The men who stayed behind in Bathang 
continued to fight through 1958, until they too finally had to flee, burning their houses as they 
left. From there, some groups from Bathang fought throughout southwestern Kham and others 
headed to Lhasa, where they joined in forming the united Tibetan resistance army, known as the 
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“Four Rivers, Six Ranges” (Tib.: Chushi Gangdruk; Ch.: si shui liu gang 四水六岗), an old 
name for Eastern Tibet.228 
The Khampa uprisings of 1956 were not isolated events. Rather, they involved many 
districts, regions and tribes in a surprisingly well-coordinated fashion. Norbu claims that, 
according to one source twenty-three major chiefs of Lithang, Chatreng, Batang, 
Lingkashi, Nyarong, Gyalthang, Gyalrong, Horko, Gaba and other areas, communicated 
with each other, responded to Yuru Pon’s call to revolt, and arranged a common day to 
launch the uprising. This was the eighteenth day of the Tibetan New Year of 1956.229  
 
Old Khampa trade networks between Kalimpong, Lhasa, and Kham initially facilitated political 
and military organizing across Kham, and later across Amdo and central Tibet. Wealthy traders 
such as Andrug Gompo Tashi, the leader of the Chushi Gangdruk Army, were invaluable to this 
pan-Tibetan effort, for they were some of the very few members of Tibetan society who could 
interact with people at all socioeconomic levels.230 Most of these twenty-three leaders were 
Khampa merchants who had made their fortunes after the Communist takeover in 1949, as China 
poured silver dollars into Kham to pay for temporary use of yaks to transport PLA supplies into 
central Tibet. However, instead of retreating safely to India with their fortunes in the early 1950s, 
these Khampa leaders spent their Chinese fortunes purchasing arms and ammunition in 
preparation for an upcoming revolt.231 They called their loose-knit alliance “The Volunteer Army 
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to Defend Buddhism (Tib.: Tensung Dhanglang Magar).”232 But despite their best efforts, the 
leaders and members of this resistance movement were ultimately unable to transcend their much 
more local loyalties and alliances. Norbu claims, therefore, that the resistance movement never 
really took on a fully national and dynamic character.233  
After many years as a political tourist traveling around China, Zangbum Dorje returned to 
Gyalthang in 1956 and discovered that Kham was in turmoil. Tibetan leaders from other areas of 
Kham encouraged him to leave Gyalthang and go to India to celebrate the 2,500th anniversary of 
the Buddha’s birthday, but he declined since he was afraid to abandon his monastery again 
during this time of great socioeconomic upheaval. When a revolt broke out in Gyalthang and the 
rebels asked Zangbum Dorje to join them in their cause, he refused. Instead, he asked the Lijiang 
branch of the PLA to send soldiers to Gyalthang to pacify the situation.234 According to Chinese 
government sources, Zangbum Dorje’s greatest worry was that the monks belonging to the 
various khangtsens at Sumtsenling would turn against one another.235  
In Zangbum Dorje’s absence, farmers in Gyalthang, including Da Zhongdian, Yangthang, 
and Kaytshag, had joined the Communist Party-organized peasants’ self defense group (nongmin 
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ziwei wuzhuang 农民自卫武装), which they initially named the Huludui 护路队.236 By March 
1957, the Communist Party had trained and equipped 660 members of this self-defense force. By 
the end of the year, it had grown to include more than 1,100 members. This stage marked the 
launch of a local militia that would later become known as the People’s Militia (minbing 民
兵).237 
These farmers intended to engage in an armed uprising, if necessary, to overcome the 
power of the monastery and help support the Communist government’s land reform policy. The 
state’s re-division of society according to class background offered unheard-of opportunities to 
those from more lowly origins, whilst former members of the religious and secular elite, who 
now were deemed to have “bad” class backgrounds, suddenly had to find ways to curry favor 
with the new Communist leaders. As one scholar has commented about this period, “the line 
between coercion and collaboration was often fine indeed.”238 
Wangchuk Tempa received letters from monastic leaders and local warlords from 
Lithang, Bathang, and Chatreng, asking him to lend his support to the Kham rebellion against 
Chinese rule and land reform. According to a former Communist Party official in charge of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 
236 Yangthang is a rural and predominately Tibetan township in Gyalthang located forty kilometers south of the 
region’s administrative center, Zhongxin Town (Zhongxin zhen 中心镇). 
 
237 These people’s militias expanded rapidly and by 1959, Gyalthang had 12,117 people’s militia members, 
comprising nearly 39% of the entire labor force in the region. For more on how the People’s Militia grew in 
Gyalthang between 1958 and the end of the Cultural Revolution, see ZXZ, 409-410. 
 
238 Jill Sudbury, “Apparitions of Red Horses: Narratives of Destruction in Bodongpa Monasteries in Central Tibet,” 
in Fernanda Pirie and Toni Huber, eds. Conflict and Social Order in Tibet and Inner Asia (Leidon: Brill, 2008), 197. 
Feminist philosopher Marilyn Frye’s theory of coercion is helpful in grasping the difficult choices that Tibetans 
living in Gyalthang faced in the mid-1950s. Frye writes that in coercive environments, the coercer manipulates the 
options to persuade the coerced to select the least unattractive option available, which is precisely the option that the 
coercer wants the coerced to select. See Marilyn Frye, The Politics of Reality: Essays in Feminist Theory (Berkeley: 
Crossing Press, 1983), 52-61. 
 
 
!
102!
implementing land reform in Gyalthang, Wangchuk responded that he had learned a lesson from 
his failed rebellions of the past and that he thought it best for the monastic leaders in Kham to 
compromise and submit to Communist rule in the area.239 When the monks at Sumtsenling 
Monastery decided to rebel against land reform and the Communist Party’s religious policies, 
Wangchuk refused to participate in the rebellion. Instead, he held meetings with village leaders 
in an attempt to convince villagers that the Communist Party had their interests at heart. He 
claimed that the CCP had treated him fairly, considering all of the grief he had caused the Party 
in the past. The Party never forced him to write a self-criticism or engage in a suku session, and 
he was never made the target of a class struggle session. The Party had a track record of treating 
cooperative members of the Gyalthang upper-class well, Wangchuk declared, and he assured the 
village heads and the monastery representatives that they had nothing to fear.  
It is possible that Wangchuk felt pressured to support land reform after accepting a 
position as Vice Governor of Zhongdian County under CCP rule in 1953.240 Wangchuk’s 
decision to “maintain a neutral stance” on land reform may also have been influenced by the fact 
that he understood that the Chinese Communist government was capable of easily suppressing 
any rebellion with armed force, if necessary. By 1956, the CCP had provided guns, ammunition, 
and basic weapon training to more than 2,000 villagers in Gyalthang, including local members of 
the police force, work team members, a self-defense troop (ziweidui 自卫队), and the locally-
formed Huludui, with the goal of creating a strong local security force to suppress uprisings.241  
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Using the name “Deka 德卡,” which had been used in the past to refer to the county’s 
main administrative unit, wealthy landowners and monks set up their headquarters at 
Sumtsenling Monastery and staged a rebellion against land reform in November, 1956. Residents 
of Village Seventeen sent their leaders to Sumtsenling to take part in what later came to be 
known as the “Bula Meeting” (Bula huiyi 布拉会议).242 Zhao Baohe and He Qichang, two 
Tibetan cadres in Gyalthang who had risen quickly through the ranks of the Diqing Prefectural 
government, and who understood that the Bula Meeting was about to take place, met with 
Zhongdian County’s monastery work group and propaganda work group to devise a strategy to 
prevent villagers from participating in this meeting.243 Once the Bula Meeting got underway, 
Zhao was sent by the Lijiang prefectural and Zhongdian county work groups to meet with the 
organizers. He succeeded in convincing a few monks who had participated in the meeting to 
meet with Guo Qingji 郭庆基, the Lijiang Prefectural Party Secretary, at the Zhongdian County 
government headquarters. Guo tried to persuade the monks to accept land reform, but they 
insisted that the amount of food allotted to them was insufficient under the new leadership and 
thus they would not support the reforms. After returning back to the monastery, these monks 
issued the public decree “Oppose the Peaceful Negotiation of Land Reform and Maintain the 
Tuguan System, Protect People’s Rights and Their Freedom to Practice Religion.”244 In the wake 
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of this proclamation, Sumtsenling monks protested on the streets of Gyalthang, carrying banners 
proclaiming: “Protect the People, Protect Religion” (baozu, baojiao 保族、保教).245  
The Diqing Prefectural work group reported on what they called the “Guihua Temple 
Incident” in a document submitted to the Yunnan Provincial authorities in January 1957. They 
wrote that: 
In the fighting at Sicun Ruoyimu 四村若依母 in December 1956, we shot dead seven 
bandit rebels and displayed their corpses on a side street (near the Monastery), inciting 
family members to claim the bodies. More than 200 rebel families arrived, and an armed 
conflict took place. One staff member was lost at the scene, and we also shot dead one 
lama. At the sound of gunfire, troops immediately rushed to the scene, and they were 
fired on.246 
 
After the Bula Meeting, the CCP consolidated the religious administration at the 
monastery and disseminated information to the monks about the Peaceful Negotiation of Land 
Reform and the Party’s policies on religion. They tried to drum up support for the Communist 
Party amongst the monks and they sent local Party officials, including Liu Yingguan and Song 
Qianzong, to the monastery to negotiate in order to ensure that the monks did not join the 
broader Kham rebellion. 
Maintaining this balancing act between appeasing the minority elites in Tibetan areas 
while simultaneously moving steadily toward land reform became very challenging in 1957. As 
the socialist frenzy of the Great Leap Forward spread throughout China, the Party cadres in 
northwest Yunnan felt increasing pressure to carry out land reform and initiate the 
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communization of farmland.247 Faced with escalating tensions in the Tibetan Autonomous 
Region and armed rebellion in many areas of Kham, the CCP gradually abandoned the strategy 
of the nationalities policy in favor of coercion.248 In order to carry out “Democratic Reforms” in 
Gyalthang, the CCP organized peasant self-defense forces that would be responsible for taking 
control of the guns and ammunition taken from the landlords and rich peasants in Gyalthang. On 
March 3, 1957, one day after the start of the Tibetan New Year, the Diqing Party Committee 
announced that land redistribution would commence in Gyalthang.  
In a last ditch to avert a rebellion, Zhao Baohe visited Zangbum Dorje and pleaded with 
him to discourage the monks from rebelling. Zangbum Dorje allegedly declared that he could do 
little to stop the rebellion from taking place, but he “showed his utmost benevolence in 
attempting to disseminate information urging the monks not to rebel.”249 Three days later, the 
rebellion commenced. 
The leaders of Zhaya 扎雅 khangtsen and Dokhar (Duken 独肯) khangtsen, along with 
village leaders and wealthy farmers in Village Three and Village Four in Da Zhongdian 
organized the rebellion.250 Farmers in Village Three stole weapons from the local self-defense 
force and residents of Village Four shot to death five Tianshengqiao Fuji brigade workers, 
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including Zhao Chaolun 赵超伦 and Pu Jianzhong. They staged a surprise attack on the PLA 
stationed in Gyalthang, and in Termarong they laid siege to the CCP headquarters. Rebels killed 
the leader of the Termarong work group, Yang Niancai 杨念才, and cut off the nose and ears of 
two female workers. A total of 1,525 people participated in this initial stage of the rebellion. 
1,161 of the participants were household militia members (menhubing 门户兵) and 364 were 
monks.251 
After the rebellion commenced, the Central Party Working Group of Zhongdian County 
held a large meeting during which Guo Qingji gave a speech about the need to suppress revolts 
and carry out the Party’s policies in minority areas, the importance of not harming the feelings of 
local power holders, and the Party’s decision to gradually implement new policies in minority 
areas. Guo emphasized that it was crucial for the Party to utilize political persuasion in minority 
areas and that the army should be used to enforce the Party’s power only in extenuating 
circumstances. 
 The Lijiang Prefectural Party Committee consequently sent Zangbum Dorje, Zhao Baohe, 
and Wangchuk Tempa to speak with the rebels in Village Four of Da Zhongdian Township. 
Wangchuk, Zhao, and Zangbum Dorje asked the rebels to hand over their weapons and horses 
and to meet with government officials. But the rebels not only refused to meet, they also insulted 
Wangchuk and Zhao and accused Zangbum Dorje of “selling out.” They also swore loudly at the 
Tibetan cadres who accompanied the three leaders. According to one Chinese eye-witness of this 
encounter, the rebels used the term “traitor” (Gyalthang Tib.: jia ga 嘉嘎) to insult these three 
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Tibetan leaders who had agreed to represent the Chinese government in this important dispute.252 
Any attempt at reconciliation between the CCP and the residents of Village Four ceased at this 
point.253 
Over the course of the next few days, the rebels moved their headquarters to Sumtsenling 
Monastery. The CCP warned the villagers to call their family members home from the monastery 
before the PLA attacked the monastery, but the villagers refused.254 The rebels were about to 
hold a meeting in Jiya khangtsen when Lapu, the head monk at Sumtsenling who served on the 
Party’s monastery committee, warned them of an imminent PLA attack. The Party surrounded 
the monastery with army vehicles belonging to the Lijiang Prefectural Division of the PLA and 
the rebels were encouraged to preemptively turn over their leaders in order to avoid having the 
army forcefully enter the monastery. The government sent Wangchuk Tempa to protect the other 
khangtsens inside of Sumtsenling as the army attacked Dokhar khangtsen. While monks in the 
other khangtsens remained in hiding, a terrible battle took place inside of Dokhar khangtsen. 
Sunnuo Zhaxi, a Tibetan work unit member, and Kelie Gegan, the rebel leader, were killed. 
Luosang Nongbu, another Tibetan worker, was injured. The PLA captured hundreds of rebels, 
including Kangsi Diwa, Guzhang Guoruo, Jiangsi Gejundun, Sigei Nianwa, Napa Xujue, and 
Canba Genong.255 
After the battle, the Party stationed Tibetan cadres at the monastery to serve as translators 
for the PLA soldiers and help them guard the monastery’s valuables. These cadres were also 
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responsible for confiscating all of the weapons in the monastery, which included twenty-three 
long armed muskets found inside of Rongba khangtsen. More than a hundred weapons were 
confiscated in the end.256 The next day, a large public meeting was held in the large square near 
the well in front of the monastery, in order to reassure the worried villagers. 
This rebellion was not the only one that took place in Tibetan areas within Yunnan in 
response to the announcement of the imminent implementation of land reform. On June 5, 1957, 
the Diqing Chinese Communist Party work group reported to the provincial party committee that 
it was still in the process of suppressing rebellions in each of the three counties in Diqing 
Prefecture. The report explained that a rebellion in Deqin, which had commenced in June, 1956, 
had since been reduced to a few stragglers, while the March, 1957 Gyalthang rebellion still had 
some “stubborn pockets of resistance.” The report also made it clear that the sixth district of 
Weixi Lisu Autonomous County had experienced some localized rioting, including an ambush in 
which eighty people snatched six packloads of foodstuffs and, in the process, killed five police 
escorts and wounded two others.257  
In mid-June, 1957, the reforms in Eastern Tibet were extended to include Chamdo in the 
Tibetan Autonomous Region, an area that Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai had promised would be 
excluded from all reforms. Well aware that a Chinese policy proclaimed just six months 
previously exempted them from land reform, Tibetans in Chamdo vehemently resisted. The 
government tried to convince or coerce Tibetan villagers to request that the reforms be 
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implemented, and in this way to circumvent the restrictions of the no-reform policy. However, 
this initiative failed, and organized resistance continued in Kham.258 
By early autumn, 1957, resistance to land reform in Gyalthang had been fully suppressed 
and the CCP’s political rhetoric shifted from emphasizing that Tibetan areas were an inalienable 
part of China, to asserting that the development of Tibetan regions was unattainable without the 
Chinese presence.259 In many respects, these policies heralded a marked decline in the autonomy 
of the region, an irony that was compounded by the establishment of the Diqing Tibetan 
Autonomous Prefecture in September 1957. Out of consideration for their decisions not to 
support the anti-land reform revolts earlier in the year, Zangbum Dorje was appointed Governor 
and Wangchuk Tempa was appointed Vice Governor of Diqing Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture.    
In October, 1957, in order to crack down on the power of Sumtsenling Monastery and to 
make sure that the monks could not join with villagers to yet again stir up “social unrest,” forty-
six monks at Sumtsenling were arrested. Land deeds that were stored inside of the monastery 
were destroyed, additional weapons were confiscated, and a significant number of the remaining 
monks were sent back to their villages or fled to the mountains. The number of resident monks 
living at Sumtsenling decreased from 1,329 to 1,078 as a result of the crackdown on this 
rebellion.260  
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The Great Leap Forward and the Socialist Education Movement 
 By August, 1958, land redistribution had been completed in Gyalthang and the old shuka 
and tusi administrative systems had been dismantled.261 Areas formerly known as shuka were 
turned into townships, and villages within each township were renamed using a numerical 
system. Land reform paved the way for the setting up of communes and by the end of 1958, eight 
people’s communes had been established in Zhongdian County.262 The “CCP Central Committee 
Resolution Regarding the Establishment of People’s Communes in the Countryside” was passed 
on August 29, 1958, and it announced that communes would lead peasants to achieve socialism 
ahead of schedule and hasten the transition to communism. By the end of October 1958, nearly 
the entire countryside in China was organized into communes with China’s 27 provinces and 
autonomous regions being organized into 26,576 people’s communes incorporating 99.1% of all 
rural households in the country.263 Every household in Gyalthang was organized into a village-
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level production team and, apart from a cow and pig allowed for each household, all of the farm 
animals were collectivized and herded together.264  
Many of the communes in Gyalthang put people to work growing enormous quantities of 
barley, but the new agricultural techniques employed did not result in a greater harvest. In fact, 
many people spent a significant portion of each day searching for wild vegetables in the forests 
and hunting for wild animals to kill for meat. Famine and malnutrition was rampant in Gyalthang 
between 1959 and 1961.265 Gyalthang residents recalled gathering and eating large quantities of a 
particular kind of bitter herb, locally called huitiao, which grew wild along the roads and the 
edges of fields.266 Eating too much huitiao was known to cause one’s neck and face to swell 
painfully (zhongbing 肿病) and those who did not quickly supplement their diet with additional 
food often died from this swelling.267 Interestingly, the annals of the Zhongdian Number One 
Middle School indicate that there were no incidents of famine or swelling caused by malnutrition 
amongst the teachers and middle school students living on the school campus.268 Apparently the 
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few students and teachers living on campus were able to cultivate enough of their own food on 
the school grounds to support themselves through the harsh winters of 1959 and 1960.269  
During the Great Leap Forward campaign of 1958-1959, collectives were amalgamated 
into communes. Mao’s vision of full socialist transformation required mobilization of rural 
residents on a scale transcending the traditional village. To accomplish this, the Party essentially 
implemented military methods of organization. During the Great Leap, basic-level government 
administration was shifted from villages to the communes, which were then placed under direct 
Party control. The communes were the first level of collectivization in Tibetan areas that 
transcended traditional village organization. The collectivized peasants were organized into 
People’s Militia, which facilitated their mobilization for large-scale land reclamation and water-
works projects.  
Since Tibetan areas were precipitously communized in August 1958, without any regard 
to the previous level of reforms or socialist transformation, areas that had not even completed 
basic land reform were now communized overnight. Party and state control were combined at the 
commune level, eliminating all vestiges of traditional leadership. Restrictions on private 
enterprise and mobility affected traditional means of livelihood.270 The coincidence of 
communization and the Anti-Rightest movement of 1958 led to an equation of “local 
nationalism” (difang minzu zhuyi 地方民族主义) with anti-Party, anti-socialist opposition.271 
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The Anti-Rightist campaign that followed the Hundred Flowers campaign ushered in a much 
more hardline nationality policy that added a new level of ideological and physical coercion to 
communization.272 Thus, in the end, what was supposed to be true “consultation” with the local 
Tibetan elite before the implementation of land reform, ended up being a kind of coercion 
followed by token consent.273  
While coercing the traditional elite into supporting land reform through the use of 
intimidation and political persuasion work, the CCP simultaneously attempted to cultivate a 
sense of revolutionary consciousness among ordinary Tibetan residents of Gyalthang. Patient 
“thought work” was a crucial component of the Communists’ efforts to create a sense of the 
voluntary and natural participation of the people in the revolution, land reform, and in the lead up 
to the Cultural Revolution.274 In Tibetan areas, this process of “socialist education” (shehui zhuyi 
jiaoyu 社会主义教育), which was grounded in a narrative plot of socialist advance, began with 
obligatory meetings in which locals were asked to recall past hardships through “speak bitterness” 
meetings.275 At these group meetings, Tibetans were required to produce and listen to 
testimonials ascertaining their consciousness of class-based oppression in the “Old Society” (jiu 
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shehui 久社会) and their present “liberation” (jiefang 解放) in the “New Society” (xin shehui 新
社会). As many scholars have pointed out, these first-person testimonials of the rural masses’ 
experiences of feudal exploitation and then liberation from class oppression were the narrative 
backbone of the Chinese Communist revolution.276  
“Speak bitterness” testimonials from young, female Tibetan villagers, in particular, were 
very effective weapons that enabled state cadres to directly attack Gyalthang’s Tibetan Buddhist 
monastic order. These testimonials were public performances designed to radically upend local 
kin-based gender hierarchies, which had traditionally mandated respect for elder Tibetan men 
and lamas. Writing about the way in which these compulsory group meetings were implemented 
and performed in the Labrang region of Gansu Province in 1958, Charlene Makley maintains 
that Tibetans performing “speak bitterness” testimonials represented “a truly ‘modern’ PRC 
subject, one who was liberated from the obligations of local kin ties and thus empowered to 
publically accuse Tibetan superiors of exploitation on behalf of the state.”277 The “speak 
bitterness” meetings therefore served to not only transform the structure of society, but also to 
fundamentally alter the minds of Chinese citizens and create a new, socialist consciousness. 
Monks who participated in the 1956-1957 Gyalthang rebellion were also ordered to take 
part in these “speak bitterness” sessions in late 1958. Some willingly admitted that the pre-
liberation era was one of bitterness while others, who refused to speak ill of the pre-land reform 
era, were sent away to join production brigades in the villages. Eighty-five percent of the 711 
monks who remained affiliated with the monastery after 1958 were very young monks. Only 367 
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monks actually continued to live at the monastery after 1958, and they were required to work on 
a collectivized production brigade and to elect one representative from each khangtsen to serve 
on a new monastery democratic organizing committee during the Great Leap Forward.278 Under 
a new Communist Party policy titled “Let the Monastery Take Care of Itself” (yi si yang si 以寺
养寺) these remaining monks were ordered to prepare uncultivated land for farming, maintain 
fertile fields year-round, and become entirely self-supporting. They were required to do all of the 
agricultural work in the fields themselves and supply their own food, water, and fuel.279  
Land reform in Gyalthang did not only redistribute the land, it also made obsolete 
previously hegemonic cultural orderings of the local social landscape, since it entirely eliminated 
the political and economic power of the monks and the other elite members of Gyalthang 
society.280 Party documents from the reform period present the Land Reform Campaign as the 
final blow to the tusi system, the system of monastic power, and the authority of local leaders. 
Since the implementation of land reform in Gyalthang overlapped with the national Anti-Rightist 
Campaign of 1957-1958, Wangchuk Tempa and other senior local officials and formerly wealthy 
landlords in Gyalthang were taken to Kunming to participate in struggle sessions and undergo 
“Rectification.” After one particular struggle session during the Rectification Campaign (1958-
1959), Wangchuk expressed his regret for all of the “anti-Party acts” that he had engaged in as a 
trader, bandit, and warlord in Gyalthang in the past.  
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Wangchuk was permitted to return to Gyalthang once the Rectification Campaign ended 
and on June 30, 1961, he fell ill and passed away at the age of seventy-six. On July 2, a religious 
ceremony and a political ceremony were both held in his honor. The Diqing Prefectural Party 
branch and government, Zhongdian County Party branch and government, the military, and the 
local schools all participated in the funeral ceremony.281 Moreover, the Yunnan Provincial 
government publically displayed their respect for Wangchuk by placing his official funeral 
announcement in the Yunnan Daily Newspaper on July 9, 1961.282  
After the Socialist Education Movement (1961-1963) had taken place, there was very 
little room left for the former Gyalthang elite to engage in meaningful governing. Many of the 
monks and upper class citizens, such as Zangbum Dorje and Liu En, who might have originally 
voiced strong opposition to the Cultural Revolution, had been co-opted into the Communist 
government structure and they found themselves in the position of defending the Communist 
Party right up until they were made targets of the Cultural Revolution. Other monks, who might 
have stood up and resisted additional political campaigns, had been effectively silenced once 
they were either co-opted into joining the Communist power structure in the aftermath of land 
reform, or deported to labor camps to engage in “thought reform through labor.” 
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The Four Cleanups Campaign 
During the Chinese Communist Party’s 10th Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee, 
which was held in Beijing in the fall of 1962, the CCP stepped up its campaign to oppose 
revisionism within the Party ranks. The communiqué of the 10th plenum recognized that the 
behavior of lower-level leading cadres had alienated the masses and added that the CCP should 
“endeavor to change this state of affairs and improve the work of those units without delay.”283 
In January, 1963, the People’s Daily complained that: 
A number of production teams are not well run…The work styles of the cadres in these 
teams are not pure…The cadres themselves lack socialist consciousness, and they even 
manifest spontaneous capitalist tendencies…Such cadres lack all awareness serving the 
people…They do not actively participate in labor, and they are always thinking about 
eating more and owning more. They not only fail to listen to the opinions of the masses, 
but they also force their demands upon the masses.284 
 
In response, the Communist Party leadership in Beijing launched the “Four Cleanups” 
campaign in many rural areas around the country in 1963 in order to crack down on what was 
perceived to be widespread corruption in party organizations, bolster the farmers’ morale after 
the catastrophes of the Great Leap, and improve the rural economy. The four targets to be 
“cleaned” were the government, the economy, the organization, and the ideology of the Party. 
Although the “Big Four Cleanups Campaign” (da siqing yundong 大四清运动) had ended in 
most areas of the country by early 1965, only in late 1965 did this campaign really get underway 
in Gyalthang, and thus it was still in its early stages when its far more ambitious successor, the 
Cultural Revolution, commenced eight months later. Indeed, it was the “Four Cleanups” 
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campaign workgroups who would issue the first directives launching the Cultural Revolution in 
Gyalthang in 1966.285 
 As a first step in the “Small Four Cleanups” campaign, which preceeded the “Big 
Cleanups Campaign” by just over one year, in November, 1963, the Lijiang Prefectural 
Committee sent a seventy-four person work team to Da Zhongdian district to “clean up” and 
stamp out signs of corruption among Zhongdian cadres.286 Once the Liiang Prefectural 
Committee work teams arrived in Zhongdian, their major assignment was to “strike roots and 
link up” with local poor and lower-middle peasants in order to gather information on the 
attitudes and behavior of local cadres.  
 These work team members were expected to eat, live, and labor together (dubbed the 
“three togethers”) with ordinary commune members. The goal was for them to serve as personal 
models for carrying out proper production and leadership work. Taking up residence in the 
homes of carefully selected poor farming families in Gyalthang villages, the work team members 
commenced their political work. Meetings were called with Gyalthang cadres at the commune 
and production headquarters and the cadres were told that the work teams had been sent down 
from Lijiang to investigate, expose, and rectify the economic and administrative malpractices of 
basic-level cadres and “other bad elements.” The cadres were told that those who cooperated in 
the investigations by freely and voluntarily “dumping their burdens” and “taking a warm bath” 
(xizao 洗澡)—conscientiously admitting their errors and making financial restitution—would be 
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treated leniently, while those who tried to cover up their own misdeeds, or the misdeeds of their 
friends and relatives, would be treated more severely.  
 Having spent a number of weeks “striking roots” in surrounding villages, the work team 
members gradually began soliciting the candid opinions of local residents regarding the mistakes 
made by local cadres. By July, 1964, the work team had split into four divisions to better cover 
the entirety of Zhongdian County, and they began to re-classify poor and lower-middle class 
peasants (pinxia zhongnong 贫下中农) and initiated struggle sessions against four types of class 
enemies, namely the landlords, wealthy peasants, counterrevolutionaries, and the bad elements 
(huai fenzi 坏分子).287 Within the first few months of the launch of the Small Four Cleanups 
campaign in Gyalthang, one cadre had been arrested, two cadres had been placed under 
surveillance, and twenty-nine cadres were forced to take part in public struggle sessions. By the 
end of that autumn, 708 out of a total of 755 agricultural cooperatives had taken part in this 
campaign. During the fall of 1964, 937 rural cadres and 2,687 hired herdsmen, small business 
owners, and other commune members were forced to “take showers” due to alleged corruption 
and misappropriation of work points and food rations.288  
 As the “Four Cleanups” campaign continued into 1965, the work groups increasingly 
attacked larger percentages of basic level cadres in townships and villages. This new kind of 
class struggle, initiated during the Four Cleanups campaign, ended up being the flint that sparked 
the fire of the Cultural Revolution in Gyalthang. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
REVOLUTIONARY ENTHUSIASM OR POLITICAL COERCION?  
TIBETAN PARTICIPATION IN THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION IN GYALTHANG 
 
 
As the sun rose over the frost-covered hills early in the morning on September 9, 1966, 
Dawa Phuntsok awoke to the sound of someone knocking on his door. The visitor 
commanded Phuntsok to attend a meeting on the village’s pastureland. Phuntsok, a 
thirty-year-old Tibetan monk who had lived in Ganden Sumtsenling Monastery prior to 
the land reform movement of 1957, quickly got dressed and joined his siblings and 
neighbors on the grassland. The leader of the village announced that volunteers were 
needed to defend the region against a formidable enemy and asked, “Who is willing to go 
to battle?” Given the volatility of the political climate at the time, no one in the village, in 
Phuntsok’s memory, dared to refrain from raising a hand. The “volunteers” were quickly 
assembled and asked to walk en masse to Ganden Sumtsenling Monastery, where they 
were told they would receive further instructions about this impending battle. Upon 
arriving at the monastery, Phuntsok was surprised to discover that the so-called enemy 
was none other than Tibetan Buddhism itself. He joined a group of farmers, students, 
cadres, monks, and nuns from the surrounding villages as they surged through the front 
gate, ascended the long staircase to the monastery courtyard, and entered the main hall. 
Around him people were tearing down thangka paintings, removing Buddhist statues 
from their wooden alcoves, and piling up Tibetan manuscripts in the courtyard in 
preparation for a bonfire, which was to be lit later that day. Phuntsok swallowed hard, 
picked up a wooden mallet, and joined other villagers in pounding away at the 
monastery’s rammed-earth walls.289 
 
  
The ransacking of Sumtsenling Monastery was not an isolated event in Gyalthang. As the 
Cultural Revolution swept through the region, local residents became entangled in the 
excitement and terror of the times. Tibetan villagers demolished the earthen walls of twenty-nine 
temples and monasteries in the area, set their wooden-shingled roofs alight, smashed Buddhist 
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ritual implements, and burned hundreds of religious manuscripts.290 Villagers pilfered or defaced 
anything of religious or cultural value and verbally and physically attacked religious and political 
leaders in town. The destruction of Tibetan cultural objects, historical archives, and religious 
institutions in Gyalthang was systematic and widespread.291  
In late spring, 1966, Mao unleashed the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution to 
eliminate his enemies and reshape relations within the party. This revolution began as an attempt 
by Mao to overcome revisionism and bureaucratism in the Chinese Communist Party by reviving 
collectivism. Unlike the past Chinese Communist Party purges that took place entirely within the 
rarefied air of the Party itself, this time around the driving forces of the cleanup—Red Guards 
and revolutionary workers—were outside of the Party. Mao sought to mobilize the masses to 
discover and attack what he called bourgeois and capitalist elements who had insinuated 
themselves into the Party and, in his view, were trying to subvert the revolution. In order to pave 
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the way for Chinese socialism to be “written on a blank slate,” Mao announced the need to first 
destroy the old, and then create the new.292  
 What were the political, social, and economic reasons why villagers actively participated 
in a revolution that sought to annihilate Buddhism and radically transform Tibetan culture?293 
Who took part in these destructive campaigns and why did they feel compelled to do so? To 
what degree did Tibetans believe in the idealistic yet powerful revolutionary ideology that spread 
so quickly across the country during the first few months of the Cultural Revolution? To a 
certain extent, mass participation liberated people during the Cultural Revolution from their 
everyday roles and enabled them to take part in a kind of revolutionary carnaval. Whether people 
joined in revolutionary singing or performed loyalty dances, whether they wrote big character 
posters or denounced a class enemy at a struggle session, the Cultural Revolution gave them an 
unprecedented opportunity to express themselves and to showcase their voices, their dreams, 
their jealousies, and their grievances.294 In pushing back against the allure in Tibetan studies of a 
conscious focus on victimization, which often comes at the expense of more complicated 
understandings of the past, this chapter will explore the various ways in which Tibetans 
experianced the Cultural Revolution in Gyalthang. 
 Although very little has been written about the Cultural Revolution in Tibetan areas, 
some of the earliest historical accounts written by foreign scholars in the 1990s suggested that 
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young Chinese revolutionaries were mostly to blame for the brutality of the Cultural Revolution 
campaigns in Tibet.295 These scholars maintained that ethnically-Han Chinese Red Guards 
traveled from predominately Chinese urban centers to coerce local Tibetans into spreading the 
ideological fervor of the Cultural Revolution into rural areas. Although Red Guards from central 
China did play an important role during the Cultural Revolution in many areas of the Tibetan 
Autonomous Region, in the case of Gyalthang, the Red Guards were composed entirely of local 
middle school students.296 Chinese Red Guards never traveled to Gyalthang from other parts of 
China to desecrate monasteries and organize humiliating and brutal struggle sessions against the 
local Tibetan population. Rather, these violent acts were carried out by local residents, including 
farmers, people’s militia members, and a small number of local Red Guards.  
 
“Destroy the Old!” Historical Erasure by Means of Annihilation 
The most direct and widely publicized attack on Gyalthang’s past took place during the 
first few years of the Cultural Revolution when local residents followed government orders to 
demolish their own monasteries and publically criticize religious and secular leaders. In a written 
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proclamation posted in town on July 28, 1966, the Xiao Zhongdian section of the Diqing 
Prefectural “Four Cleanups Campaign” (si qing yundong 四清运动) Work Group ordered 
villagers to destroy all Buddhist statues, paintings, and icons and to rid themselves of the 
remnants of “feudal superstition.”297  
In August, 1966, announcements in Chinese national newspapers urged young people, 
workers, and cadres to “Destroy the Four Olds” (po si jiu 破四旧), defined as the exploiting 
class’ old ways of thinking, old culture, old customs and traditions, and old habits.298 According 
to Zhongdian County Party documents, the position of the Four Cleanups work groups operating 
in Gyalthang was strengthened on August 23, 1966, when the People’s Daily printed Mao’s call 
to intensify the “Destroy the Four Olds” campaign.299 However, the Destroy the Four Olds 
campaign also shifted the work groups’ attention away from identifying corruption amongst 
lower-level cadres and toward a new target—the vestiges of traditional markers of religious, 
ethnic, and cultural identity.  
Buddhism became an early target of this campaign in Tibetan regions in China, and 
prefectural work groups in Gyalthang quickly drew up plans to destroy temples, monasteries, 
religious icons, and sacred texts, and to carry out struggle sessions against religious and political 
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leaders.300 The work groups also asked young people to assemble at Gyalthang’s only middle 
school, the Zhongdian County Number One Middle School, where they encouraged students to 
set up a Cultural Revolution committee on their campus and a Cultural Revolution Small Group 
for each grade level. After the central CCP’s decision on June 13, 1966 to temporarily suspend 
all classes and have students devote themselves full-time to the Cultural Revolution, formal 
studying came to a halt in elementary and middle schools in Gyalthang. In interviews conducted 
in 2010 and 2014, former students recounted spending the summer reading Mao’s political 
speeches and wishing they could demonstrate their revolutionary consciousness more actively.301 
The Zhongdian County Number One Middle School students joined together to form a 
small but vocal Red Guard troop (hong weibing 红卫兵) in September, 1966. They were inspired 
by Chairman Mao’s call to emulate the Tsinghua Middle School Red Guards in Beijing.302 In 
Gyalthang, local youth—including many enthusiastic revolutionaries who were not permitted to 
join the Red Guards due to their unfavorable class backgrounds—started pasting up big character 
posters (da zi bao 大字报) and marching through the streets.303 
The Red Guard movement in Gyalthang may be labeled “local” to the extent that Red 
Guards from outside of the area never came to Gyalthang to take part in revolutionary activities. 
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However, between August 8 and November 25, 1966, Red Guards from Gyalthang were sent on 
revolutionary trips to link up with Chinese Red Guards and travel to Beijing for mass rallies. 
Availing themselves of the opportunity provided by the now extended summer vacation, middle 
school students began to travel, often for the first time, outside of their hometowns. Mao 
encouraged students to ride buses and trains across the country to “ignite the fires of revolution,” 
declaring that, “we must support the great exchange of revolutionary experience by the 
masses.”304 By early September, all relevant authorities had been informed by the State Council 
that Red Guards engaged in such exchanges were to enjoy free travel, board, and 
accommodation. An autumn and winter of revolutionary tourism commenced as young people 
embarked on the journey of a lifetime. Twenty Red Guards from Gyalthang eventually made it to 
Tiananmen Square in Beijing to greet Chairman Mao.305 
Qilin Wangdu, a Tibetan middle school student and the grandson of the Vice Governor of 
Zhongdian, joined Red Guard friends in the autumn of 1966, to participate in the “great link-up” 
and travel to Lijiang, Kunming, Chengdu, Chongqing, and Xi’an. Although during his first few 
weeks on the road he enjoyed the chance to travel by bus and train and exchange revolutionary 
ideas with youth from other parts of China, his enthusiasm quickly dampened once he received 
word that both his father and paternal grandfather had become targets of intense struggle sessions 
in Gyalthang. Growing disillusioned with the Red Guard movement, Qilin returned back to 
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Gyalthang in November 1966 to find that his class status had been relabeled and his family’s 
political situation was now extremely dire.306   
There is insufficient data to ascertain the percentage of Tibetans who joined the Red 
Guards during the Cultural Revolution, but given the small percentage of Tibetan students 
enrolled in middle school in Gyalthang in the 1960, it is likely that the number of Tibetan middle 
school aged Red Guards there was very low. Of the 289 enrolled students at Zhongdian Middle 
School in 1960, 50.2% were Han, 39.4% were Naxi, 4.8% were Bai, 2.8% were Lisu, and only 
2% were Tibetan.307 There were no Tibetan teachers working at the school in 1960.308 However, 
despite the small number of Tibetan Red Guards in Gyalthang, it appears that many Tibetans still 
participated in the Cultural Revolution. According to two Tibetan residents of Gyalthang who 
became Red Guards in 1967, the Red Guards were influential revolutionary activists, but unlike 
in some other parts of the country, they were not responsible for the majority of the destruction 
that occurred in Gyalthang during the Cultural Revolution.309 In addition to the Red Guards, 
thousands of villagers and people’s militia members were involved in ransacking the monasteries, 
burning Tibetan books and manuscripts, and holding struggle sessions to criticize local 
leaders.310  
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The “people’s militia” in Gyalthang was composed of local residents who had been given 
basic military training by People’s Liberation Army officers, ostensibly to prepare them for 
armed resistance in the event of a foreign invasion. In 1959 Mao Zedong ordered local leaders 
around the country to expand the people’s militia and the Zhongdian County government 
responded by organizing 38% of the adult residents of the county (around 12,000 people) into a 
collective people’s militia. Ideological indoctrination was one of the most important goals of 
militia training, and in the 1960s people’s militia members were urged to get involved in class 
struggle. People’s militia members were also expected to study the lives of various model 
soldiers held up for emulation, such as Qilin Wangdan 七林旺丹, a local Tibetan farmer who 
helped the PLA suppress anti-Communist government rebellions in Gyalthang in the 1950s.311 
By late 1967, many middle-aged villagers and people’s militia members had started to emulate 
the Red Guards’ dress code, including attaching red armbands to their left shirtsleeves.312 
In late August, 1966, the Diqing Prefectural government issued the order to “Use the 
Four Cleanups Campaign as a Launching Pad for the Cultural Revolution” (si qing wei zhongxin 
zhuanru wenhua da geming 四清为中心转入文化大革命).313 Over the next few months, the 
work teams in Zhongdian County were withdrawn from the county seat and ordered to relocate 
to the villages to educate rural residents about the Cultural Revolution. The work teams’ goal 
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was to get impoverished farmers to recognize that poor living conditions were the result of 
centuries of exploitation by the former Tibetan monastic and ruling classes.  
Since the seventeenth century, Sumtsenling Monastery had been the most influential of 
all religious and political institutions in Gyalthang. Although the Zhongdian County government 
had seized the monastery’s farmland and had ordered the monks to disrobe, grow their hair, and 
return home to work in agricultural cooperatives in 1957, the monastery remained standing and 
its many statues, books, and paintings remained largely undisturbed. Even after land reform, 
Sumtsenling Monastery remained a powerful symbol of the region’s pre-Communist past. It 
therefore became one of the first targets of the Cultural Revolution.314 
On September 7, 1966, the Da Zhongdian 大中甸 “Four Cleanups” work group 
committee issued a proclamation entitled “The Plan to Mobilize the Masses to Destroy 
Sumtsenling Monastery.”315 The following afternoon, an advance party of 120 people was 
formed, including the Red Guards from Zhongdian County Number One Middle School, 
residents of Zhongxin Town, and farmers from Namsal township (Nuoxi xiang 诺西乡) and 
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314 Tsering Shakya claims that the Communist Party viewed the monastic institutions as one of the three “evils” of 
“old” Tibetan society. Thus, monasteries became an early target of the nascent Communist government’s attention. 
The other two “evils” were the aristocratic estate-holders and the Tibetan Government. Shakya, The Dragon in the 
Land of Snows, 248. To a certain extent, Tibetan monastic institutions, particulary in Kham, were also singled out 
for being at the heart of rebellions that had been costly to the Chinese Communist efforts to institute land reform in 
Tibetan areas. See Jill Sudbury, “Apparitions of Red Horses: Narratives of Destruction in Bodongpa Monasteries in 
Central Tibet,” in Fernanda Pirie and Toni Huber, eds., Conflict and Social Order in Tibet and Inner Asia (Leidon: 
Brill, 2008), 194. 
 
315 Ch.: Guanyu fadong qunzhong daohui guihuasi de jihua 关于发动群众捣毁归化寺的计划. See Le’an Wangdui, 
Dangdai Yunnan zangzu jianshi, 93. Party records indicate that Vice Secretary Zhang, referred to in documents as 
“Vice Secretary Zhang of the Da Zhongdian ‘Four Cleanups’ Work Group” (Da Zhongdian ‘si qing’ gongzuo zong 
tuan dang wei fu shuji Zhang XX 大中甸‘四清’工作总团党委副书记张XX), called Da Zhongdian cadres to a 
meeting on September 7, 1966, where the work group made plans to mobilize villagers to destroy Sumtsenling 
Monastery. Party documents do not reveal any other information about the identity of Vice Secretary Zhang, 
including his ethnicity. Many ethnic minority residents of Gyalthang have adopted Chinese names, so Vice 
Secretary Zhang’s surname does not necessarily indicate that he was Han Chinese. XXJZZZ, 396; ZXZ, 308-310.  
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Jiefang township 解放乡, two predominantly Tibetan townships close to Sumtsenling.316 They 
assembled at the monastery and made plans to enter it the following day. On the morning of 
September 9, 1966, government officials affiliated with various Diqing Prefectural and 
Zhongdian County bureaus, along with thousands of workers, farmers, and monks from nearby 
villages, entered Sumtsenling and burned sacred texts, thangkas, and Buddhist statues.317 This 
was the event in which Dawa Phuntsok took part.  
Nyima Chodon, a fifty-four year-old English teacher with a multi-ethnic background 
(Tibetan, Naxi, and Bai), recalled how his neighbor, a forestry worker and woodcarver, had 
participated in the destruction of Sumtsenling Monastery. This forestry worker, Tsering Norbu, 
was harvesting trees in an old growth forest in Kaytshag village on the morning of September 9, 
1966, when he received an order to return to town and proceed immediately to Sumtsenling 
Monastery. After reporting to the gates of Sumtsenling a few hours later, the Xiao Zhongdian 
work team leader informed Tsering Norbu that his task for the next few days was to cut down all 
of the large wooden pillars in the main hall of Sumtsenling monastery so that they could be 
sawed into small logs and burned as fuel in wood stoves. When Sumtsenling was originally built 
and consecrated in 1679, silver coins had been placed ritualistically underneath each of the main 
pillars of the monastery. According to Nyima Chodon, Tsering reported that after he cut down 
the main pillar in the largest hall of the monastery, he came across five tarnished silver coins that 
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316 In 1984, Namsal township was 97% Tibetan and Jiefang township was 99% Tibetan. Although I was unable to 
access any pre-1984 demographic information about these two townships, given the general population trends in the 
area, it is likely that the number of Tibetan residents in these townships was even higher during the Cultural 
Revolution. YSDZZZXDZ, 76, 79. 
 
317 Chinese party records indicate that as many as 10,000 villagers, Red Guards, monks and nuns, and work group 
members from Gyalthang may have participated in ransacking, looting, and burning valuable religious and cultural 
artifacts at Sumtsenling Monastery on September 9, 1966. XXJZZZ, 396; Le’an Wangdui, Dangdai Yunnan zangzu 
jianshi, 93. 
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had been placed underneath the base of the pillar three centuries earlier. He quickly pocketed 
them before anyone around him noticed. That evening when he returned to town, he told the 
children living on his street to line up in a row, and he gave one silver coin to each child. Nyima 
Chodon carefully hid this silver coin amongst his own personal possessions for the next twenty-
two years.318  
During the days following the desecration of Sumtsenling Monastery, local residents took 
furniture, pots, utensils, and large wooden beams back to their villages to make use of them in 
their own homes. The monks’ living quarters, the kitchen, and the main prayer halls of the 
monastery were torn down and a large quantity of reusable building materials was trucked into 
town in army vehicles. Some Gyalthangpa today claim that many of the large Tibetan houses 
built in the late 1960s on Gyalam Street (Jinlongjie 金龙街) and Cangfang Street 仓房街 utilized 
wooden beams and chiseled stones taken from Sumtsenling. Although some Tibetan residents 
were reportedly hesitant to prominently display objects that had been taken from the monastery, 
such as ornately carved window screens, they were willing to use the stones and wood from the 
monks’ quarters to rebuild or expand their own homes.319 This was less of a concern among Naxi 
and Han residents living in houses that were built along Beimen Street 北门街 and Pijiang Alley 
皮匠破 in Gyalthang in the late 1960s, where wooden screens and ornately carved wooden 
dragon heads from Sumtsenling Monastery were openly displayed.  
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318 Interview with Nyima Chodon in Gyalthang on June 20, 2013. 
 
319 Interview with the director of the Diqing Red Army Long March Museum (Diqing Hongjun Changzheng 
bowuguan 迪庆红军长征博物馆) in Gyalthang on July 29, 2014. 
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During an interview in March 2013, a Naxi resident of Beimenjie confirmed that many 
items taken from Sumtsenling were incorporated into refurbished houses in town in the late 
1960s. He proudly showed off his family’s two homes on Beimenjie, both of which were built in 
the architectural style typical of Naxi homes in the area. These homes showcased beautifully 
carved wooden roof beams that had been taken from the main prayer hall at Sumtsenling. He 
recalled how exciting it had been as a five-year-old child to be part of the political fervor 
surrounding the burning and looting of Sumtsenling. On September 9, 1966, his uncle had lifted 
him onto his shoulders and walked the four kilometers from the center of town to the monastery 
so that he could witness the destruction firsthand. When I asked him precisely who in the 
community was involved in looting and burning the monastery, this informant replied that 
everyone in the area participated.320 For eight straight days villagers looted and burned 
Sumtsenling and for the next two weeks the surrounding villages were enveloped in acrid smoke 
from the slow-smoldering roof beams. By the end of the month, all that remained of Sumtsenling 
was the ruins of some tamped down earth walls.321  
The fervor of the “Destroy the Four Olds” campaign intensified in the fall and winter of 
1966 and by the end of the year, two major warring factions had formed in Gyalthang—the 
“Turn Rivers into Oceans with Mao Zedong Thought” (Fan jiang dao hai Mao Zedong sixiang 
zhan dou dui 翻江倒海毛泽东思想战斗队)” faction, based in Zhongxin Town, and the “Peasant 
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320 Interview conducted with a Naxi landlord in Gyalthang old town on March 15, 2013.    
 
321 XXJZZZ, 396. A photograph of the ruins of Sumtsenling Monastery is printed in Ma Wenlong 马文龙, ed. 
Lixiang jia yuan – Xianggelila 理想家园 – 香格里拉 [An Ideal Home: Shangri-la] (Kunming: Yunnan minzu 
chubanshe, 2009), 55. Although the caption accompanying this photograph states that it was taken in 1968, a former 
Tibetan official in the Zhongdian County Propaganda Department insists that he took this photograph in late 
September 1966, and that the editor, Ma Wenlong, simply misprinted the date while compiling this book. Interview 
with former Zhongdian County Propaganda Department official in Gyalthang on June 5, 2013. 
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Revolutionary Rebel 6721 General Headquarters” (Nongmin geming zaofan 6721 zongsi lingbu 
zhan dou dui 农民革命造反6721总司令部 战斗队) faction, predominately based in Namsal 
township, a predominantly Tibetan township near Sumtsenling. Villagers had also formed twenty 
other smaller rebel groups (zhan dou dui 战斗队) in the region.322 However unlike in many other 
parts of the country, in Gyalthang rebel groups never engaged in large-scale armed conflict 
during the Cultural Revolution, since they did not have access to large quantities of ammunition. 
The People’s Liberation Army stored their ammunition in the meeting rooms adjacent to 
Zanggong Hall (also called Zangjing tang 藏经堂), at the base of Gyalthang’s hill-top fortress 
(Tib.: rDo mkhar rdzong, Ch.: Daguishan 大龟山). Because the army base was located right 
next to this Ancestral Hall and the army maintained control of its facilities during the Cultural 
Revolution, the rebels were unable to break into the storage rooms to obtain ammunition.323  
In November the Diqing Prefectural government called back the “Four Cleanups” work 
group and established the “Cultural Revolution Small Group” in its place. Zhongdian County’s 
elementary school teachers were assembled and transported to Lijiang, where they engaged in 
manual labor by day and studied the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee’s “May 16th 
Notice” and Mao Zedong’s “August 18th Proclamation” by night.324 On January 1, 1967 the 
People’s Daily and the Red Flag magazine ran the article “Carry out the Cultural Revolution to 
the End,” and two weeks later Mao ordered the army to set up stations in rural areas in order to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 
322 XXJZZZ, 396. 
 
323 Interview with the director of the Shangri-la Red Army Long March Museum (Xianggelila hongjun changzheng 
bowuguan 香格里拉红军长征博物馆) in Gyalthang on July 29, 2014. 
 
324 Le’an Wangdui, Dangdai Yunnan zangzu jianshi, 104. 
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support the revolutionary fervor of the farmers and rural workers. On January 27, 1967, a former 
“Four Cleanups” work group member posted the first big character poster targeting the 
Communist Party in Gyalthang. It urged Gyalthang residents to “Blow up the Prefectural Party 
Committee,” and it sparked a frenzy of big character poster creation in town. Students met 
together for hours to copy excerpts of Mao’s speeches onto big character posters. In order to 
assist with the vast quantity of big character posters being posted in town, the prefectural 
working group erected large bulletin boards in Gyalthang’s main square and business district.  
In addition to demolishing Tibetan temples and monasteries in Gyalthang, Cultural 
Revolution activists also targeted local religious rituals and cultural traditions. Families were 
urged to burn or smash all religious objects in their homes. Prayer flags were removed from 
roofs and mani stones and stupas were ground into pebbles and used to pave roads. Tibetan 
proverbs and folk songs were forbidden; in their place came unfamiliar Chinese slogans and 
revolutionary Tibetan songs modeled on Chairman Mao’s quotations.325 Tibetans were ordered 
to discard their Tibetan-style clothing in favor of blue Mao suits and caps,326 cut their long hair 
short in the Chinese style, and replace traditional Tibetan religious holidays and secular festivals 
with Chinese revolutionary holidays.327 Lamas, sprul sku (reincarnate lamas), diviners, Naxi dto-
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325 A few of these new Tibetan revolutionary songs were compiled and translated into Chinese in 1977 by Sun 
Zhicheng, a member of a Kunming-based Song and Dance Troupe. This Song and Dance Troupe traveled to rural 
towns and villages in Yunnan predominately populated by ethnic minority groups to stage revolutionary 
performances for villagers. Interview with Sun Zhicheng in Kunming on July 31, 2011; Sun Zhicheng’s Diary 
(September 20, 1977), 10, 12, 27. For more on how song and dance troupes in Tibetan areas substituted 
revolutionary lyrics for Tibetan folk lyrics and wove elements of Tibetan folk music into new Chinese melodies, see 
“Interview with Artists of the Tibeton [sic.] Song and Donce [sic.] Troupe,” Peking Review 33 (21) August 18, 
1978: 20-24. 
 
326 Interestingly, many Tibetan women living in Kaytshag (Geza xiang 格咱乡), a rural Tibetan township located to 
the northwest of Sumtsenling, continue to wear green Mao caps today, while Naxi and Bai women in Gyalthang and 
Lijiang often wear blue Mao caps, something that is not as common anymore in other areas of the country. 
 
327 Kolås, Tourism and Tibetan Culture in Transition, 45. 
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mba, and other religious figures came under renewed attack.328 Every night at political meetings, 
work group activists and local Red Guards ordered villagers to denounce religious leaders. 
According to a Tibetan monk who participated in similar meetings in Lhasa, at these gatherings 
participants were urged to call out:  
The gods, lamas, religion and monasteries are the tools of exploitation; the three serf-
owners made Tibetans poor; the Chinese Communist Party liberated us and gave us food, 
clothes, houses, and land; the Chinese Communist Party is more kind than our own 
parents. May the Chinese Communist Party live for ten thousand years! May Mao Tse-
tung live for ten thousand years! The crimes of the three serf-owners who at the flesh and 
drank the blood of the people are bigger than the mountains and cannot even fit in the 
skies; from this day forward we will destroy them.329 
 
Monks were forced to wear dunce’s caps, paraded through the streets by young activists, and 
coerced into participating in “reform through labor” (laodong gaizao 劳动改造), which often 
involved digging latrines and carrying heavy baskets full of human excrement to fertilize the 
land.330 Instead of presenting monks with khatas (white ceremonial silk scarves) as a sign of 
respect, villagers brought their muddy, patched trousers to struggle sessions and hung them 
around the monks’ necks to show their disgust for this “exploitative religious class.”331 Many 
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328 Emily Chao, “Hegemony, Agency, and Re-presenting the Past: The Invention of Dongba Culture among the Naxi 
of Southwest China,” in Melissa Brown, ed., Negotiating Ethnicities in China and Taiwan (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1996): 208-239.  
 
329 Dhondub Choedon, Life in the Red Flag People’s Commune (Dharamsala: The Information Office of His 
Holiness the Dalai Lama, 1978), 60-61. 
 
330 Le’an Wangdui, Dangdai Yunnan zangzu jianshi, 93. Of course, the degree to which the young activists were 
also coerced into participating in the ideological campaigns of the Cultural Revolution is a question worth asking. 
For more about the degree to which Tibetan activists willingly destroyed their own heritage during the Cultural 
Revolution, see Sam van Schaik, Tibet: A History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011), 245; Makley, The 
Violence of Liberation, 122-123. 
 
331 Interview with Dawa Phuntsok at Sumtsenling Monastery in Gyalthang on July 24, 2014. 
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monks ultimately committed suicide or died from the severe injuries they sustained during these 
public beatings.332 
Zangbum Dorje is perhaps the best-known victim of the Cultural Revolution in 
Gyalthang. As a young child, he had been recognized as the seventeenth reincarnation of the 
Zangbum Lama of Sumtsenling Monastery. He traveled to Lhasa in 1912 for an education in 
Buddhist philosophy and Tibetan medicine, returning to Gyalthang in 1921 to teach and preside 
over Sumtsenling Monastery’s 1,300 monks.333 Zangbum Dorje appointed Chair of the 
Preparatory Committee for the founding of the Diqing Tibetan Autonomous District and then 
given the largely ceremonial title of the Governor of Diqing Prefecture, a position he was the 
first to hold, and which he retained until 1966.334 
Despite his attempts to persuade wealthy landlords in Gyalthang to submit to Chinese 
rule in the early 1950s and his continual cooperation with Yunnan Provincial leaders in the early 
1960s, in 1967 Zangbum Dorje was forcefully brought back from upper-level cadre meetings in 
Kunming to be the target of struggle sessions in Gyalthang. For five months in the spring and 
summer of that year, Red Guards paraded him up and down the streets of Gyalthang and led him 
out to villages to be struggled against in successive townships. His personal possessions were 
confiscated, and he was criticized and beaten. A monk who was thirty-one years old at the time 
recalled riding on the back of a tractor to a struggle session in Kaytshag (Geza 格咱), a rural 
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332 XXJZZZ, 39-40, 396. The Diqing Prefectural Gazetteer states that a total of 616 people in Diqing Prefecture 
died after being struggled against during the Cultural Revolution, but it does not indicate how many of those who 
died were monks; DZZZ, 553.     
 
333 Sulang Jiachu, Sulang Jiachu zangxue wenji, 342. 
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!
137!
Tibetan township located to the northeast of Sumtsenling.335 He was instructed to watch as a 
young Tibetan woman from Kaytshag loudly denounced Zangbum Dorje, waved her fist in his 
face, and then sat on his back and rode him like a horse across the stage. 
The geographer Emily Yeh maintains that Tibetan women’s roles were viewed as critical 
to the success of the Chinese state’s ideological campaigns in Tibet and Tibetan women were 
often “mobilized to break male monastic as well as secular authority.”336 Likewise, Charlene 
Makley writes that: 
The unprecedented visibility of the few Tibetan and Han women who took centre stage to 
scream their bitterness at Tibetan incarnate lamas would have been particularly 
significant for locals. Indeed, Tibetans’ accounts of this process throughout the frontier 
zone suggest that in singling out Han and Tibetan women identified as activists or former 
serfs to publically humiliate lamas, cadres sought to utilize the gender status of such 
women to desecrate Tibetan divine masculine authority and to assert instead the modern 
superiority of rational and ordinary biological sex difference. In speaking bitterness 
narratives, the figure of the Tibetan woman revolutionary agent was particularly suited 
for the ritualized exposure of monks and lamas’ ‘legitimate claims’ to Tibetans’ patrifilial 
loyalty, and for demonstrating the legitimate ascendance of state-empowered cadres in 
their stead—she embodied the culmination of national incorporation as emasculation.”337 
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335 Interview with monk in Sumtsenling Monastery in Gyalthang on July 24, 2014. 
 
336 Emily Yeh, Taming Tibet: Landscape Transformation and the Gift of Chinese Development (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2013), 84. It is interesting to note that Yeh employs the passive voice—i.e. “Tibetan women were 
mobilized”—in describing how gender played a role in the Cultural Revolution.  Most of my informants in 
Gyalthang also spoke in the passive voice when describing their participation in the Cultural Revolution—i.e. “We 
were told to…,” “I was made to…,” etc.. Likewise, most Chinese-language accounts of the Cultural Revolution in 
Gyalthang make use of the passive voice. A number of other foreign scholars have also employed the passive voice 
in describing the destruction that took place during the Cultural Revolution. See, for instance, Antonio Terrone’s 
comments: “Revolutionary fervor and violence resulted in the destruction of thousands of religious sites and 
buildings as well as bringing on physical and psychological harassment to thousands of ‘politically labeled’ 
individuals including the aristocratic and monastic elite.” Antonio Terrone, “Householders and Monks: A Study of 
Treasure Revealers and their Role in Religious Revival in Contemporary Eastern Tibet,” in Sarah Jacoby and 
Antonio Terrone, eds., Buddhism Beyond the Monastery: Tantric Practices and their Performers in Tibet and the 
Himalayas (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 79. By employing the passive voice, narrators are able to describe the atrocities of 
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337 Makley, “The Politics of Memory,” 119-120. For a more lengthy account of the gender dynamics in Tibet during 
the Chinese political campaigns of the 1950s and 1960s, see Makley, The Violence of Liberation, particularly 90-93, 
116. 
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 As a result of severe beatings inflicted during lengthy struggle sessions, Zangbum Dorje 
died in June, 1967. He was not alone in meeting this fate. One of the great-nephews of Zangbum 
Dorje remarked that it was, of course, “quite normal” (hen zhengchang 很正常) that Zangbum 
Dorje died at the hands of locals in 1967. Taken aback at my expression of astonishment, this 
great-nephew, who was a former revolutionary activist during the Cultural Revolution, explained 
that nearly all of the major religious figures and power holders in town were denounced and 
ultimately died of their injuries or committed suicide in 1967. This former activist’s own father, 
one of the first Tibetan underground Communist Party members, was subjected to repeated 
struggle sessions during the Cultural Revolution and eventually died in 1972 of injuries sustained 
during these struggle sessions. Similarly, his grandfather, who was a powerful Tibetan political 
leader and later became the Vice Chairman of the Diqing Prefectural Committee of the Chinese 
People’s Political Consultative Conference, died in 1967 from internal injuries sustained during 
struggle sessions.338 Between 1967 and 1970, hundreds of religious leaders, prominent 
landowners, and Communist Party cadres—including many of the cadres who had helped 
“liberate” Gyalthang in 1950—were struggled against. Heavy wooden placards announcing their 
crimes were hung around their necks and they were forced to wear tall dunce hats as they were 
paraded through the streets. An unknown number were persecuted to death.  
Apart from destroying monasteries and attacking local leaders who symbolized 
Gyalthang’s former secular and religious power structure, revolutionary activists also engaged in 
a process of renaming as an attempt to re-narrate the past. During the Cultural Revolution there 
was a feverish effort to remove all “superstitious and feudal” Tibetan names and to replace street 
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338 Interview with the great-nephew of Zangbum Dorje in Gyalthang on October 15, 2012. 
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names and village names with new revolutionary Chinese names. Many of the traces of this 
renaming frenzy are still visible in the town today. The first government-run school in Gyalthang, 
the “Zhongdian Elementary School of Yunnan Province” (Yunnan shengli Zhongdian 
xiaoxuexiao 云南省立中甸小学校), which was founded in 1936, was renamed the “Red Guard 
Elementary School” (Hong wei xiaoxue 红卫小学) in 1967.339 The school still goes by this name 
today. One of the main East-West boulevards in Gyalthang was also renamed “Red Flag Road” 
(Hong qi lu 红旗路) at the height of the Cultural Revolution, and many Gyalthang parents gave 
their newborn children revolutionary-sounding Chinese names during the Cultural Revolution to 
demonstrate their ideological vigor.  
This frenzy of naming followed on the heels of an earlier round of renaming, which 
occurred after violent rebellions against land reform were suppressed in Gyalthang in 1957-1958. 
To celebrate Gyalthang’s so-called “peaceful negotiation of land reform” (heping xieshang tudi 
gaige 和平协商土地改革) a number of villages in the Gyalthang area were renamed, including 
“Happiness Township” (Xingfu xiang 幸福乡) and “New Sun Township” (Xinyang xiang 新阳
乡) located in Nyishar Township, and “Liberation Village” (Jiefang cun 解放村), which is just to 
the east of Sumtsenling Monastery.340 In the Yangthang district three rural townships that had 
been hot spots of resistance during the land reform campaign were renamed “Linking-up 
Township” (Lianhe xiang 联合乡), “Unity Township” (Tuanjie xiang 团结乡), and “Peace 
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Township” (Heping xiang 和平乡). 341 Two additional Tibetan townships in the Termarong 
(local Tib.: Tongwa; Ch.: Dongwang 东旺) district located around one hundred kilometers north 
of Zhongxin Town that had fiercely resisted falling under Chinese Communist control in the 
1950s were renamed “Victory Township” (Shengli xiang 胜利乡) and “New Alliance Village” 
(Xinlian cun 新联村) in 1958 once their leader, Wangchuk Tempa, had been defeated.342 To this 
day, each of these places has retained the name imposed on it by the Chinese government during 
the Mao era. 
In December 1967 two warring Red Guard factions in town asked the People’s Liberation 
Army to intervene and impose strict security measures in town. Re-education classes organized 
by the army gradually led to a more orderly state of affairs in town, and by late 1967 the army 
had effectively quashed the power of the Red Guard factions and taken full control of the 
government at the prefectural level.  
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341 Ibid., 94, 99, 103.   
 
342 Wangchuk Tempa (Wang Xueding 汪学鼎) was born into a powerful family in Gyalthang and briefly underwent 
monastic training in Lhasa from 1947-1948 before returning to Gyalthang to organize armed rebellions against the 
People’s Liberation Army and the Communist government in the 1950s. For more on Wangchuk Tempa see Bstan-
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南省迪庆藏族自治州委员会，文史资料研究委员会 [Chinese People’s Political Consultative Committee, 
Committee of Diqing Precture in Yunnan Province, Literary and Historical Materials Research Committee], Diqing 
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Materials from Diqing Prefecture, Volume 7] (Kunming: Yunnan yafeng san he yinwu jingmao you xian gongsi, 
2005), 8-16. 
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Covering up the Past: Official Assessments of the Cultural Revolution 
Attempts at the management of the public’s memory of the Cultural Revolution began 
soon after the end of the Mao era. The new government under Deng Xiaoping introduced far-
reaching economic reforms, including the return of landholdings to individual households, as 
well as new policies on ethnic minority cultural and religious practices, which permitted certain 
innocuous expressions of Tibetan culture. This economic and cultural liberalization was expected 
to “rectify the ‘leftist’ mistakes” (jiuzheng ‘zuo’ de cuowu 纠正‘左’的错误) of the Cultural 
Revolution and defuse any remnants of local discontent with Communist Party rule. While 
implementing these new reform-era policies, the Zhongdian county government urged local 
residents to look forward rather than dwell on painful memories concerning the recent past. 
Although the editors of Zhongdian County Gazetteer blame Lin Biao, the Gang of Four, 
and other so-called “Leftist Extremists” for the excesses of this period, thereby adhering to the 
central Party’s official historical assessment of the Cultural Revolution, and they only devote 
five pages of this nearly 1,000-page volume to Cultural Revolution history, they nevertheless 
make it clear that the destruction and violence that took place during this decade was carried out 
at the hands of the local population.343 Interviews conducted with Tibetan residents of Gyalthang 
support this assessment. Many of the Gyalthang residents with whom I spoke explained that at 
the height of the Cultural Revolution, Gyalthang villagers did not think of this movement as a 
campaign that had been imposed by the Han Chinese. Rather they regarded it as yet another in an 
ongoing series of national political campaigns in which they had taken part since the mid-1950s. 
  The extent of Tibetans’ participation in Mao-era political campaigns raises a number of 
questions about coercion, responsibility, and agency. What kinds of choices were available to 
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Tibetans when they deliberated how best to respond in the face of enormous social and political 
pressures?344 Coercion certainly was, and continues to be, a reality for Tibetans living under 
Chinese Communist rule. Yet, individuals still made decisions when faced with a particular set 
of dire options at any given time, and those choices have continued to haunt residents of 
Gyalthang to this day. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
ETHNIC POLITICS, HISTORICAL AMNESIA, AND THE REFRAMING  
OF GYALTHANG HISTORY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 
 
Instead of destroying the past, a new version of Gyalthang’s past began to be created in 
its place during the post-Mao reform era, but this fabrication was done as much for economic 
reasons as ideological reasons. In the early 1980s and then again in the 2000s the practice of 
replacing place names was renewed. In 1982, the names of four main boulevards in Gyalthang 
were changed to reflect the town’s relatively new Communist history. One road, running from 
north to south, was renamed “Peace Road” (Heping lu 和平路), ostensibly to reflect the 
importance of peace in building a strong socialist society while implementing the “Four 
Modernizations.”345 The other main boulevard in town was renamed “Long March Avenue” 
(Changzheng dadao 长征大道) in 1982, as a public reminder that the Second Division of the 
Red Army had come through Gyalthang in 1936 during the Long March. An additional road 
running from East to West through town was renamed “Unity Road” (Tuanjie jie 团结街) in 
1982 to celebrate the state’s promotion of harmony and unity amongst all ethnic minority groups. 
However, the most dramatic example of reinvention through re-naming occurred two 
decades later. In the late 1990s, the Chinese Communist Party initiated a national campaign to 
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“Open up the Western Regions” (xibu da kaifa 西部大开发), and the central government singled 
out tourism as an important development strategy for southwest China. Regarding tourism as a 
promising new source of revenue for a government that was heavily dependent on state 
subsidies, the Yunnan Provincial Government reacted quickly and made substantial investments 
in the necessary infrastructure to promote tourism in the region over the next nine years. 
Gyalthang was identified as a particularly suitable area for tourism development, due to its 
scenic beauty, diverse ethnic minority population, and its relatively low prospects for 
successfully following a more conventional industrial development path.  
Government officials on the county, prefectural, and provincial levels in China have long 
celebrated the development of tourism as a painless road that will bring economic development 
to non-industrialized areas of Southwest China. The development discourse in contemporary 
China holds that tourism is a promising way to allow previously ‘backward’ areas to catch up 
with the more ‘developed’ regions in China. Tourism was designated as a strategic growth point 
for the national economy and in regions of the country mainly inhabited by ethnic minority 
populations, it was promoted as the number one tertiary industry in the 1990s. In 1999 the central 
government issued a regulation to increase the length of China’s two most important national 
holidays, the Spring Festival holiday and the May 1st holiday. As a result of these extended 
holidays, an increasingly affluent middle class was able to take time away from work and engage 
in domestic tourism. By the end of 2000, national annual earnings from domestic tourism had 
reached 317 billion RMB and domestic tourism accounted for more than 90% of all tourist trips 
taken within China.346 Compared to cities and coastal areas, the more rural areas in Southwest 
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China have not received as large of a share of tourists or of the national revenue generated from 
domestic tourism. However, since many of these rural areas lack other significant means of 
income generation, tourism plays a critical role in the health of these local economies. 
Up until the late 1990s, logging was the largest revenue-generating industry in Northwest 
Yunnan province. Large-scale logging began in the late 1960s in Diqing Prefecture, and from the 
1960s through the 1990s, timber provided the main source of revenue for local governments at 
the provincial, county, and township levels.347 In the 1990s, eighty-four mostly township-owned 
mills produced timber worth more than 366 million RMB annually.348 Ineffective forestry 
management as well as a general reliance on timber as the main source of prefectural revenue 
resulted in massive deforestation throughout the prefecture, and particularly on the 
mountainsides closest to the more densely inhabited areas. 
In the summer of 1998, disastrous flooding left 4,100 dead and displaced an additional 
230 million people in Hubei, Anhui, and Jiangsu Provinces.349 Although initially heavy rains 
caused by El Nino and that year’s unusually abundant winter snowmelt in Tibet and Qinghai 
provinces was blamed for the flooding, a few months later government officials declared that the 
floods were actually caused by the extensive deforestation that had taken place along the upper 
reaches of the Yangtze River. As a result, in August 1998, the central government announced an 
unconditional ban on all logging in the mostly Tibetan areas of the upper Yangtze, including 
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parts of Sichuan Province and northwestern areas of Yunnan Province.350 All of the timber 
markets in these areas were closed down in September of that same year, leaving local 
governments to search for way to make up more than eighty percent of their annual revenue 
without resorting to illegal logging.351 
As home to twenty-five of China’s fifty-six officially designated ethnic nationalities, by 
far the largest number of any province or autonomous region, Yunnan province had pursued 
ethnic tourism as its “dragon head” of development since the early 1980s.352 However, it was 
only after the financial reality of the logging ban hit that local officials began to re-double their 
efforts to draw tourists to the region. Tourism had been promoted in Diqing Tibetan Autonomous 
Prefecture ever since the region was opened to foreigners in 1992, and from 1993 to 1995 the 
prefecture saw an influx of 185,000 tourists. In 1995, tourism revenue in Yunnan reached 
thirteen percent of the local GDP, providing a huge boost to an otherwise very localized and 
somewhat stagnant economy.353 Local governments immediately began to search for ways to 
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market Diqing Prefecture as an even more attractive tourist destination. In 1998, officials in the 
Diqing prefectural government formulated a five-point plan aimed to revive Tibetan culture. 
Tibetan culture was designated as an exploitable resource and Tibetan folk songs and dances 
were singled out as cultural products that could be made available for tourist consumption.354   
At first the biggest obstacles to expanding the tourist industry in Diqing prefecture was 
the lack of road access and adequate tourist facilities. Most of the roads in the region were built 
for military purposes or to access timber and export timber south to Lijiang and Dali, and thus 
for decades at a time just a few roads were considered adequate to meet local traffic needs. 
During the 1990s road construction took place at an unprecedented rate, but the hundreds of 
kilometers of roads that were built by the prefectural forestry bureau were constructed solely for 
the purpose of logging, leading straight out of the towns and into the forests. 
In 1999 the Shangri-La Regional Airport was completed to link Gyalthang with Lijiang, 
one of Yunnan’s premier tourist sites located just over one hundred miles away to the southeast. 
In that same year, the Diqing Prefecture Tourism Bureau invested over 7 million RMB in 
Gyalthang’s Sumtsenling Monastery in order to build a new parking lot and re-guild the golden 
rooftop.355 The county also provided funds to build a new main street, known as “Long March 
Avenue” (Changzheng dadao 长征大道) to house the county government. They ordered that all 
hotel, restaurant, and shop signs that faced Long March Avenue must be written in Tibetan script 
in addition to Chinese. 
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In the following year, more than one million tourists visited Diqing Prefecture, which 
was an increase of more than 150% from before the logging ban took place in 1998. Ninety-four 
percent of these tourists were domestic Chinese tourists.356 By September of 2001, total visitors 
to the area had reached 1.2 million, of which only 65,000 held foreign passports.357 In 2001 local 
government revenues from the tourism industry were reported to have surpassed their revenues 
at the peak of the logging era by more than 10 million RMB, now bringing in a total of 68 
million RMB annually. Tourism continued to skyrocket, and in 2002, more than 1.5 million 
tourists visited Diqing prefecture.358 Road development continued at a rapid pace, not just in 
Shangri-la, but in rural areas all over China. Between 2003 and 2005, the Chinese government 
paved more rural roads than it had during the entire previous half-century of Communist rule.359 
However, it was really the State Council’s approval of Zhongdian’s name change, which took 
place on December 17, 2001, that caused Zhongdian to stand out from other areas in Yunnan 
Province and tout itself as the “authentic” Himalayan paradise. 
 
The Politics of Naming and the Myth of Shangri-la 
Place names are often at the heart of identity politics, and thus the very choice of a name 
can be fraught with political implications. The Chinese name “Xianggelila” is a transliteration of 
the name “Shangri-la,” which is neither Chinese nor Tibetan but rather entirely English in its 
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linguistic origins. This English loan word was first used by the British author James Hilton when 
he published his best-selling book Lost Horizon in 1933. Hilton’s book was an immediate hit in 
Britain and America and was made into a film by the Hollywood director Frank Capra in 
1937.360 In the story, a group of four Westerners, including an American and a British diplomat, 
board an airplane in India in order to flee a revolution. They crash in a remote part of the 
Himalayas and find themselves in a beautiful and spiritual land, which Hilton describes as 
“touched with the mystery that lies at the core of all loveliness.”361 Buddhist and Christian 
monks rescue the Westerners and take them to a Tibetan monastery called Shangri-la. The 
monastery is hidden in a peaceful and scenic valley known as the Valley of the Blue Moon. 
Ironically, the “High Lama” that presides over the day-to-day operations of this supposedly 
Tibetan monastery is actually an elderly Capuchin monk from Luxembourg. Thus, while the 
valley’s inhabitants are Tibetans, the keepers of the civilization that is preserved and developed 
in this valley are European. Shangri-la serves as a kind of museum to isolate and preserve 
Western civilization from the economic and cultural uncertainty that was so prevalent in Europe 
in the early 1930s.   
Mary Cingcade reminds us that it was years later, in post-war Europe, that the image of 
Shangri-la took on a different sort of “Orientalized fantasy,” and the concept of a “peaceful, 
harmonious land untouched by the evils that plagued developed civilizations” became directly 
associated with Tibet.362 Tibet remained one of the most inaccessible regions in the world up 
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until the 1980s. As a result, in post-World War II Europe and North America, “the popular image 
of Shangrila became the romantic fantasy of a harmonious, peaceful and secluded society.”363  
As Donald Lopez argues, mystery and romance became the defining features of the Western 
tourist agenda in Tibet:  
Tibet and Tibetan Buddhism have long been objects of Western fantasy.  Since the 
earliest encounters of Venetian travelers and Catholic missionaries with Tibetan monks at 
the Mongol court, tales of the mysteries of their mountain homeland and the magic of 
their strange – yet strangely familiar – religion have had a peculiar hold on the Western 
imagination.”364   
 
Indeed, Shangrila is a distillation of a borrowed piece of Tibetan mythology, overlaid with a 
Western dream of sanctuary and refuge.365 It is likely that James Hilton misrendered the Sanskrit 
word “Shambhala,” which describes a mythical northern paradise, into his own Anglicized name 
“Shangri-la.”366   
Orville Schell asserts that the “sanctuary of Shangrila” represents “the resolution of the 
dreams of hundreds of frustrated explorers and adventurers and millions of curious and 
emotionally needy ordinary people back home in Europe and America.”367 The First World War 
administered a profound shock to Westerners’ confidence in their own civilization and many 
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Europeans entered into a period of doubt and self-reflection about their own social and cultural 
values. As their disillusionment with their own culture grew, a number of European and British 
citizens became obsessed with the idea of an unchanging and “traditional” Tibet.368 Lost Horizon 
brilliantly encapsulated and popularized this symbolic cultural drama. The main character in the 
novel, Hugh Conway, is disillusioned by the post-war situation in Britain and alienated from his 
own materialistic and spiritually shallow culture. He finds hope in the hidden wilderness of 
Shangri-la—the land of “limitless horizons and immense empty spaces.”369   
Yet, as this fantasy of a land without contamination from the outside world, and with air 
that had a “dream-like texture, matching the porcelain-blue of the sky” became threatened by 
European explorers and adventurers, as well as by the increasing strength of the post-1949 
Communist Chinese government, the popular fantasy of Shangri-la could no longer risk being 
anchored to something as vulnerable as a real geographic location.370 Peter Bishop writes that 
“the myth of Tibet could no longer be trusted to Tibet, to the geographical place; instead it had to 
be transferred on to what was truly timeless and formless. That place alone could never be 
threatened.”371 As Western ambivalence and social angst increased, the myth and the allure of 
Shangri-la became even more enticing, ephemeral, and geographically unspecific. 
While James Hilton’s novel played a major role in popularizing the myth of “Shangri-la” 
in the Western world, during the 1950s and 1960s a very different view of Tibet was being 
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circulated within the People’s Republic of China. The film “Serf” (Nongnu 农奴), directed by Li 
Gun in 1963, was broadcast in movie theaters across China throughout the 1960s and was 
responsible for shaping the views of an entire generation of Chinese concerning the Tibetan 
“feudal system.”372 The poster for this film, which was pasted on buildings and printed in 
newspapers throughout China, displayed a photograph of a Tibetan aristocrat crushing the back 
of a hunched-over slave with his boot. These stereotypical images of Tibet gradually transformed 
as radically different views of Tibet were introduced into the Chinese mindset over the next few 
decades—specifically, images of an ethereal, other-worldly land of Shangri-la. 
While translating the myth of Shangri-la into Chinese, Chinese intellectuals appropriated 
the Western image of a natural sanctuary, removed from the complications and spiritual 
pollutants surrounding modern-day life. However, the Chinese interpretation of Shangri-la drew 
predominately on Chinese rather than Western frames of reference.373 The idiom “shiwai 
taoyuan 世外桃园” (other-worldly peach garden), which is often used by tour guides today to 
convey the concept of Shangri-la to Chinese visitors, is a term drawn from Chinese classical 
literature. More than sixteen centuries ago, the Chinese author Tao Yuanming (365-427 AD) 
wrote a compilation of poetry and prose known as “The Peach Blossom Source” (Taohua Yuan 
桃花源).374 This piece describes the adventures of a fisherman who wanders through a tunnel at 
the source of a stream and discovers a community of people completely cut off from the rest of 
society. The villagers treat the fisherman well but request that he does not tell anyone living in 
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the outside world about them. The fisherman returns to his home and, unable to forget his 
experiences in the peach garden, tries years later to find his way back to this oasis. He is 
unsuccessful and finally ends his life while pining away for the mystical land that he has left 
behind.375   
Most Chinese first encountered the term Shangri-la not by reading Lost Horizon, which 
was only translated into Chinese in 1991, but by watching a film bearing the same English name, 
which was dubbed in Chinese and shown in major Chinese cities throughout World War II.376  
The Chinese title of the film was “The Romance of the Peach Blossom Village” (Taohuayuan 
yanji 桃花源言记). There are enough contemporary cross-references between Tao Yuanming’s 
literary concept of an “other wordly peach garden” and James Hilton’s myth of “Shangri-la” to 
suggest that Chinese intellectuals continue to draw parallels between these two images and to 
localize the Western concept of Shangri-la for their Chinese readership.377 
Just over fifty years after the film “Lost Horizon” was first shown in China, the concept 
of “Shangri-la” was picked up by international tour operators to market Tibetan areas to Western 
tourists. By the mid-1990s, the image of Shangri-la had caught on in the Chinese domestic 
tourism market as well, and as the economic importance of tourism to Tibetan areas grew, the 
value of the name Shangri-la became increasingly evident to local tourism planners. Despite 
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recognizing that the name originated in a work of fiction, tourism developers across the Tibetan 
plateau were soon engaged in various attempts to find the “true location” of James Hilton’s 
Shangri-la.378 In late 1996 Diqing prefectural government officials put together a research party 
composed of more than forty academics in the fields of literature, ethnology, religion, linguistics, 
geography, and Tibetology, to search for evidence that Shangri-la was indeed located in Diqing 
Prefecture. After months of investigation, these experts concluded that Khawa Karpo Mountain 
(Meili Xueshan 梅里雪山) in northern Diqing Prefecture was the same mountain as the “Mount 
Karakal” mentioned in James Hilton’s novel, and that the surrounding area was quite similar to 
the book’s description of the mythical “Valley of the Blue Moon.” Moreover, Hilton wrote that 
three rivers crossed through the Valley of the Blue Moon, and, the experts argued, the current 
boundaries of Diqing Prefecture encompass three rivers: the Nujiang 怒江, the Lancangjiang 澜
沧江, and the Jinshajiang 金沙江. Lastly, researchers discovered that an American transport 
plane did indeed crash in Gyalthang during World War II, and despite the fact that this was years 
after Hilton’s novel was written, they still felt that this evidence substantiated their claim that 
Hilton had modeled his story of Shangri-la on Diqing Prefecture.379 
The local government stamped its approval of this investigation in September 1997 
during the Khampa Arts Festival, when the Vice Governor of Yunnan Province publicly 
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pronounced Diqing Prefecture to be the “true Shangri-la.” On November 1, 1997 the China Daily 
printed a portion of the speech that the Vice Governor gave praising the peace and tranquility of 
Diqing prefecture: 
On this peaceful and fertile land, unadorned people worship their gods in splendid 
lamaseries. There is complete harmony between man and nature, and man and man.  
More than 60 years ago, three English pilots caught glimpses of this utopia, and Hilton 
painted a sketch of it. Soon the world can see with their own eyes what this world is like. 
Shangri-la shall nonetheless…continue to symbolize the longing of human beings for a 
perfect and peaceful world.380 
 
During the next four years, Zhongdian County competed heavily with other Tibetan 
areas, including Daocheng County in Ganzi Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture in Sichuan 
Province, and Muli Tibetan Autonomous County in Sichuan Province, for recognition as 
“Shangri-la.”381 In addition, directly to the south of Zhongdian County, Lijiang Naxi 
Autonomous County, which had seen an enormous increase in tourism after it had been 
designated as a UNESCO World Heritage Site in 1997, put up a tough battle for the title of 
“Shangri-la.” The Austrian-American botanist Joseph Rock had lived in the Lijiang area on and 
off between 1922 and 1949, and during this time he made several trips to Diqing Prefecture as 
well as to other Tibetan areas in Sichuan, Qinghai and Gansu Provinces. In the 1920s and 1930s 
he published descriptions and photographs of many of the places that he visited in a series of 
articles in National Geographic magazine. Many supporters of Lijiang’s claim to the Shangri-la 
believe that it was Rock’s descriptions of the area that gave Hilton the necessary geographic 
knowledge to write his novel. The greatest disadvantage that Lijiang faced in the battle for the 
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title of Shangri-la was that Hilton claimed the residents who lived in his mythic Shangri-la were 
Tibetans. Lijiang was officially designated as a “Naxi Autonomous County” in 1961 and thus 
faced difficulties in maintaining its status as a Naxi autonomous region while trying to claim that 
it was Tibetan enough to be Hilton’s Shangri-la. 
Local officials in Zhongdian wisely drew upon a number of political arguments to make 
their case that Zhongdian was uniquely ripe for a name change. They asserted that Tibetans have 
always made up the majority in this area of Yunnan and therefore for the sake of social stability 
it would be politically savvy to change the name of the county to one that could better reflect the 
sentiment of the local people.382 These officials claimed that the origin of the Chinese name 
Zhongdian implied suppression of the Tibetan people since it was originally created to remind 
people of the necessity of loyalty (zhong 忠) to the Naxi feudal lord (dian 滇) who had ruled 
over the Tibetans in this area during the Ming Dynasty.383 These same officials concluded that 
the Tibetan people have long considered this name discriminatory and have rejected it, and as a 
result, for decades this name has been used only by government officials and not by the local 
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382 This argument was crafted in such a way as to meld seamlessly with Deng Xiaoping’s ideology of political 
reforms.  The reform policy promised greater tolerance for China’s ethnic minorities and their “special 
characteristics,” which had been ruthlessly suppressed during decades of ideological fanaticism in the mid-twentieth 
century.  These reforms aimed to wash away the excesses of the Mao years, which had alienated many ethnic 
minorities and damaged the party’s reputation.  Through more lenient “minority friendly policies,” the central 
government hoped to restore its authority and legitimacy and lay the foundation for future social stability.  Susan 
McCarthy describes the state’s attempt to revive, promote, and control Hui religious practices during this period of 
reforms.  See Susan McCarthy, “If Allah Wills It: Integration, Isolation, and Muslim Authenticity in Yunnan 
Province in China,” Religion, State & Society 33 (2) 2005: 121-136.   
 
383 Zhondian Xian Gengming Wei Xianggelilia Xian de Zhuanjia Zhulun Yijian [Opinion of the Group of Experts on 
the Name Change from Zhongdian County to Xianggelila County], Zhongdian County Government Document, 
1997. In reality, the two Chinese characters that have been used to refer to Zhongdian ever since an imperial post 
was established there in 1724 are “中甸,” which simply mean “middle district” or “central pasture.”  These 
characters were most likely selected to transliterate the Tibetan name of rgyal thang, meaning “royal plain,” and they 
do not carry any derogative connotations. ZXZ, 46-49.   
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people.384 They maintained that to leave the name unaltered could result in great confusion and 
would most likely harm the socio-economic development of the area. The officials cited the 
Chinese Communist principle of “naming by the people” (min cong zhu ren) and contended that 
to promote social stability it would be best if the name were changed to a more local name “that 
rightfully belonged to the Tibetan people.”385 
The academics that were commissioned by Deqing Prefecture to write a report about 
Zhongdian County claimed that “Xiang ge” means “inside the heart” in the Gyalthang Tibetan 
language, while “li” and “la” mean “sun” and “moon” respectively. The name “Xianggelila” 
would therefore mean “to have the sun and the moon in your heart” in the local language. This 
daring attempt at philology took the three syllables from the English-language word, 
“Shangrila,” which was made up by a British author in 1933, and turned them into four distinct 
words of “local Tibetan origin.” The research team maintained that Shangri-la is derivative of the 
Tibetan words “sems-gi nyin zla,” which, literally translated into English, means “heart (or mind) 
of sun moon.” In Gyalthang Tibetan, this name might be pronounced something like “zemgi 
nyinda.” The researchers argued that “zemgi nyinda” was the origin of the name Xianggelila, 
despite the fact that most local Tibetans never heard of this name before learning about the 
county government’s push for a name change.386 
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384 While traveling, living, and conducting research in Gyalthang between 1998 and 2014, I never met anyone who 
felt that the name Zhongdian was discriminatory. Although Tibetans still call the region by its Tibetan name, 
Gyalthang, when speaking in Tibetan, the name Zhongdian is widely used by local Tibetans when referring to the 
name of their county in Chinese. Other researchers support these observations as well; see Hillman, “Paradise under 
Construction,” 178. 
 
385 Ibid. 
 
386 Ibid. Hillman asserts that although he consulted with many linguists, language teachers, and ordinary citizens 
across the county, he could not find any words in the local dialects of Tibetan that came close to meaning “to have 
the sun and the moon in your heart.” 
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The county officials’ final argument was that the name change would demonstrate the 
Communist Party’s concern for the development of the area and would also show their 
commitment to supporting the “civilizing process” (wenming 文明) of the Tibetan nationality. 
This argument, as well as the researchers’ other arguments, were politically well-timed and 
creatively worded and on December 17, 2001 the Civil Administration Department of China 
formally agreed to change the county name to Xianggelila 香格里拉 (Shangri-la). The State 
Council ratified their decision and a new image of a harmonious, romantic, and accessible Tibet 
was endorsed and aggressively marketed by local government officials, tourist agencies, and 
local cultural brokers. Over the past decade, Chinese and foreign vacationers have poured into 
the area, hoping to experience Hilton’s magical paradise first-hand.  
Many locations around the world have become tourist destinations predominately due to 
the myths that have been ascribed to them. Nelson Graburn describes Japanese tourism to rural 
areas such as spas and heritage sites as symbolic quests for nostalgic rejuvenation in the face of 
rising levels of urban angst.387 Koichi Iwabuchi takes the argument that modern, urban Japanese 
desire to nostalgically relive the past even further when he claims that contemporary Japanese 
society has gone so far as to appropriate images from other cultures in order to evoke memories 
of a simpler, less industrialized lifestyle. Iwabuchi maintains that, “the politics of transnational 
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387 In Japan, the “home village” (furusato 故郷) campaign of the 1980s and 1990s promoted a nostalgic, 
romanticized image of the countryside. The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) first used the term furusato in the 
1970s to draw national attention to the loss of “traditional kinship relations” and “home town values” in a rapidly 
urbanizing society. Furusato later became the cornerstone of the LDP’s cultural policy, enabling the party to address 
difficult political, social, and environmental issues under a single rubric. Furusato was appropriated by the media, 
and by both city and village planners in the 1980s and 1990s. These bureaucrats aimed to channel the public’s 
discontent with urban life into a new rural tourism industry that promised to soothe harried urbanites while 
revitalizing economically impoverished rural areas. See Nelson Graburn, “The Past in the Present in Japan: 
Nostalgia and Neotraditionalism in Contemporary Japanese Domestic Tourism,” in Richard Butler and Douglas 
Pearce, eds., Change in Tourism: People, Places, Processes (London: Routledge, 1995), 47-70.   
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evocation of nostalgia is highlighted when it is employed to confirm a frozen temporal lag 
between two cultures, when ‘our’ past and memory are found in ‘their’ present.”388 Other 
scholars have argued that modernity fosters a “culture of nostalgic melancholia” which is 
expressed through fantasies of escape, “whereby the past is exoticized in a distant and often 
highly sexualized place and culture.”389  
In many ways, the nostalgia and romanticism surrounding Shangri-la serves this same 
function, for it is the dream of a harmonious rural lifestyle that attracts so many urban Chinese to 
Gyalthang.390 Xuan Ke 宣科, a Naxi musician who lives in Lijiang and who was one of the very 
first people to promote Diqing Prefecture as the “authentic” Shangri-la, explains how modern, 
urban Chinese residents desire to experience rural life:  
[Shangri-la] is not for tourists.  It is for real people looking for a real place where there is 
harmony. There are blue skies, not like in Beijing. People are searching for a new world. 
No money, no power, no politics. This is the place that people have dreamed of, from the 
book and the movie.391    
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388 Koichi Iwabuchi, Recentering Globalization: Popular Culture and Japanese Transnationalism (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2002), 174.  
 
389 Caren Kaplan, Questions of Travel: Postmodern Discourses of Displacement (Durham: Duke University Press, 
1996), 34, 45. 
 
390 Writing about tourism in Jiuzhaigou, an ethnically Tibetan area in northern Sichuan Province, Wenbin Peng 
describes how tourists tend to view their experiences in Tibetan areas as journies away from modernity. He writes: 
“A tourist’s experience in Jiuzhaigou can be fruitfully viewed as that of a tourist-pilgrim. The tourist-pilgrim goes 
on a journey in search of a place isolated in time and space. The journey to the area is as journey back in time, a 
return to Nature.” See Wenbin Peng, “Tibetan Pilgrimage in the Process of Social Change: The Case of Jiuzhaigou,” 
Pilgrimage in Tibet, Alex McKay, ed. (Richmond: Curzon Press, 1998), 195. 
 
391 Tom Korski, “Could This Be Utopia?,” South China Morning Post Review, November 29, 1997: 1. The image of 
the countryside as a vast, wholesome antidote to the corruptive elements in urban life is evident in a great deal of 
imagery employed not just by Chinese intellectuals, but also by the Chinese government, throughout the twentieth-
century. Mao Zedong’s written work indicates that he may have viewed the countryside as an enormous washing 
machine—an ocean-like realm that could purify those that had been corrupted by life in the cities. From the sent-
down youth of the Cultural Revolution, to the political enemies exiled to the countryside or sentenced to “re-
education through labor” during the various political campaigns from the 1950s-1970s, there was a sense that with 
enough time in the countryside, these political impurities would get wiped clean, and these former class enemies 
would turn into blank slates themselves.   
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What is so startling about this utopic image of the region is how the current promotion of a 
harmonious Shangri-la differs so dramatically from the Communist state’s portrayal of Tibet up 
until the last decade.392 Although for more than four decades, the Chinese government had 
protrayed Tibetan areas as primitive and backward, suddenly it began to promote these areas as 
harmonious, romantic, and exotic locales. The contemporary pure and idealized image of 
Shangri-la can easily be juxtaposed with the images of Yunnan that were circulated in the 
Chinese media during the Maoist and Dengist periods. During the first eight decades of the 
twentieth century, Yunnan was seen as a province occupied by backwards, dirty, lazy, and 
distinctly unmodern minority populations. However, when Zhongdian County’s name changed to 
Shangri-la County, the vast majority of the negative images of Tibet changed overnight into 
positive images of a mystical land of Shangri-la.  
Dru Gladney argues that the people described as peripheral by Harrell are, in another 
sense and at the same time, central to Chinese Communist ideology because it is only through 
the construction of a less developed minority group that a contrasting, more developed, or 
civilized majority group such as the Han can be constructed.393 In contemporary China, Marxist 
evolutionism has been coupled with another “civilizing project” that some scholars have 
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392 According to the Chinese Communist Party’s version of history, Tibet was a slave state controlled by a Buddhist 
feudal clergy prior to its “liberation” by the Communist People’s Liberation Army. The China Daily once claimed 
that Tibet was “a serfdom more brutal than that of medieval Europe.” In light of these political claims, it is 
astonishing to witness the Chinese government’s assertions that this Tibetan area of Yunnan Province was actually 
the earthly utopia that inspired Hilton’s 1933 novel, given that the People’s Liberation Army first occupied 
Zhongdian County in 1951. See Korski, “Could This Be Utopia?,” 1. 
 
393 Dru Gladney, “Representing Nationality in China: Refiguring Majority/Minority Identities,” The Journal of 
Asian Studies 53 (1) 1994: 92-123. 
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described as “the modernizing project.”394 In Chinese school textbooks as well as in the media, 
the “primitivity” of the ethnic minority groups in China is often contrasted with to the 
“modernity” of the Han Chinese majority. Under Chinese Communist leadership, the more 
“advanced” and “civilized” Han nationality is considered to bear the burden of helping their less 
fortunate compatriots to “develop” (fazhan 发展).395  
Harrell argues that the process of determining where each ethnic minority group belonged 
on the scale of evolutionary history was important “in order to plan the political struggles and 
development campaigns that would raise the civilizational levels of the various minzu.”396 In 
government documents and public speeches, government officials often point out that a shortage 
of human resources is the main obstacle blocking economic and social development in minority 
areas of the country. A national discourse revolves around the need to “raise the cultural level” 
(tigao wenhua chengdu 提高文化程度) of rural villagers living in southwest China.397 
Regardless of whether they exhibit contempt or nostalgia for the countryside, many urban 
Chinese tend to conceive of the city and the countryside as distinct, non-overlapping spatial 
entities. Urban residents who travel to the countryside deny the rural residents who live there 
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394 Åshild Kolås, Ethnic Tourism in Shangrila: Representations of Place and Tibetan Identity (Ph.D. dissertation: 
Department of Social Anthropology, University of Oslo, 2004), 180; Ann Anagnost, “The Politics of Ritual 
Displacement,” in C. F. Keyes, et al., eds., Asian Visions of Authority: Religion and the Modern States of East and 
Southeast Asia (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1994), 224-225. 
 
395 Kolås, Tourism and Tibetan Culture in Transition, 47. 
 
396 Harrell, Cultural Encounters, 24. 
 
397 Susan Blum’s research on Han views of ethnic minorities living in Kunming challenges the assumption that the 
Han tend to automatically link images of ethnic minorities with negative traits such as primitiveness or 
backwardness. Indeed, these stereotypes tend to be more closely associated with the inhabitants of specific 
geographic regions of China, such as the more rural and mountainous regions, regardless of their ethnicity. Blum 
points out that many of her informants regarded urban Bai to be more “advanced” and “civilized” than Han peasants. 
See Susan Blum, Portraits of Primitives: Ordering Human Kinds in the Chinese Nation (Baltimore: Rowman and 
Littlefield, 2001). 
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temporal equivalence with those living in the cities.398 Some urban Chinese tourists travel to 
ethnic minority areas in order to discover a “traditional China” that has been forgotten, and 
which the ethnic minority groups in China are presumed to embody.399 China’s ethnic minorities, 
once objects of pity and disparagement, started to become “objects of desire” after China began 
searching for its national soul in the early 1990s.400   
In the mid- to late-1980s, a new, nostalgic literary movement became known as “root-
seeking literature” (xungen wenxue 寻根文学), due to the fact that it advocated a return to nature 
and a rediscovery of Chinese language and culture. Root-seeking authors believed that the nation 
needed to look inward and backward, before it could come to grips with what it means to be 
“Chinese” in a new and rapidly changing environment. This movement explored the roots of 
Chinese culture by eulogizing the primitive and the ancient. For Chinese citizens living in the 
crowded and quickly modernizing coastal regions of the country, the “root-seeking” process 
entailed an attempt to rediscover parts of China’s cultural heritage and ethnic diversity that had 
been denounced as feudal and backward during the past three decades of Communist rule. As 
“reservoirs of still-extant authenticity,” China’s ethnic minorities were given a great deal of 
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398 Here I am referring to Johannes Fabian’s concept of the “denial of coevalness.” By denying that others occupy 
the same temporal realm, it becomes easier to marginalize these Others. Johannes Fabian, Time and the Other: How 
Anthropology Makes its Object (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983).  
 
399 Almaz Khan, “Who Are the Mongols? State, Ethnicity, and the Politics of Representation in the PRC,” in 
Melissa Brown, ed., Negotiating Ethnicities in China and Taiwan (Berkeley: University of California, 1996), 125-
160. 
400 The Chinese search for a national soul arose out of the “ideological vacuum” of the 1990s. This vacuum is often 
attributed to Chinese citizens’ disillusionment with the high level of corruption that accompanied China’s 
spectacular but unequal growth in the 1980s. Widespread disillusionment led to the Tiananmen Square democracy 
protests, which took place in the spring of 1989 and ended with a brutal military crackdown on June 4, 1989. In the 
months and years that followed, Chinese intellectuals engaged in a great deal of soul searching about the direction in 
which China was heading in the era of reform. This led to such movements as the “root-seeking” literary movement 
and to the production of a number of popular television series, such as Heshang 河殇 (River Elegy) and Beijing ren 
zai Niuyue 北京人在纽约 (A Beijinger in New York).  
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attention in this literary movement.401 Around this same time ethnic tourism began to be 
marketed as a way for Han Chinese to get back in touch with what it means to be Chinese. The 
level of nostalgia that is such a prevalent part of domestic Chinese tourism may be interpreted as 
a sense of longing, not just for the past, but also for a time when people experienced a lifestyle 
that was more in tune with the natural environment. These types of dreams are reflected clearly 
in the promotion of Shangri-la as a place where “simple people live in harmony with nature.”402 
A great deal of state investment in Tibetan monasteries in western China took place in the 
1980s and 1990s in order to compensate for the numerous monasteries and relics that were 
destroyed during the Cultural Revolution.403 The reconstruction of Sumtsenling Monastery 
commenced in 1983 with funding provided by the local population and the Zhongdian County 
government, and nearly six hundred monks joined the monastery during the next ten years.404 
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401 Louisa Schein, “Gender and Internal Orientalism in China,” Modern China 23 (1) 1997: 72, 94. Writing in the 
mid-1990s, Dru Gladney describes the growing interest amongst Chinese intellectuals and urban Chinese towards 
“things ethnic.” He states: “There is a shifting interest in China toward things ethnic and obscure, often contributing 
to the exoticization and eroticization of minorities in China’s public culture. The extraordinary abundance of ethnic 
minority restaurants, boutiques, and even theme parks (in Beijing, Shenzhen, and Kunming) have contributed to a 
kind of “ethnic chic” that makes China’s pop culture increasingly diverse and multi-cultural.” See Gladney, 1996. 
For more about the role that “ethnic chic” plays in China’s contemporary pop culture scene, see Zha Jianying, China 
Pop (New York: The Free Press, 1995). Erik Mueggler maintains that minority intellectuals who were educated in 
the 1950s began to take a renewed interest in ethnology in the early 1980s as the political fanaticism of the Anti-
Rightest campaign and the Cultural Revolution came to an end. During this second wave of ethnological production, 
new ethnological institutes were established and a number of new ethnic studies (minzu xue 民族学) journals were 
published for the first time. See Erik Mueggler, “Dancing Fools: Politics of Culture and Place in a ‘Traditional 
Nationality Festival,’” Modern China 28 (1) 2002: 8.  
 
402 Kolås, Tourism and Tibetan Culture in Transition, 107. 
 
403 State investment in Tibetan Buddhist institutions also appears to be part of a strategic policy geared toward 
promoting a Tibetan-Chinese identity intended to make Tibetans feel more like an integrated part of China and less 
interested in pursuing a Tibetan national identity. See Hillman, “Paradise under Construction,” 181. 
 
404 DZZZZ, 21; ZXZ, 235. It seems likely that this number, despite being printed in many officially sanctioned 
publications in Gyalthang, is overinflated. Many of these monks might have formerly registered with the 
government in order to be affiliated with Sumtsenling Monastery, but it is doubtful that so many monks resided at 
Sumtsenling in the 1990s. 
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Although Sumtsenling was again able to recruit novice monks in the reform era, its numbers 
were restricted by a quota and it was impossible for the monastery to function as a center of 
learning as it had done in the past. Since an entire generation of learned monks had left the 
monastic order, escaped into exile, or passed away during the Cultural Revolution, very few 
qualified monks were now available to teach these young novices, who could neither read or 
write Tibetan. Moreover, because religion was still considered a grave threat to the Chinese state, 
the few Buddhist teachers who had taken up residency again at Sumtsenling after the Cultural 
Revolution were explicitly prohibited from giving any tantric initiations.405 As a result, young 
monks entering the monastery in the post-Mao era had little hope of accomplishing the twenty 
years of study considered necessary for the completion of a Geshe degree in Buddhist philosophy. 
The rebuilding of Sumtsenling went ahead in the 1990s, with much of the labour carried out by 
the monks themselves, but the monastery soon became a center of Buddhist teaching in name 
only.  
It is likely that the main drive behind the county government’s heavy investment in 
Sumtsenling Monastery was that county officials viewed the Sumtsenling as a means to draw 
thousands more visitors to Shangri-la every year. The monastery was, therefore, offered up as 
one more piece of bait to attract tourist revenue.406 Today Sumtsenling Monastery is the most 
visited monastic tourist site in Gyalthang. 
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405 One locally highly respected lama, who had fled to India in 1959, was allowed to return to Sumtsenling 
Monastery in 2006 after he signed a document promising the Chinese government that he would refrain from giving 
tantric initiations in Gyalthang. Interview with this lama at Dokhar khangtsen in Sumtsenling Monastery in 
Gyalthang, July 24, 2014.  
 
406 Åshild Kolås explains that, in 2002, when she discussed the possible paths that the Shangri-la County 
government might take to promote the development of the tourism industry, the government officials she spoke with 
explained that there was a need to “develop” monasteries as tourist sites. They intended to “revive” ritual life in the 
monasteries and encourage more frequent public performances, such as the performance of cham. Cham are 
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Sumtsenling Monastery originally adhered to Gelugpa Tibetan Buddhist monastic 
practices that prohibited charging admission fees to pilgrims and visitors. Donations left on alters 
were managed by the monastery and were spent on basic food and clothing supplies for the 
monks. However, as the monastery started receiving increasing numbers of visitors, the local 
government instructed the monastery to charge entrance fees to tourists. The Monastery 
Management Committee (Siguanhui 寺管会), which was set up by the Religious and Minority 
Affairs Bureau in 1984, first started charging a token entrance fee of two jiao (US 3¢) in the late 
1980s.407 By 1996, the county government began to realize the monastery’s earning potential and 
they pressured the Monastery Management Committee to increase the ticket price tenfold to two 
RMB (US 30¢). In 1998 a ticket office was set up through the County Finance Department and 
the entrance fee was raised again to ten RMB (US $1.50) for all non-Buddhist visitors. 
Locals were exempt from paying this fee, since it was assumed that most local residents 
were Buddhist. The ticket office was charged with the responsibility of “helping the monastery 
manage its funds,” a system which one county official claimed was “very good for the 
monastery, because the monks are not used to dealing with economic management and now they 
can focus on their studies.”408 Despite the protests of the monks and the monastic administrators, 
who claimed that they did not have any need for such financial guidance from the government 
since monks have historically handled the financial affairs of their own monastery, the ticket 
office remained open and visitors continued to be charged admission fees.  
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ritualistic dances performed by masked Tibetan monks. They usually take place in the courtyards of monasteries. 
Kolås, Ethnic Tourism in Shangrila, 51. 
 
407 Ben Hillman, “Monastic Politics and the Local State in China: Authority and Autonomy in an Ethnically Tibetan 
Prefecture,” The China Journal (54) 2005: 35.  
 
408 Cited in Kolås, Tourism and Tibetan Culture in Transition, 14. 
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From 1998 to 2006, the monastery received 1.47 RMB from every admission ticket of 10 
RMB. This money was supposed to be divided up evenly and given to the monks as a monthly 
allowance. One monk I spoke with in the summer of 2007 told me that each monk’s monthly 
allowance between 2002 and 2005 was around 80 RMB.409 The county government set aside an 
additional 4 RMB from every admission ticket to invest in the restoration and expansion of the 
monastery. The remainder of each ticket (4.53 RMB) went directly into the county government’s 
coffers to cover tax and administration costs. In 2006, these entrance fees provided the county 
government with annual revenue of more than five million RMB.410   
In 2006 the county government decided to raise the admission price from ten RMB to 
thirty RMB, in late 2008 it was raised again to one hundred RMB, and by 2013 it had reached 
115 RMB. The monks I spoke with at Sumtsenling Monastery in July, 2007, explained that the 
county and prefectural governments invested a great deal of money in restoring the monastery 
between 1984 and 2007 and they were therefore hoping to regain some of this money through 
higher admission prices. However, the monks, on average, were unhappy about the increases in 
the admission prices for both financial and cultural reasons.   
In 2007, the monks were most worried about the fact that increased admission prices 
would have a financially detrimental effect on their own livelihood. Up until 2006, donations that 
were left behind by pilgrims and tourists visiting the monastery constitued more than half of the 
monks’ monthly allowance.411 However, these monks were convinced that with higher admission 
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409 During this period, the monks’ monthly income was also heavily subsidized by donations that pilgrims and 
tourists left at the monastery. 
 
410 Cited in Hillman, “Paradise under Construction,” 180. 
 
411 According to the monks I spoke with in the summer of 2007, most monks at Sumtsenling earned an allowance of 
around 250 to 330 RMB per month in 2007. This income was high enough to allow them to eat a well-balanced diet 
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prices, very few visitors would be willing to drop additional money in the donation boxes inside 
of the monastery. As a result, the county government would profit from the increased ticket 
prices at the expense of the monks’ livelihood. Some monks also opposed the increase in 
admission price because they were concerned that with such a high price, tourists would expect 
to get something in return. The monks were worried that the county government would pressure 
them into performing for the tourists. Indeed, in the winter of 2005, the monks began to perform 
daily debates in the monastery’s main courtyard for the benefit of curious tourists. Moreover, for 
profit-making reasons tour guides and their tour groups are now admitted to the monastery from 
early morning to late evening, regardless of the rituals scheduled to be performed. Although it is 
obvious that the presence of tourists wandering around the premises must be disturbing to the 
monks involved in serious study, the monks are no longer in a position to oppose the onslaught 
of tourism.   
This raises issues about the potentially secularizing or “de-sacralizing” effects of tourism, 
which are often heightened by tensions that are created when religious or sacred sites become 
tourist destinations.412 The treatment of local culture as a tourist attraction often alters or destroys 
the very meaning of specific rituals or activities that were once sacred to local people. Hosts 
often perform their own culture in a way that is designed to appear “authentic” in order to satisfy 
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and to purchase a variety of items for individual consumption. However, one monk pointed out that although the 
monks have a very decent life at the monastery, they are still extremely poor compared to the lay people and the 
merchants that profit off of the monastery by selling trinkets and various services to tourists just outside the 
monastery gates. 
 
412 For more about sacred sites as tourist destinations, see Jeremy Boissevain, “Introduction,” in Jeremey Boissevain, 
ed., Coping with Tourists: European Reactions to Mass Tourism (New York: Berghahn Books, 1996), 1-26; 
Michael Murray and Brian Graham, “Exploring the Dialectics of Route-Based Tourism: The Camino de Santiago,” 
Tourism Management 18 (8) 1997: 513-524; Justine Digance, “Pilgrimage at Contested Sites,” Annals of Tourism 
Research 30 (1): 2003: 143-159; and Myra Shackley, “Managing the Cultural Impacts of Religious Tourism in the 
Himalayas, Tibet and Nepal,” in Mike Robinson and Priscilla Boniface, eds., Tourism and Cultural Conflicts (New 
York: CABI Publishing, 1999), 95-111. 
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tourists’ desire for authenticity. These performances destroy real cultural meanings for both 
locals and tourists, and cultural authenticity is subsequently replaced by “staged authenticity.”413   
Indeed, tourism has the potential to be a culturally destructive force that can cause the 
collapse of cultural meanings in heavily touristed areas, as commodification ushers in a kind of 
cultural flatness.414 Along the way, all depth of appreciation, understanding, meaning, and 
belonging is replaced by superficial glitter.415 According to the abbot of a Tibetan monastery in 
Jiuzhaigou, an ethnically Tibetan area of Sichuan Province, this process arguably took place at 
his monastery in the mid-1990s. While Jiuzhaigou government officials argued that tourism had 
helped local people develop a “clear sense of the market economy,” this abbot complained in 
1998 that the massive influx of tourists accelerated the erosion of traditional Tibetan values.416 
Tourism and profit margins now largely define the kind of historical narratives that are 
produced and disseminated by the Shangri-la County government’s bureaus and tourism 
agencies. Starting in 2002, the newly renamed Shangri-la County government invested 
increasingly larger annual sums of money in gilding the roofs of Sumtsenling’s three main halls, 
commissioning elaborate thangkas to be hung in each hall, and expanding the parking lot in front 
of the monastery to accommodate tour buses.417 Tibetan monks now sell cold drinks and cheap 
trinkets to tourists at concession stands set up inside the monastery.  
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413 Dean MacCannell, The Tourist: A New Theory of the Leisure Class (New York: Schocken Books, 1976). 
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Visitors are also provided with a very particular account of the illustrious history of this 
supposedly seventeenth-century Tibetan monastery. According to the historical narrative printed 
on the admission ticket, Sumtsenling was built in 1674 after the Fifth Dalai Lama asked the Qing 
Kangxi Emperor for permission to construct a monastery, which he was subsequently granted.418 
No mention is made of the fact that Sumtsenling was destroyed during the Cultural Revolution at 
the hands of locals and rebuilt only very recently with tourism-driven government subsidies. The 
plight of Sumtsenling monastery illuminates the degree to which the maximization of profit has 
become the standard of governance in Gyalthang in the post-Cultural Revolution era. Concerns 
about how cultural commodification, coupled with officially endorsed historical amnesia, has 
effaced local histories of violence in Gyalthang remain unaddressed in public. 
The “Shangrila-ification” of Tibet took place at a remarkable rate in the late 1990s, as 
mainstream Chinese film directors produced romanticized feature films for their urban Chinese 
audiences and Tibetan singers with music videos showcasing travel brochure imagery broke into 
the popular music industry.419 In-flight magazines on China Eastern Airlines began to showcase 
glossy photographs of lush Tibetan landscapes and extravagantly dressed Tibetan nomads in 
order to promote Tibetan areas in China as exciting and romantic places to visit.420 
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The desire to travel away from “modernity” appears to be one of the main factors that 
still drives young, urban Chinese tourists to visit Shangri-la.421 The past two decades of rapid 
modernization has given rise to new levels of anxiety, ambivalence, and disorientation in 
Chinese society. The growing contradiction between the central government’s push for 
modernization and society’s desire to maintain a sense of continuity with the past have led the 
tourist industry to capitalize off of the fantasy of traveling into the past.422 A trip to Tibet has 
become a rite of passage for the newly wealthy Chinese living in Shanghai, and those urban 
residents who visit Tibet often describe it as a place of spirituality and freedom, “far from the 
competitive striving and commercialism of contemporary urban life.”423 
While tourism has long been heralded as a way to bring economic progress to less 
developed areas, some scholars have also argued that ethnic or cultural tourism may in fact 
strengthen the process of reflecting upon, conserving, reforming, and recreating certain cultural 
traditions.424 It is impossible to tell which residents of Shangri-la are taking part in business 
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opportunities to make money and which are doing it to make a statement about their Tibetan 
identity or their cultural values.425 There is a fine line between the presentation of culture to 
tourists and the invention of new cultural traditions in the interest of economic profit. Will 
certain religious ceremonies, dance performances, festivals, or traditional foods ultimately 
become components of, in Philip McKean’s words, a “hypocritical fake culture, created by the 
secularizing tendencies of tourism,” which turns everything, including culture, into a pure 
economic entity?426 How do local people construct or maintain their idea of place in a town that 
is being overrun by tourism? When Tibetan landlords buy houses on the outskirts of town in 
order to rent out their supposedly more Tibetan-looking homes in the Old Town to Han Chinese 
shop owners, how does this transform local understandings of what it means to be a Gyalthang 
resident?  
The enormous interest that outsiders have shown in investing and developing the tourist 
market in Shangri-la over the past two decades has caused many people to question who, in the 
end, is actually benefiting from this new wave of tourism. Some anthropologists have proposed 
that tourism may boost traditional representations of place when tourists follow in the path of 
pilgrims and make sacred sites their primary travel destinations.427 Hosts may be able to subvert 
state-sactioned hegemonic interpretations of these sacred areas by using tourism as a means to 
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reclaim older traditions and to revitalize their sense of ethnic and cultural pride.428 Those who are 
visited by tourists may begin to “see their own culture with new eyes” as ethnic and cultural 
differences become marketable and profitable commodities.429 By marketing their culture to 
outsiders, some anthropologists argue, people often rediscover their own history and their own 
sense of tradition and begin to realize their own worth as a culturally vibrant community.430   
Over the past decade, a few anthropology graduate students from Gyalthang have 
supported the central government’s claims that ethnic tourism may not only help develop 
economically stagnating areas of the country, but may also help encourage locals to take greater 
pride in their local culture.431 This argument fits in nicely with the contemporary Chinese 
discourse on tourism and modernity, which suggests that tourism may provide the best means to 
“develop and civilize” ethnic minority areas of the country that have not been privy to the same 
level of economic development as other areas of the country over the past twenty years.  
Ralph Litzinger maintains that, starting in the 1980s the Chinese Communist Party 
encouraged ethnic minority intellectuals to promote popular rituals, traditional practices of 
medicine, and other so-called traditional modes of social morality in their home villages, in order 
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to “assist in the project of bringing development to minorities.”432 Litzinger writes: “ironically, 
these indigenous practices, once marked for destruction for their ties to the feudal past the 
revolution had struggled so long to overthrow, were now being championed as locally productive 
technologies of social order.”433 The state’s neoliberal vision of a modernized, developed area of 
Southwest China hinged on a strategy of using tourism to connect remote villages to broader 
markets across the country.434 While some local officials were interested in raising the standard 
of living for the people living within their jurisdiction, others were interested in economically 
developing the area for the sake of generating higher revenue for the county, prefectural, and 
provincial governments.  
Litzinger argues that the Chinese state often involves itself in cultural and religious 
affairs of minority peoples, such as the Yao, in an effort to define tradition and identity in ways 
that support its own agenda. To a large extent the state’s tourism promotional efforts can be 
chalked up to its interest in expanding tax revenues. The commoditizing of minority culture, 
religion, and history is a long-term development strategy, a legitimizing strategy, and a strategy 
to maintain political stability. Timothy Oakes maintains that “the prosperity of ethnic groups per 
se was not the core of the modernization agenda as much as attracting external capital 
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investments for large-scale projects that would benefit the economy overall. The role of ethnic 
tourism, then, was best summed up by enticement.”435 Local minority officials often tried to 
mobilize state resources to achieve their own locally oriented goals.436 Cultural performances by 
minority groups would be “served up as bait” for profit-hungry outsiders who were interested in 
investing their money and signing lucrative business contracts to exploit this rapidly expanding 
sector of the economy. Erik Mueggler contends that: 
Peoples formerly marginalized as “backward” are inserted into the post-Mao national 
landscape—but at the price of finding their cultural resources reduced to readily 
manufactured “objects” and their cultural identities to possessors of these objects, which 
may be sold and consumed globally as signs of the new national ecumene.437 
 
The way in which different Chinese ethnic minority populations began to be appraised as 
valuable citizens of the People’s Republic of China and the way in which their culture began to 
be freshly evaluated was through neoliberal lenses that were focused on the profit-making 
potential of each group’s inherent cultural resources. 
It seems probable that the state’s efforts to support the revitalization of ethnic minority 
culture in the reform era is more due to the government’s desire to maintain political stability 
than their inherent interest in preserving and promoting ethnic cultures and folk religions. Susan 
McCarthy maintains that the Chinese state has been largely successful at engaging in 
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developmentalist policies that promote a distinct form of “ethnic resurgence.”438 She argues that 
the official party-state involvement in this resurgence is rather counterintuitive given that after 
decades spent suppressing anything that hinted of tradition, government units in China now play 
the role of patron, curator, and consumer of minority culture and cultural institutions. The state 
now encourages minorities to develop their own ostensibly unique cultural identities and codifies 
these in policy, education, history, and the arts. The socialist market economy is increasingly 
viewed as the Chinese Communist Party’s answer to what they have long viewed as “minority 
backwardness,” and, ironically, also as the means of furthering national integration. Some 
Chinese officials today believe that the market is capable of achieving what the Maoist socialist 
project tried but failed to achieve: the construction of a unified, integrated, modernized, 
multinational nation (tongyi de duo minzu guojia 统一的多民族国家).439  
In Gyalthang, many local people are quite savvy about tourism. Although they do view 
the development of the tourism industry as an opportunity to earn some extra cash, they certainly 
do not expect that they will be the ones benefiting the most off of tourism.440 A local joke plays 
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off of the Tibetan nickname for Shangri-la. Instead of “Semkyinyinda,” meaning “the sun and the 
moon of the heart,” which is the new Tibetan name that has been given to the town of Shangri-la, 
local people have started calling the town “Shanggyinyinda,” which means “the sun and moon of 
the wolves.” They wryly explain that “wolves” from all over China have moved into the area in 
order to take advantage of the tourist boom.441 
Aside from tourists who hope that their travels will enable them to experience authentic 
cultural experiences and from investors who hope to profit off of the local tourist industry, host 
communities also play an active role in marketing indigenous cultural resources. The host-guest 
relationship is sometimes described as a form of cultural imperialism since the tourist, or 
“guest,” is often seen as the critical determinant in most studies about tourism. Ethnic tourism, in 
particular, is often viewed as an imperialist activity in that it transforms ethnic or racial 
difference as an object to be commodified, marketed, and consumed. It is because ethnic and 
racial differences are reified during the process of ethnic tourism, Dean MacCannell argues, that 
“ethnic tourism is the mirror image of racism.”442 Domestic ethnic tourism often reproduces and 
disseminates ethnic images and stereotypes of indigenous groups that may already be in 
circulation. It also serves as a channel through which the uneven power structures that exist 
among different ethnic groups are reinforced.443   
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And yet, Kolas argues, ethnic stereotypes are continuously reworked in the complex 
interactions between the visited, the visitors, and the mediators of the visits—whether these are 
state agents or private entrepreneurs. The local culture that is marketed to tourists is subject to 
continuous reinterpretation and negotiation. It is for this reason, she argues, that ethnic tourism 
does not merely mirror or reproduce ethnic or racial stereotypes.444 The gaze of ethnic tourism 
tends to reflect “the social experience of the majority encountering itself while consuming 
images of the ethnic.”445 Since the “reform and opening up” policies of the late 1970s, ethnic 
tourism has fit comfortably with Chinese state policies that have defined and categorized ethnic 
minorities and their place in the national social hierarchy.       
Robert Wood used the image of a billard game to criticize early methodological 
approaches to tourism, which viewed “local culture” as passive and stagnant. Tourism, he 
claims, does not act like a moving ball in a billiard game while local culture acts as an inert ball 
waiting to be knocked asunder. The impact that tourism has on local culture, Wood argues, is 
“always played out in an already dynamic and changing cultural context.”446 Indeed, residents of 
even highly touristed areas tend to not be mere passive recipients of tourism, but rather variously 
“encourage, resist, or participate in the development process.”447 My research in Gyalthang 
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supports this conclusion, suggesting that in actuality the relationship between tourists and locals 
might not fit the “oppressor/oppressed” model quite so well. 
State-led market development in China has ushered in a new era of ubiquitous 
commodification, and although scholars continue to debate the applicability of the term 
“neoliberal” to the current Chinese political, social, and economic system, there is little doubt 
that the state plays a decisive role in the extensive marketization of Chinese society.448 The 
spread of neoliberal ideology has led to the marketing of ethnic identity in China, and ethnic 
minority groups’ enthusiasm for the commercialization of their own culture has led to new forms 
of collaboration. What happens when minorities are no longer seen as simply reacting to or 
resisting the Chinese state but rather as central agents in the creation of new collaborative ethnic 
projects between the state and the people? What might the anthropology of post-Mao nationalism 
look like if it refuses to find in the ethnic subject the perfected example of authenticity or 
resistance? It seems that we now need to move beyond tropes of subjugation, assimilation, and 
resistance—to which past scholarship has easily reduced Han majority/minority relations—and 
instead come to see the latest state-sponsored revival of minority ethnicity as reinforcing 
local/state collaboration in an era of global capitalism. 
Chinese tour companies have aggressively marketed Shangri-la as a place where exotic 
Tibetans live in communal harmony in a beautiful and unsullied natural environment. As more 
and more tourists travel to areas like Shangri-la in order to nostalgically experience a sense of 
long-lost community again, the nature of the town has transformed, ironically affecting the very 
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relationships between local people that the tourists have come to witness first-hand. When a 
community has been purposefully “developed” with tourism in mind, can this community still 
provide a sense of identity to the people inhabiting it? When a place name has been reinvented 
for the sake of tourism, what does this do to local residents’ notions of place?   
When I first traveled to Gyalthang in 1998, what later came to be termed the “Old Town” 
(gucheng 古城) was a rather unassuming assembly of one and two-story Tibetan-style wooden 
and mud houses lined up along a few unpaved dirt roads. There were very few businesses in the 
Old Town and, with the exception of one large hotel on the outskirts of town, none of the 
businesses were set up to cater to tourists. The “New Town” was made up of a single main street 
lined with unimaginative concrete block buildings. By 2002, the town was gearing up to market 
itself as a tourist attraction and much had changed. The streets of the Old Town were paved with 
cobblestones to resemble the Old Town of neighboring Lijiang, which was seen as a model for 
tourism developers, and buildings that adhered to Naxi architectural standards were being 
remodeled and repainted to look “more Tibetan” before they were turned into quaint little 
guesthouses and cafés. All of the buildings lining the main street of the New Town were 
repainted with bright colors in supposedly Tibetan designs and elaborately decorated streetlamps 
were erected. One journalist who visited Shangri-la at this time described this transformation as 
the creation of a “Tibetan toy town.”449   
Moreover, in preparation for the Shangri-la Arts Festival, which was scheduled to take 
place in May 2002, the prefectural government mandated that all of the store signs in town be 
replaced with new signs printed in both Chinese and Tibetan. This bilingual sign project was 
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undertaken with such haste that much of the Tibetan script that appeared on these signs ended up 
being mere transliterations of their corresponding Chinese names. This resulted in some very 
tortured Tibetan language printed on hilarious and confusing signs.450 Although the Tibetan 
words written on these signs are virtually incomprehensible to literate Tibetans, because the 
majority of the Tibetans living in Gyalthang have not received any formal training in literary 
Tibetan and local Han, Naxi, Bai, and Yi residents tend to be literate only in Chinese, these 
Tibetan-language signs have not posed much of a problem for local residents. In fact, most of the 
people living in Gyalthang remain completely unaware of the misspellings printed on their 
storefront signs. The signs were not created for the benefit of the local people, but purely to 
enhance the “Tibetan” look of the town and to attract the attention of the tourists.451 
The malleability of Tibetan identity was on display in the main square of Shangri-la Old 
Town one evening in July 2007: 
A large group of people had gathered together and were expectantly gazing at the make-
shift stage that had been set up on the second-floor balcony of a building facing the 
square. The large red and gold banner that hung above the balcony announced that Tashi 
Dundrup (Zhaxi Dunzhu 扎西顿珠), a Tibetan pop singer, would be performing tonight 
on stage. Just a few months earlier he had participated in the nationally televised male 
talent show, known as “Good Boys” (Hao nan’er 好男儿), and had come in sixth place—
the most prestigious finish that any Tibetan had achieved in the short history of the 
show.452 Although he was born to Tibetan parents in Shangri-la County, from an early 
age he lived with his grandmother and attended elementary school in Kunming. As a 
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young adult he moved to Shanghai and received formal music training at the Shanghai 
Music Institute. As a result, despite speaking only a few words of the Gyalthang Tibetan 
language, he was considered a local hero and his performance in the Old Town square 
was heralded as a major event of the year. As Tashi Dundrup finished his performance 
for the evening, one young Tibetan woman turned to me with a look of adoration on her 
face and claimed: “Just as Shangri-la is an international trademark [guoji pinpai 国际品
牌] that represents the land of Tibet, so too has Tashi Dundrup become an international 
trademark representing us Tibetans. I am overjoyed that Tashi Dundrup has returned 
home to perform for us this evening.”453 
 
This young Tibetan woman viewed Tashi Dundrup’s fame as a symbolic step indicating that the 
Tibetan people had made it, at long last, in the Han world of popular music. She expressed her 
pride not only in her hometown’s “international trademark,” but also in the trademark of Tibetan 
ethnicity that Tashi Dundrup had come to represent.  
Addressing the audience in standard Mandarin, Tashi Dundrup encouraged the young 
Tibetans in the crowd to take a more active interest in Tibetan music and support Tibetan pop 
singers that are struggling to make it in the domestic Chinese music scene. He urged his fans to 
resist becoming fully acculturated into Han Chinese society and advised them to learn to speak, 
read, and write Tibetan. Upon finishing this impassioned speech, Tashi Dundrup broke into his 
most popular song, which had won him great acclaim on national television, and which he sung 
entirely in putonghua. Tashi Dundrup admitted on the stage that evening that, having left 
Gyalthang at a very young age to attend schools in Kunming and Shanghai, he was unable to 
speak more than a few words of what he termed his “mother tongue.”   
The young woman, who expressed such strong support for Tashi Dundrup, represents 
what some Tibetans have derisively termed the “acculturated” population of young Gyalthangpa, 
who have been raised linguistically, socially, religiously, and politically in a Han world. The fact 
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that Tashi Dundrup’s well-marketed Tibetan identity may actually be carefully staged—not 
unlike the myth of Shangrila—did not seem to bother her. The local government’s promotion of 
ethnic tourism set the stage for this woman and others like her to express their ethnic pride in 
ways that would have been far more risky in previous domestic political climates.454  
Moreover, as this area has economically prospered, Tibetan monks, businesspeople, and 
tour guides living in India or in other Tibetan areas within the PRC have moved to Shangri-la to 
try their hand at a new way of life. The types of exchanges that have taken place between these 
Tibetan ‘outsiders’ and local Tibetan residents have also contributed to an awareness of a 
growing pan-Tibetan identity.455 Thus, although Shangri-la originally was envisioned as a way to 
increase local government revenues by playing off of the exotic appeal of a rural utopia, the 
effects that this project have had on local identity have not been entirely under the control of the 
state.  
 
Discomforting Memories of Past Suffering 
Despite the fact that many young and middle-aged Tibetans have embraced Shangri-la’s 
tourism boom, a number of elderly Gyalthangpa have begun to privately voice their discontent 
with the rampant commercialism in town. They have also quietly asserted the importance of 
recounting Gyalthang’s troubled past. Public commemorations of the tragedies of the Cultural 
Revolution are still prohibited, but many elderly Tibetans have begun to voice their unease about 
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was because China’s national team did not have any Tibetan players. Hillman, “Paradise under Construction,” 187. 
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the disconnect that exists between the Chinese state’s official narrative and their own private 
memories of past events. Some of this unease can be seen in the forms of memory practice found 
today in accounts of the Cultural Revolution given in private interviews. These often focus on 
collective tragedies that are still remembered within the Tibetan community, presumably handed 
down by word of mouth. One such collective tragedy occurred during the “Cleanse the Class 
Ranks” campaign in September 1968, when the slogan “struggle, criticize, and reform” was 
widely promulgated and tens of thousands of people in Gyalthang were accused of wrong-doing. 
Hundreds of people died what later came to be termed “unnatural deaths” (fei zhengchang 
siwang 非正常死亡).456  
A number of elderly cadres and loyal Communist Party members hanged themselves or 
swallowed pesticide in order to finally put an end to what must have seemed to them to be the 
certainty of endless psychological and physical torture. During an interview in his home in 
Nyishar Township, a Tibetan potter recalled a tragic story involving one high-ranking cadre in 
Gyalthang. This cadre, who had been subjected to multiple struggle sessions in the winter of 
1967 and was likely under enormous psychological pressure, asked his father and son to join him 
in walking for two days to the banks of the Yangtze River.457 Upon reaching the river, these men, 
who represented three different generations within one family, committed suicide together by 
jumping into the raging waters. It is said that they called out “Long live the Communist Party!” 
as they fell.458 The grandfather, grandmother, father, mother, and three children of another 
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456 Le’an Wangdui, Dangdai Yunnan zangzu jianshi, 94. 
 
457 In the northwestern part of Yunnan Province, local people refer to the Yangtze River in Chinese as the Jinsha 
jiang 金沙江 (Golden Sand River). 
 
458 Interview with resident of Tangtö Village (Tangdui cun 汤堆村) in Nyshar Township on April 26, 2013. 
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Tibetan family living in Nyishar used a thick rope to tie themselves together at the waist. They 
then jumped into the Naizi River, a small river that flows through Gyalthang not far from 
Sumtsenling Monastery, preferring to drown rather than live among people who had destroyed 
their own local monastery.459 
Not all Tibetans participated in violent or destructive acts during the Cultural Revolution. 
Although there was little or nothing that residents could do to stop the destruction of 
Sumtsenling at the time, a small number of monks and nuns resisted the order to smash its walls 
and burn the thangkas housed there. Perhaps the most famous of these resisters was Tsering, a 
monk from Nyishar who is now viewed as a hero by a number of monks currently residing in the 
Dokhar khangtsen at Sumtsenling. In September 1966, upon hearing that nearby villagers and 
monks had been ordered to destroy the monastery, Tsering fled into the forests on the outskirts of 
town in order to avoid having to participate in the destruction. By late autumn the nights were 
getting very cold and his food supplies were running low, so he returned to his house in Nyishar 
to visit his family and restock his supplies. The evening after he arrived back in his village, 
Tsering’s young nephew stabbed him to death with a knife to prove his own revolutionary 
consciousness. The nephew then declared that he had “drawn a clear line” (hua yitiao xian 划一
条线) between himself and his “reactionary” uncle.460 
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459 Interview conducted with Dawa Phuntsok on July 24, 2014 in Sumtsenling Monastery in Gyalthang. The Nazi 
River (Naizi he 奶子河) is often referred to in English as the “Milk River.” Tibetans in Gyalthang either use Chinese 
or Gyalthang Tibetan to refer to local place names. Gyalthang Tibetan is unintelligible to speakers of Tibetan from 
Lhasa. Moreover, most Gyalthangpa are unable to read, write, or speak standard (Lhasa) Tibetan, making 
transcribing local Gyalthang names for particular villages, rivers, mountains, or grasslands into standard Tibetan 
very difficult. For more on the particular challenges involved in transcribing place names from Gyalthang Tibetan 
into standard Tibetan, see Bartee, “A Grammar of Dongwang Tibetan,” 93; Krisadawan Hongladarom, “rGyalthang 
Tibetan of Yunnan: A Preliminary Report,” Linguistics of the Tibeto-Burman Area 19 (2) 1996: 69-92. 
 
460 Interview conducted with monks at Dokhar khangtsen in Sumtsenling Monastery in Gyalthang on July 24, 2014. 
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In some cases, it was clear from interviews that individuals retained memories of painful 
events, but it seemed that these had rarely, if ever, been told to others, much less written down. 
Nyima Chodon, a fifty-four year-old English teacher with a multi-ethnic background (Tibetan, 
Naxi, and Bai), recalled how rarely he saw his parents after his father, a Communist Party 
member in Gyalthang, was demoted during the Four Cleanups campaign. Because his 
grandparents owned a small amount of farmland along the banks of the Yangtze River, his father 
had been labeled a “small-scale landlord” in 1964 and forced to work on a collective farm in a 
village outside of town. During the Cultural Revolution, the villagers on this farm turned against 
all of the “sent-down” cadres who had recently arrived, and Nyima Chodon’s father was 
denounced and struggled against. He committed suicide by hanging himself from a tall tree in the 
forest on the outskirts of the village. His widow was not permitted to retrieve his body, but was 
forced to publically denounce her husband and move back to town with her son.  
Nyima Chodon explained how frightening it was for him, as a six-year-old child, when he 
was left alone at home for five days in the middle of winter while his mother secretly returned on 
foot to where his father had hanged himself. Stumbling around at night under the cover of 
darkness, she managed to dig a shallow grave in the hard, snow-covered ground and bury her 
husband’s body there. While his mother was away in the forest, Nyima Chodon joined other 
elementary school students in attending “Little Red Guard” (xiao weibing 小卫兵) meetings in 
Gyalthang’s town square, reciting slogans from Mao’s little red book, and practicing the “loyalty 
dance” (zhongzi wu 忠字舞) to demonstrate his allegiance to the Communist Party.461 
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461 The “loyalty dance” was viewed as a means to inculcate young Chinese children with patriotic values and loyalty 
to Chairman Mao. Children performed it across the country during the first few years of the Cultural Revolution. 
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Victim narratives like the ones recounted above are prevalent within the individual oral 
histories of those who lived through the events. While it is certainly true that thousands of 
Gyalthang residents were victimized by the Cultural Revolution, the hegemonic trope of 
victimhood leaves little space for participants to recall other forms of activity that took place 
during the Cultural Revolution. Tibetans living in Gyalthang responded to the Cultural 
Revolution in a number of ways—some resisted and often paid with their lives, but many others 
participated in the violence for a variety of political, social, ideological, and personal reasons. 
This range of responses, from suicide and exile to looting and murder, sheds light on the difficult 
decisions Tibetans made under particularly complex and coercive conditions. Yet the diversity of 
these experiences is not conveyed in most oral narratives. 
While many Gyalthang residents vividly recalled observing the fervent demolition of 
Sumtsenling Monastery in September 1966, very few people admitted that they had personally 
been involved in the destruction. In one interview, an elderly Tibetan villager from Nyishar 
Township recounted how he walked with his friends and neighbors to Ganden Sumtsenling 
Monastery on the morning of September 9, 1966, in order to satisfy his curiosity about the newly 
announced “Destroy the Four Olds” campaign. He watched as his friends, neighbors, and fellow 
villagers burned thangkas and smashed Buddhist statues in the monastery’s courtyard. He 
insisted, however, that he did not personally participate in the destruction.462 In the months 
following this interview, I spoke with other Gyalthang residents who vividly recalled observing 
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While rehearsing this dance, children moved in a prescribed manner across the floor to trace over the Chinese 
character zhong 忠, meaning “loyalty.” Interview with Nyima Chodon in Gyalthang on July 24, 2011. 
 
462 Interview with elderly Tibetan villager in his home in Nyishar Township on April 25, 2013. 
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thousands of other people demolish the walls and roof of the monastery, yet only one interviewee 
admitted that he had done more than just passively watch. 
 The documentary filmmaker Xu Xing 徐星 reported similar findings after interviewing 
hundreds of people who participated in the Cultural Revolution. Xu explained that one of the 
most disappointing aspects of making his 2007 film, “A Chronicle of My Cultural Revolution” 
(Wo de Wenge Biannianshi 我的文革编年史), was that although he interviewed hundreds of 
people who insisted that that they were eye-witnesses to horrible acts of violence and destruction 
during the Cultural Revolution, not one person was willing to admit that he/she had personally 
taken part in the violence.463 
How did the Chinese state win the complicity of Tibetans in carrying out violent political 
campaigns? When one elderly Tibetan man recounted to the journalist Patrick French that he 
joined other Red Guards in desecrating the Jokhang Temple in Lhasa in 1966, he used the 
following metaphor: “it was the Chinese who killed the sheep, but we were the ones who skinned 
and gutted it.”464 Yet, such a frank acknowledgement of participation in the Cultural Revolution 
and culpability for the destruction that occurred is relatively rare. Many Tibetans are unwilling or 
feel unable to discuss their involvement in the Cultural Revolution, since such acts raise 
contentious questions not only about the past, but also about the present. Although government 
officials in Gyalthang never explicitly stated this during our conversations, it seems plausible 
that local officials do not want Gyalthang residents to openly deal with their town’s thorny past 
because the present continues to resemble the past in too many ways. Religious repression, 
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464 Patrick French, Tibet, Tibet: Dreams and Memories of a Lost Land (London: Harper Collins, 2003), 200. 
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economic and political coercion, and local/state collaboration are still very real issues in 
Gyalthang today. The Chinese state has tried to sideline attempts among Han Chinese citizens to 
start public discussions about agency, responsibility, coercion, and collusion during the Cultural 
Revolution, which has made it doubly challenging for Tibetans to initiate analogous discussions 
in their own communities.465 The government may very well fear that allowing Tibetans to 
openly air their grievances about past political campaigns could lead to expressions of discontent 
with the current state of affairs. For Tibetans living in Gyalthang, therefore, the unspeakable past 
continues to be fraught with both political and emotional danger.466  
Whilst the traumas of the period are rarely spoken of, they are certainly not forgotten, 
especially as the perpetrators and their families are often still living within the same 
communities. Lest they open old wounds and threaten the existing order of social relations, 
recollections of ideological enthusiasm and personal participation in brutal political campaigns 
continue to be repressed in casual conversations amongst friends and neighbors in Gyalthang. 
The unspeakable among the Gyalthangpa is not just the product of state repression, it is also a 
marker of locals’ struggles with the nature of their own and other Tibetans’ agency in (and 
responsibility for) the unprecedented shape and scope of state violence during the Mao era. This 
unease is certainly not unique to Tibetans in Gyalthang; similar sentiments have been observed 
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465 In 1986 the Chinese author Ba Jin proposed the building of a state-funded Cultural Revolution museum to 
educate young people about the atrocities that occurred during the Mao era. See Ba Jin, “A Museum of the Cultural 
Revolution,” June 15, 1986, accessed January 5, 2011: http://www.cnd.org/CR/english/articles/bajin.htm. However, 
to this day, only a few private museums commemorating the Cultural Revolution have been built, such as the 
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466 For a similar account of the challenges an anthropologist faced while interviewing Tibetan elders in Gansu 
Province about their experiences in the early Mao period, see Makley, “The Politics of Memory,” 115-116. 
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by scholars working in other close-knit communities in China that were also deeply shaken by 
the trauma of Mao-era campaigns.467 
During the course of my oral history research, elderly Gyalthangpa spoke to me about 
their reluctance to recall their experiences during the Cultural Revolution, particularly when 
speaking with younger members of their household. Many of these elders lamented that young 
Gyalthangpa are not interested in or seem unable to comprehend such a complex and rather 
unflattering narrative of their home town’s recent past, perhaps because they are not being 
educated about Mao-era history in school.468 These elders complain that young people are only 
interested in landing decent-paying jobs, purchasing material goods, and socializing with their 
friends. They claim that Tibetan teenagers have very little interest in listening to their parents and 
grandparents recount the atrocities of the Cultural Revolution. There is a general sense among 
elders in this Tibetan community that the politically safer and psychologically less painful option 
is to remain silent and to let traumatic memories of the past be covered up by the day-to-day 
concerns of the present. While some elder Gyalthangpa said that they felt some responsibility to 
pass lessons that they learned from the Cultural Revolution down to the next generation, they 
also admitted that they had not yet made any concerted effort to do so. Many felt that the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
467 In his ethnography on the politics of memory in Dachuan Village in Gansu Province, Jun Jing explores how 
tragic memories of the Cultural Revolution could not be completely acknowledged at the local level, since many 
victims and perpetrators of Cultural Revolution-era violence continued to live as neighbors in the post-Mao period. 
Jing, Temple of Memories. 
 
468 Chen Xiaojing, the former governor of Shanghai (1964-1967) who recently wrote a carefully hedged account of 
his experiences as a Communist Party leader during the Cultural Revolution, explains that while many young people 
in China today know that their country was engulfed in a period of turmoil in the 1960s, very few have any real 
sense of the extreme nature of this revolution. He maintains that because the Cultural Revolution is no longer 
discussed in homes or classrooms, events that were once “earth shattering have now turned into words with vague 
and sketchy meanings.” See Chen Pixian [pseudonym], Chen Pixian huiyilu: zai “yi yue feng bao” de zhongxin 陈
丕显回忆录: 在"一月风暴"的中心 [Chen Pixian’s Memoir: In the Midst of the January Storm] (Shanghai: 
Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 2005). 
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emotional hurdles were too high and the political risks too great for them to justify spending 
much effort trying to educate the younger generations about the past.  
 
Resisting Historical Erasure 
Despite the fact that traumatic stories of the Cultural Revolution were rarely shared 
amongst family members and neighbours in the reform era, a new social practice began to 
emerge in the 1980s and 1990s. This involved the ritual of returning material objects to their 
original location. It served, in some ways, as a form of rewriting the past. 469 Tibetan villagers 
slowly started returning the wooden beams, carvings, statues, furniture, silver coins, and copper 
utensils that they had stolen from Ganden Sumtsenling Monastery during the Cultural Revolution, 
apparently out of the belief that holding onto these items would lead to bad karmic 
consequences.470 It was common knowledge that households that had not returned pilfered items 
after the end of the Cultural Revolution had been afflicted with illness or other tragedies.471  
One older Tibetan cadre in the Zhongdian County government confessed that for many 
years he owned a large segment of a wooden pillar that had been taken from Sumtsenling in 
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469 In her ethnography on tourism and development in Shangri-la, Åshild Kolås reports that a Tibetan woman who 
witnessed the destruction of Sumtsenling Monastery in 1966 confessed in an interview that, in the reform era, locals 
had started feeling increasingly uneasy about possessing religious objects that had been stolen during the Cultural 
Revolution. Kolås, Tourism and Tibetan Culture in Transition, 44. 
 
470 According to the Diqing Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Gazetteer of Religion, the prefectural government also 
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Gyalthang monasteries and temples between 1983 and 1993. For more on the Diqing Prefectural Committee’s 1983 
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September 1966. His family used this chunk of wood as a table, positioning it near their wood 
stove in order to place dishes on it while preparing meals. One cold November evening in 1988 it 
caught fire. The fire spread quickly and nearly destroyed their entire house. Early the next 
morning, believing that the house fire had been caused by their involvement in the desecration of 
Sumtsenling twenty years earlier, his family followed the example of other Tibetan residents in 
town and secretly returned this stolen wooden pillar back to the monastery under the cover of 
darkness, even though it was charred and entirely useless to the young monks then in 
residence.472  
Some of the wooden window screens, statues, and furniture that had been taken from 
Sumtsenling in 1966 remained in people’s homes until a devastating fire burned down nearly 
two-thirds of the buildings in Gyalthang’s old town on January 11, 2014.473 One Gyalthangpa 
asserted that it was inevitable that a fire of this scale would take place, as it served to cleanse the 
town of all the wooden carvings and furniture that had been stolen from the monastery in 
1966.474 Other residents insisted that what had been “cleansed” during this fire was not the 
town’s karmic debt to Sumtsenling Monastery, but rather its last two decades of rampant 
commercialization.475 Most of the buildings that burned in this fire were Tibetan and Naxi 
houses that had been leased to business owners and then converted into bars, stores, and 
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472 Interview with former Tibetan cadre in the Zhongdian County government, June 9, 2013. 
 
473 Chris Buckley, “Fire Ravages China District Said to Inspire Shangri-la,” New York Times, January 11, 2014, 
accessed January 20, 2015: http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/12/world/asia/fire-destroys-hundreds-of-homes-in-
ancient-tibetan-town.html?_r=0. 
 
474 Interview with elderly Gyalthang resident, August 2, 2014. 
 
475 Interview with a business owner whose guesthouse burned in the fire. Interview conducted while standing on a 
rubble pile marking the former entrance to his guesthouse, Gyalthang, June 10, 2014. 
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guesthouses catering to tourists. A few months after the fire, the Shangri-la County government 
drew up a three-year plan to carefully reconstruct the “old” town of Gyalthang, complete with 
cobblestoned streets lined with cafes, shops, and discos. New plumbing, electrical wiring, and 
broadband cables have now been installed underneath the town’s meandering streets and 
building supplies have been trucked in to construct high-end hotels and restaurants.476  
It is not in the economic interest of local government officials or of local residents who 
hope to benefit from the tourism industry to dwell on the fact that thousands of local residents 
destroyed Tibetan religious and cultural artifacts, struggled against respected elders, and 
demolished nearly all Tibetan temples in the region during the Cultural Revolution. To a certain 
extent, therefore, the silencing of historical memory is the product of local, state, and corporate 
collaboration. Responsibility for the trauma caused by the Cultural Revolution remains complex: 
the perpetrators of violence were arguably also victims of the coercive environment of the time. 
Many residents have therefore chosen to remain silent about their participation in the Cultural 
Revolution, and sustained religious and political repression in the reform era has made it difficult 
for elderly Tibetans to collectively come to terms with their involvement in past atrocities. 
Nearly four decades after the end of the Cultural Revolution, politically, economically, and 
emotionally driven historical amnesia continues to live on in Gyalthang. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Scholarship written in the post-Mao era that focuses on Communist campaigns in Tibetan 
areas has frequently employed ethnicity as a mode of historical analysis.477 Yet, as this case 
study of Gyalthang demonstrates, conflicts in some Tibetan areas in the 1950s and 1960s were 
not necessarily viewed and articulated by local residents as ethnic conflicts in quite the same way 
that they are today. Viewing Communist political campaigns in Tibetan areas through 
predominately ethnic lenses, without also taking into account the similarities between campaigns 
in Tibetan, Han, and other areas, may result in ahistorical understandings of how local notions of 
identity transformed during the Mao and post-Mao eras. Melvyn Goldstein maintains that during 
the Cultural Revolution,  
Tibetans were forced to abandon deeply held values and customs. Although this policy 
was implemented all over China, because Tibetans’ national and cultural identity was so 
closely associated with Buddhism, the attacks on these struck squarely at Tibetans’ core 
ethnic identity in a way that the destruction of Chinese Buddhism or Christianity did not 
do for Han Chinese.478  
 
The collectivization of monastic land during land reform, coupled with the physical destruction 
of Tibetan monasteries and temples prior to or during the Cultural Revolution, profoundly 
influenced the religio-cultural identities of Tibetans who grew up during the Mao era. However, 
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studies of other communities in China, where Han Chinese residents similarly participated in 
destroying their own religious institutions and targeting their own community leaders, indicate 
that the fabric of these communities was also torn apart by the trauma of these campaigns.479 
During the reform era, many Han Chinese communities also began to restore their Buddhist 
monasteries, Confucian and Daoist temples, and Catholic churches, and revive or rearticulate 
very local religious practices.480 It seems logical, then, to question how—or even if—the 
experiences of Gyalthang residents were all that different from those of rural residents living 
anywhere else in China during the socialist and post-socialist periods.  
 Pursuing this question by reframing this study as a comparative one (between Gyalthang 
and other communities in China) might reveal new patterns or insights about the Cultural 
Revolution in Han and non-Han areas. However, this approach also has its methodological 
limits. Recent scholarship on the Cultural Revolution has begun to paint an even more detailed 
and nuanced picture of the extent to which people’s experiences of the Cultural Revolution 
differed widely. Students at particular middle schools, residents of different cities, farmers in 
different parts of the country, and workers of diverse class backgrounds experienced the Cultural 
Revolution in distinct ways.481 Class status, gender, age, location, ethnicity, occupation, 
friendship group, personality, kinship relationships, educational background, and ideological 
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orientation all greatly influenced how people were affected by—and became involved with—
Mao era campaigns. Therefore, it seems rather unproductive to generalize about the ways that 
Gyalthang residents experienced the Cultural Revolution and to compare these experiences with 
those of Han Chinese living elsewhere in China.482 I have taken a different approach in this 
study, which is to examine how ethnicity along with other factors played a role in shaping the 
experiences of Gyalthang residents during the Mao era.483  
The current amount of local interest in ethnic identity and ethnic difference in Gyalthang 
seems to be a relatively new phenomenon. The attention paid to ethnicity in the reform era has 
been shaped by 1) the Chinese state’s initial loosening of certain restrictions on religious and 
cultural practices in the reform era, 2) the Yunnan Provincial government’s focus on ethnic 
tourism as a development strategy in the twenty-first century, and 3) the emergence of a new 
form of pan-Tibetan identity and sentiment in the aftermath of the 2008 protests.484 However, 
although it seems as though ethnic identity was not emphasized or articulated in quite the same 
way in Gyalthang in the 1950s and 1960s as it is today, a strong sense of local identity still 
existed. The construction and negotiation of ethno-political identity in Gyalthang was as much 
informed by inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic relationships and perceptions as it was by local 
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residents’ relationships with the Chinese state. In other words, the tensions, concerns, conflicts, 
and everyday grievances at the forefront of the minds of Gyalthang Tibetans were as much 
shaped by their relationships with other local ethnic groups (such as the Naxi, Yi, Bai, and Hui) 
and non-local Tibetans as they were by their relationships with the Han Chinese or state.485 In 
Gyalthang, as in much of the rest of China, local understandings of ethnic identity, authority, and 
the state cannot really be separated from very local conceptions of place, family, religion, and 
power.  
 Gyalthang is an area that represents, in many ways, the interface of the Tibetan world 
with many other ethnically, linguistically, and culturally diverse worlds in southwest China. This 
part of the Tibetan plateau is truly multi-ethnic, linguistically complicated, and anything but 
culturally homogenous. Historically the Naxi controlled large regions of Northwest Yunnan and 
throughout the twentieth century, the southernmost regions of Gyalthang were predominately 
populated by Naxi residents. Naxi merchants, dongba ritual practitioners, and landowners played 
important roles in Gyalthang society in the twentieth century and many Naxi business people and 
cadres remain in positions of authority in Gyalthang today. During the late 1940s, the 
underground Communist Party gained support among young Naxi residents of Lijiang, and some 
of these educated Naxi youth introduced Tibetan and Bai merchants in Lijiang to Communist 
ideology.486 It seems probable, therefore, that early Communist activists in Gyalthang, many of 
whom were Tibetan, Naxi, and Bai, were not met with the same degree of mistrust as they might 
have been in other areas of the Tibetan plateau.  
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Furthermore, as the first two chapters of this study illustrate, given the geographic 
location of Gyalthang—and the local elite’s complicated relationships with representatives of the 
Qing and Republican governments—the Gyalthang elite did not necessarily initially view 
Chinese Communist leaders’ efforts to gain control over Gyalthang with a great deal suspician. 
Unlike in certain other parts of the Tibetan plateau, the need to alternatively negotiate with or 
creatively resist Chinese governments’ encroachments into Gyalthang territory was not a foreign 
one for Gyalthang religious and secular leaders. In Central Tibet, Amdo, and possibly other parts 
of Kham, where Communist campaigns were often imposed by Han cadres who could not 
communicate with local Tibetan residents, ethnic differences and notions of a Tibetan “us” 
versus a Chinese Communist “them” may have been more stark.487 As a result, due to 
Gyalthang’s ethnic and cultural heterogeneity and its location along the Sino-Tibetan frontier, 
local support for particular Mao-era campaigns may have been more extensive in Gyalthang than 
in other Tibetan areas. However, fragmented evidence from other Tibetan regions also suggests 
that Tibetan participation in the Cultural Revolution may have been far more widespread than 
many scholars originally assumed.488  
The abrupt ideological U-turn and that took place on a national level in the aftermath of 
the Cultural Revolution was augmented at the local level by religious and secular leaders’ efforts 
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487 For an examination of how one Amdo Tibetan community experienced the early years of collectivization, see 
Benno Weiner, The Chinese Revolution on the Tibetan Frontier: State Building, National Integration and Socialist 
Transformation, Zeku (Tsékhok) County, 1953-1958 (Ph.D. dissertation: Columbia University, 2012). Melvyn 
Goldstein presents a different perspective on Tibetan nomads’ experiences in Western Tibet. See Melvyn Goldstein, 
“Change, Conflict and Continuity among a Community of Nomadic Pastoralists: A Case Study from Western Tibet, 
1950-1990,” in Robert Barnett, ed., Resistance and Reform in Tibet (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), 
76-111. 
 
488 Jan Wong, “Tibet: Life at the Top of the World,” The Globe and Mail (Toronto) December 10, 1994; Shakya, 
The Dragon in the Land of Snows, 320-323; Goldstein, et. al., The Struggle for Modern Tibet. 
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to condemn the violence and destruction of the Mao-era. By the early 1980s, the Red Guard 
movement had been officially denounced—and, for the most part, publically accepted—as a 
source of social chaos. Fear of social instability explains why the occasional memoir penned by a 
former Red Guard that offers a less condemnatory account of the Cultural Revolution has not 
been well received by the Chinese government.489 In many areas of the country, including 
Gyalthang, it seems to have been generally accepted that the only acceptable way to view the 
Cultural Revolution was to regard it as a grave mistake.490 In the early 1980s county 
governments and local residents in many parts of China publically condemned the recent 
destruction of their own local religious and cultural institutions, but very few people publically 
proclaimed their own responsibility for these past mistakes. It was much more common that 
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489 These memoirs often do not emphasize the bitterness of the so-called “ten years of turmoil” (shinian dongluan 十
年动乱), and occasionally go so far as to valorize the Red Guards’ actions during the Cultural Revolution. The 
identity of the Red Guards—as opposed to the sent-down youth, even though these two groups overlapped greatly—
has gained negative connotations in the political discourse of contemporary China. In contrast to the images of 
social unrest and adolescent violence that the term “Red Guards” evokes, the hardship that the sent-down youth 
experienced in the countryside during the Cultural Revolution gives the rustification experience a tint of glory. See 
Peter Zarrow, “Meanings of China’s Cultural Revolution: Memoirs of Exile,” Positions 7: 1 (1999): 184; Mobo 
Gao, The Battle for China’s Past: Mao and the Cultural Revolution (London: Pluto, 2008); Guobin Yang, “China’s 
Zhiqing Generation: Nostalgia, Identity, and Cultural Revolution in the 1990s,” Modern China 29 (3) 2003: 289. 
 
490 An incident that took place in 1985 in Xianyang, Shaanxi Province highlights the post-Mao government’s 
attempts to suppress public awareness of some of the more positive aspects of the Cultural Revolution. In 1985 a 
poster was put up on a wall on Northwest Cotton Factory Number One that proclaimed “Wenhua da geming hao 文
化大革命好” (The Cultural Revolution Was Good). The authors of this poster listed what they considered to be the 
merits of the Cultural Revolution, such as the fact that hybrid rice crops were invented, people became politically 
energized, and large-scale infrastructure projects such as the Nanjing Bridge were built. The poster alarmed local 
and national Communist Party officials and an investigative team from Beijing was dispatched to Xianyang to 
research the incident. A young worker was quickly found guilty and sentenced to ten years in jail. See Wu Zhenrong 
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Differences and Similarities between Dissidents and Democrats],” Da cankao 大参考 [Big News], April 3, 2004, 
accessed March 4, 2010: http://www.bignews.org/20040403.txt. 
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people who had formerly taken pride in being revolutionary activists, now took measures to 
cover up their past activities.491  
As I argue in Chapter Three, the written sources and oral narratives that I have been able 
to access indicate that Tibetan participation in the Cultural Revolution in Gyalthang was 
widespread. The extent of Tibetan participation raises a number a number of questions about 
agency, choice, resistance, responsibility, and lament in Gyalthang. To what extent did coercion 
play a role in Tibetan complicity in the dismantling of Sumtsenling Monastery, as well as in the 
other actions that villagers took during the Cultural Revolution? During interviews that I 
conducted in 2012 and 2013, some Gyalthang residents described the Cultural Revolution as a 
campaign that had been imposed by the Han Chinese, but others recounted viewing the “Destroy 
the Four Olds” campaign as yet another in an ongoing series of national political campaigns in 
which they had taken part since the mid-1950s. How appropriate or theoretically useful is the 
concept of “collaboration” when it comes to explaining why some religious and secular leaders 
joined forces with representatives of the Chinese Communist state in the 1950s in response to 
mounting social and political pressures? Can and should the collaboration/resistance paradigm be 
applied to the choices, adjustments, and compromises that Tibetans made under Chinese 
Communist rule? 492 Why hasn’t this paradigm been applied to Han villagers in other parts of 
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491 One anthropologist recounted conversations he had in 2012 with a number of middle-aged Uighurs who had 
relocated from Kashgar to Aksu in the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution. These men and women claimed that 
they had joined the entirely Uighur Red Guard movement in Kashgar and had attempted to destroy the Id Kah 
Mosque during the Cultural Revolution. In the early 1980s their families were forced to leave Kashgar and move to 
Aksu in order to find them suitable Uighur marriage partners, since many Uighur families in Kashgar refused to let 
their sons and daughters marry former Red Guards. Personal communication with Rune Steenberg Reyhe at the 
Association for Asian Studies Conference in Seattle on April 2, 2016. 
 
492 Robbie Barnett argues that certain members of the Tibetan exile community and some of their sympathizers in 
the West have unfairly—and, according to him, inaccurately—applied what he terms the “collaborator-martyr” 
model to Tibetan leaders who have worked with representatives of the Chinese Communist Party. See Barnett, 
“Beyond the Collaborator-Martyr Model.” 
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China who similarly had to make difficult choices under coercive conditions during the Mao 
era?493 How might we begin to answer these thorny questions? 
 Attempting to navigate a binary between resistance and collaboration may not be the 
most fruitful way forward when it comes to exploring what actually occurred in Gyalthang 
during the 1950s and 1960s. As Timothy Brook points out in his scholarship on Chinese wartime 
collaboration under Japanese occupation in the 1930s, the terms collaboration and resistance are 
too stark when it comes to understanding how people handle daily decision making in a 
particularly complex and coercive environment.494 Collaboration often takes place when 
individual people are pressured into dealing with each other and they end up making 
compromises in order to go on with their lives.  
When underground Communist Party agents first started negotiating with the Tibetan 
elite in Gyalthang in the late 1940s, it is unlikely that many Tibetans suspected that these 
negotiations would turn into a very lengthy Chinese occupation of eastern Tibet. After all, 
Gyalthang residents had become accustomed to being ruled by whichever warlord, village head, 
tusi, or Republican government representative held power in the area at any given time. The day-
to-day struggles that villagers faced were roughly the same regardless of who held the reins of 
power, so people often got on with their lives, even when doing so meant adjusting to the 
demands of external powers. This made the fact that they were being governed by their Tibetan 
village heads who reported to the Chinese Communists as plausible as the fact that they used to 
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493 Apart from historians of Taiwan or of the Chinese civil war (1937-1949), very few historians have used the term 
“occupation” to describe how the Chinese Communist Party gained control over Han Chinese rural areas in the 
1940s and 1950s. 
 
494 Timothy Brook, Collaboration: Japanese Agents and Local Elites in Wartime China (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2005), 26-30. 
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be governed by the same elite group of Tibetan leaders who reported back to the Nationalists, 
and prior to that, the Qing. Gyalthang’s Tibetan leaders could not have foreseen in the late 1940s 
how complicated things would quickly become in the decades ahead. 
In the first few years of the Chinese Communist Party’s administration in Gyalthang, 
local Tibetan, Naxi, Bai, and Han leaders were co-opted into the government and offered high 
administrative posts. Apart from cultivating the elite to take part in the new Communist 
government, the Communist Party also worked hard to cultivate a sense of revolutionary 
consciousness among ordinary Tibetan residents of Gyalthang. Patient “thought work” was a 
crucial component of the Communists efforts to create a sense of the voluntary and natural 
participation of the people in the revolution, land reform, and in the lead up to the Cultural 
Revolution.495 In Tibetan areas, this process of “socialist education” (shehui zhuyi jiaoyu 社会主
义教育), which was grounded in a narrative plot of socialist advance, began with obligatory 
meetings in which locals were asked to recall past hardships through “speak bitterness” 
meetings.496 At compulsory group meetings, Tibetans were required to produce and listen to 
testimonials ascertaining their consciousness of class-based oppression in the so-called “Old 
Society” and their recent “liberation” under communism.  
Many of the Tibetan religious and secular leaders who might have originally voiced 
strong opposition to the Cultural Revolution had either been forced into labor camps during the 
anti-rightist campaign of 1957-1958, or, like Wangchuk Tempa, found that they did not have the 
power to resist new political campaigns after they had been co-opted into the Communist Party’s 
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495 Jonathan Unger, “Introduction,” In Jonathan Unger, ed., Using the Past to Serve the Present: Historiography and 
Politics in Contemporary China (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1993), 1-8. 
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!
202!
governing structure. Certain Tibetan leaders, such as Liu En and Zangbum Dorje, were in the 
unenviable position of justifying and implementing land reform and other campaigns right up 
until they became the targets of brutal struggle sessions during the Cultural Revolution. Does the 
“collaboration/resistance” model make sense in places like Gyalthang where the local authorities, 
policy implementers, and sometimes even policymakers, are themselves Tibetan?  
In “L’état, c’est nous, or We Have Met the Oppressor and He Is Us: The Predicament of 
Minority Cadres in the PRC,” Stevan Harrell explores how China’s basic level cadres (jiceng 
ganbu 基层干部) have been called upon to play a dual role that involves representing the state to 
the community and representing the community to the state. This dual role has placed them in 
the kind of double-bind situation common to people who find themselves in the position of being 
state-community intermediaries. Throughout the history of the People’s Republic of China, the 
ability of basic-level cadres to negotiate state-community relations has been seen as crucial to the 
success of policy implementation. Harrell argues that if state-minority relations, or state-
community relations in minority areas, were simply Han-minority relations, there would be very 
little to write about—it would be a situation of clear and direct colonial rule. However, as he 
points out, the Chinese state, although it is Han Chinese in its policy-making leadership and in its 
intellectual and policy directions, is not entirely Han in its personnel. An important part of the 
minority policy and state administration in minority areas is to bring minority people into the 
state as cadres at various levels—not only at the brigade or village level, but also as salaried 
government cadres at the township, county, prefectural, and provincial levels of the 
administration. Indeed, one of the most strategic moves in the Chinese Communist Party’s 
approach to ethnic minority policies has been the inclusion of ethnic subjects in the research and 
management process itself.  
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Given the extent to which community relationships, local religious authority, and the 
Chinese state were interconnected in Gyalthang by the late 1950s, to what extent did Tibetans 
have agency, in the wider coercive sense of the word agency, in the 1960s? Studying agency has 
long been a matter of great concern for scholars interested in the varied social histories and 
politics of the Maoist era.497 This concern with Mao-era agency stems from a wider theoretical 
concern with recognizing the importance of peoples long considered marginal to the construction 
and shaping of political policies. The sharp delineation between state and society that occurs in 
many of these studies that attempt to locate and explain agency, often obscures the complicated 
sets of politics that exist in local communities. This effort to locate agency often loses traction 
exactly at the points were state and society begin to blur—that is where the source, intention and 
consequences of agency become unclear.498 Kimberley Manning posits that state language and 
state policies significantly influence how people come to recognize themselves as social and 
political beings. She argues that state discourses generate, certify and validate certain 
subjectivities while invalidating others. The state does not just provide the tools for “peasants” or 
“workers” to exercise their agency, but also the vocabulary and the motivation necessary to 
understand and internalize that agency in the first place. This further complicates questions of 
agency, since the process of becoming a “peasant” or a “worker” transpires, in part, “through the 
state’s normalisation and naturalisation of new social categories.”499  
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Since very little scholarship on the Cultural Revolution in China’s ethnic minority areas 
has been conducted to date, it is hard to determine the degree to which revolutionary fervor was 
geographically widespread in China. It seems likely that a complex and very local mixture of 
coercion, class-based ideology, youthful enthusiasm, and communal or personal resentments led 
to different dynamics and different kinds of participation in the Cultural Revolution in Tibetan 
and other ethnic minority areas. Unfortunately, the nature of the currently available written 
sources limits our ability to come to more definite conclusions about many of these issues. We 
simply do not yet have access to all of the pieces of this very complicated puzzle. 
 Due to these missing pieces, when it comes to determining why events occurred as they 
did during the Cultural Revolution, one is often left with only educated assumptions. A few 
questions about the Cultural Revolution in Gyalthang that remain unanswered in this study 
include: precisely which social forces led Tibetans in Gyalthang to get involved in the Cultural 
Revolution? Who, specifically, held the reins of power in Gyalthang at any given moment in the 
years leading up to and during the Cultural Revolution? Why did those who had a certain amount 
of power act in the ways that they did? During the course of my archival, ethnographic, and oral 
history research in Gyalthang, I often felt that my sources raised more questions than they 
answered. Ironically, this may be their most important contribution to our understanding of the 
Cultural Revolution in Tibetan areas and in China as a whole. 
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